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FOREWORD
To the relief of many residents in the United
States, China’s investment activities in Europe have
been attracting increased scrutiny. Europeans seem
keen to avoid making the mistakes of a decade ago,
when China took advantage of Europe’s economic
weakness in the wake of the eurozone sovereign debt
crisis and the Great Recession. Through state-owned
enterprises, state-affiliated entities, and nominally
private investors and companies, China provided the
funds necessary for capital-hungry European firms
and governments to last through the worst of the
dual-economic crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s.
Given the unfolding recession induced by the
coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, legitimate
concerns exist that China might repeat this part of its
playbook. These concerns apply especially to Chinese
investment in Europe that strengthens Beijing’s control
of militarily relevant infrastructure; its access to
dual-use, defense-related technology; and its political
influence across the continent. Although European
awareness of the risks posed by Chinese investment
has increased substantially over the last few years,
gaps in the defenses remain.
This study—written in support of United States
European Command and the United States Department
of Homeland Security—identifies the latest Chinese
investment practices and trends, the most critical
sectors and countries at risk, and the gaps in European
defenses. Additionally, and beyond merely admiring
the problem, the interdisciplinary research and
writing team assembled and led by Dr. John R. Deni
presents an array of policy recommendations for
decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic. The

xiii

Strategic Studies Institute is proud to publish this
important contribution to the understanding of the
unfolding strategic competition playing out between
China and the United States.

DR. CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has
unleashed an immense shock to the global economy.
In Europe, gross domestic product has fallen, and
unemployment has risen. China might take advantage
of the crisis—just as it did in the wake of the
global financial crisis a decade ago. As part of its
broader national security strategy, China might
again use its sovereign wealth fund, governmentaffiliated companies, and nominally private Chinese
firms to provide necessary liquidity in Europe.
In doing so, Beijing could take advantage of
Europe’s economic difficulties to obtain sensitive
technologies, build soft power, and acquire militarily
significant infrastructure.
Admittedly, the situation in 2021 is not a mirror
image of the early to mid-2010s. Pressure on Chinese
foreign reserves and concerns about excessive risk
taking overseas caused authorities in Beijing to
impose limitations on currency outflows, leading to a
downturn in overall Chinese outbound foreign direct
investment over the last several years. And some
data from 2020 indicate concerns over another round
of distressed European asset purchases by China in
the wake of the pandemic-induced recession might
be unfounded.
At the same time, European attitudes toward
China have changed significantly in recent years,
thanks in part to China’s repression of Uyghur
Muslims, its snuffing out of democracy in Hong Kong,
its poor handling of coronavirus disease 2019, and its
aggressive diplomacy in Europe. Having viewed the
EU-China relationship as a “maturing partnership” in
2003, the EU today sees China as a “systemic rival.”
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In the policy realm, the European Commission issued
additional guidelines on safeguarding strategic
European assets and technologies, and several
European states have strengthened their investment
screening laws. To address liquidity needs, the EU
developed a €750 million pandemic recovery proposal
in mid-2020 that holds the prospect of providing grants
and loans to European governments and companies
in distress. So, given the decline in Chinese outbound
foreign direct investment in Europe since 2016 and
Europe’s slow but steady awakening to the threats
posed by Chinese investment, perhaps the West has
little cause for concern today.
A yearlong examination of this subject by an
interdisciplinary team of experts from the US Army
War College, private think tanks, and academia
has revealed, despite the clear differences with the
situation a decade ago, several reasons for serious
concern about predatory Chinese economic statecraft
in Europe today. First, Beijing’s strategy remains
exploiting economic ties with Europe for China’s
national security objectives. Through investment
in Europe as well as an array of complementary
policies—public diplomacy, cyber operations, trade,
cultural exchanges, and media operations—China
aims to expand the economic benefits it derives
from Europe, acquire European technology for both
economic and military purposes, and increase China’s
influence in Europe.
Additionally, the increased European skepticism
toward China has not necessarily been uniform across
the continent. Some Europeans appear less concerned
with Beijing’s influence and have been more open to
Chinese investment, allowing China to leverage the
EU’s open market.
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Thirdly, the regulatory, legal, and policy responses
to Chinese investment across the continent vary
widely in terms of the kinds of investments
screened, the sectors deemed worthy of protecting,
and the design of the screening procedures. Several
EU countries lack foreign direct investment screening
mechanisms altogether, and efforts to strengthen
existing tools remain somewhat flawed, leaving
Europe vulnerable to Chinese economic statecraft
(economic statecraft is the use of economic policy to
achieve national security goals).
Finally, the most recent data indicate Chinese
investment in Europe is rebounding from the
downturn of 2020 and becoming increasingly
sophisticated. In short, the complete story of China’s
role in exploiting the pandemic-induced crisis is far
from over.
Given these risks, the United States and Europe
should aggressively parry Chinese efforts to
acquire control over or access to militarily relevant
infrastructure and sensitive, dual-use technologies
in Europe as well as Beijing’s efforts to strengthen
its influence in capitals across the continent. The
risks to European and, hence, US security are most
acute in the European countries that are leaders in
dual-use technology, home to infrastructure relevant
to US and allied military operations and training,
or likely to play leading or otherwise important
roles vis-à-vis national security in partnership with
Washington. These countries include Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, and the United Kingdom.
To achieve these goals and safeguard American
and allied security vis-à-vis predatory Chinese
investment, US and European policymakers can take
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the following steps, which are explained in greater
detail in the final chapter of the study.
•

Tighten investment screening requirements.

•

Make investment screening retroactive.

•

Apply a national security lens to advanced
technology.

•

Ensure contingency access to infrastructure.

•

Offer liquidity alternatives.

•

Complicate NATO exercises with
infrastructure-related hurdles.

•

Provide alternatives and promote more
domestic innovation.

•

Screen some investments, regardless of
national origin.

•

Leverage NATO.

•

Magnify China’s shortcomings through public
diplomacy.

•

Mandate transparency.

•

Increase staffing at US embassies in Europe.

•

Enhance shared transatlantic understanding.

•

Routinize EU-US coordination and
cooperation.

Although not necessarily foolproof, implementing
these policies could help ensure Europe is better able
to defend itself from predatory Chinese investment
activity as the pandemic recession unfolds.
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1. INTRODUCTION
John R. Deni
©2022 John R. Deni

With most of Europe suffering the effects of a
pandemic-induced recession, will China repeat the
role it played in the wake of the 2009–12 European
sovereign debt crisis, essentially acting as a lender of
last resort for countries and firms in need of liquidity?
A decade ago, in the wake of the global financial
crisis, Chinese investment in Europe exploded.
In 2008, Chinese outbound foreign direct investment
in Europe totaled just €700 million in completed
transactions. By 2016, this amount had grown to
€37.3 billion in completed transactions. At the time,
Chinese investments brought much-needed capital
to the cash-strapped continent.
Chinese investors have been drawn to Europe
for several reasons, including the undervaluation
of European assets, the appeal of technologically
advanced industry, and a friendlier investment
climate relative to the United States. During the
2010s, Chinese investments were mostly concentrated
in the most advanced economies of Europe, with the
United Kingdom (30 percent), France (18 percent),
Germany (13 percent), and Italy (11 percent)
leading the way.
Most of these investments were made by Chinese
state-owned enterprises or China’s sovereign
wealth fund, which are directly tied to the central
government and, hence, to the Chinese Communist
Party. Ostensibly private Chinese firms have
increasingly invested in Europe as well, displacing
the role of state-owned enterprises over the last
several years. China’s 2017 national intelligence law,
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however, further blurred the line between private
entities and the Chinese state and provided a fig leaf
of legality for government interference in the
activities of private companies. The law states,
“All organizations and citizens shall support, assist,
and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in
accordance with law.”1 Most China experts in the
West believe Chinese companies, organizations, and
individuals do not have a choice in this matter.
From a traditional national security perspective,
much of this investment was relatively harmless.
But some investments led to Chinese ownership
and operation of infrastructure relevant to military
operations and exercises in or through Europe.
Additionally, some of these investments provided
Beijing with access to technologies and research vital
to current and future European defense capabilities.
More broadly, Chinese investment also strengthened
Beijing’s hand in several capitals across Europe,
augmenting China’s soft power and influence.
The purpose of this study is to assess whether
and how China is repeating the role it played in the
aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis and the Great
Recession, to identify related national security risks
for the United States and key allies, and to offer
recommendations on how to reduce these risks.
The framework of analysis, as just foreshadowed,
comprises three risk categories, including:
•

infrastructure necessary for military operations,
exercises, and contingency and crisis response
in and through Europe;

1. China Law Translate, “National Intelligence Law
of the P.R.C. (2017),” China Law Translate, June 27, 2017,
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence
-law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/.
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•

advanced, dual-use technologies and related
raw materials and other components necessary
for defense capability development; and

•

political influence in European capitals over
matters related to national security.

In terms of military operations and exercises in
and through Europe, moving forces from North
America and forward-stationed locations in Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom to
potential crisis zones in northeastern Europe, the
Black Sea littoral, the Middle East, and much of
Africa is vital for the protection of US interests. In the
event of a crisis in Europe, Canada and the United
Kingdom would likely send additional forces to
the continent. As a result, Chinese investment in
European infrastructure is most concerning in likely
transit countries, in countries that host US forces
or pre-positioned US military equipment, and in
countries that are critical to supplying the energy
necessary for operations in Europe—especially
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. Chinese
ownership or operation of infrastructure in these
countries could give Beijing leverage, impact
freedom of military movement, and jeopardize
operational security.
For defense capability development and
manufacturing, Chinese investments in the most
technologically advanced economies in Europe are
especially worrisome from Washington’s perspective,
given Beijing’s track record of stealing technology
and intellectual property. Chinese investments could
put defense capability research, development, and
manufacturing at risk, particularly for several priority,
dual-use technologies.
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Finally, Washington is keen to ensure Chinese
investments do not build decisive influence through
economic statecraft in Europe. Increased Chinese
influence in European capitals could undermine—
and, arguably, already has undermined—Western
solidarity on national security–related issues.
By assessing Chinese investment activity in these
three categories—militarily relevant infrastructure,
dual-use technology, and diplomatic leverage—
this study identifies the greatest risks to US and
allied interests. First, though, the study will outline
the contours of the pandemic-induced economic
recession now gripping Europe. Its breadth, depth,
and anticipated outcomes are all assessed in
chapter 2, with a particular eye toward comparisons
to the sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession of
a decade or more ago.
This scene setting is then followed in chapter 3
with an examination of China’s strategy toward
Europe and its policies there. Understanding what
China is after in Europe is the first step for both
European and US policymakers to begin thinking
about how best to parry Beijing’s efforts. This chapter
also includes an assessment of whether and how
Chinese activity in Europe has been on the rise since
the onset of the pandemic—especially, investment
activity, broadly defined.
After examining how China’s approach to Europe
may be evolving, in chapter 4, the study analyzes
how Europe has evolved. Perceptions toward
Beijing have shifted dramatically in recent years,
and this chapter describes and explains the changes.
Chapter 5 extends this analysis of perception by
looking at changes in European policies. Investment
screening, liquidity alternatives (“liquidity” is the
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cash available to firms), and other steps taken by
Europeans in recent years mean the continent is not
quite as open to China as it once was. Nonetheless,
Europe’s defenses have gaps, and this chapter seeks to
identify them.
Chapters 6 and 7 dive into the details of the
risks Chinese investment poses to relevant military
infrastructure in Europe and dual-use technology and
related raw materials. Throughout the research for
this study, the third category of risk—the political and
diplomatic influence Beijing achieves through Chinese
investment in Europe—emerged as a recurring theme.
This third category of risk, therefore, is addressed
in both chapters 6 and 7 and elsewhere in the study
(especially in chapters 3 and 4).
Given the ubiquity of Chinese investment across
Europe, some parameters were necessary for the
scope of the countries addressed in this study. Europe
comprises 40 countries (28 of which are in NATO
and 27 of which are in the EU). This study will not
examine all of these countries. Instead, the writing
team assessed the most important countries across
each of the risk categories. Some—France, Germany,
and Italy—fall into all three risk categories, and two—
Belgium and Hungary—are only in one category.
Together, these nine countries—Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, and the United Kingdom—represent the focus
countries for this study. Other European countries
are discussed occasionally, but the focus throughout
is largely on these nine countries. See figure 1-1 for a
Venn diagram showing the focus countries.
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Figure 1-1. Venn diagram showing focus countries

Europe has not been the only extraterritorial
destination for Chinese investment and attention
in recent decades. Africa and Latin America have
both been the objects of sustained and substantial
attention from Chinese investors. Chapters 8 and 9
examine Chinese engagement with these regions to
draw lessons Europe could apply in parrying Beijing’s
economic statecraft.
Finally, Chapter 10 offers concluding analysis
and practical recommendations for policymakers in
Europe and North America. From better protecting
indigenous technologies to leveraging NATO, this
chapter outlines over a dozen feasible and actionable
recommendations to reduce risk and safeguard
American and European interests from predatory
Chinese investment in Europe.

6

Methodological Note
The research for this multiauthor monograph
was based on a variety of primary and secondary
sources. The primary sources included semistructured
research discussions with more than five dozen
US civilian and military officials, European civilian
and military officials, industry experts, trade
association officials, think-tank experts, investment
bankers, and legal experts. Due to the pandemic’s
impact on travel, nearly all discussions were
conducted by phone or via video call. Without
exception, these discussions were not for attribution.
Researchers employed a common list of openended, guiding questions for the semistructured
discussions. The researchers, however, tailored
some of the questions according to the discussant’s
expertise or responsibilities. Responses to questions
were documented by researchers in real time through
note-taking. In some cases, follow-up or clarifying
research discussions were conducted, primarily
by e-mail.
Other primary sources included public-opinion,
economic, fiscal, and intergovernmental organization
data; official government pronouncements and
rhetoric; and contemporary news reports. These
sources are noted with appropriate citations and,
in the case of graphs and charts, with captions.
The secondary sources included a wide array
of analyses and studies by leading think tanks,
academically oriented articles in peer-reviewed
journals, authoritative websites and blogs, and other
monographs and books.
Together, the secondary and primary sources
were assessed through a mixed methodology
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that blended several types of qualitative analysis,
including content analysis, narrative analysis,
and case-study analysis. The content analysis was
primarily applied to official pronouncements and
rhetoric as the research team distilled these sources
for key messages, themes, and policy directions. This
methodology helped inform the narrative analysis,
which was both deductive and inductive and
primarily applied to the research discussions
referenced earlier in this chapter. The case studies
examined key European countries based on economic,
political, and military factors, as referenced earlier
in this chapter and spelled out in greater detail in
chapters 6 and 7.
After developing and editing an initial draft of
the study, the writing team produced a coordinating
draft for external review. Next, United States
European Command and the Department of
Homeland Security Economic Security Mission
Center, the cosponsors of the study, reviewed and
commented on the coordinating draft. Additionally,
all individuals interviewed as part of the research
process were given the opportunity to review and
comment on the coordinating draft.
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2. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COVID-19
IN EUROPE
Mark Duckenfield
©2022 Mark Duckenfield

The sudden onset of the coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in the spring of 2020
in Europe created a sharp economic downturn that
has the potential to produce opportunities for Chinese
investors. This chapter outlines the scope of this crisis,
contrasting it with the Great Recession of 2007–09 and
the eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2009–12 and
highlighting the responses of European governments.
Although the pandemic-induced crisis is very different
from the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis, and
even though European governments have responded
much more aggressively than they did a decade ago,
this chapter points out how China might still attempt
to acquire European assets, especially through the
purchase of “zombie firms,” which are firms that
are unable to generate enough profits to cover debtservicing costs and need to borrow to “stay alive.”1
Following the Great Recession and the eurozone
crisis, the pandemic-induced recession is the third
major economic crisis to impact the EU significantly
in the past 13 years. European national governments
and EU institutions are better prepared to address
the economic fallout now than they were in the two
previous crises. Having learned lessons and addressed
problems from the stagnant recovery of the early
1. Giovanni Favara, Camelia Minoiu, and Ander
Perez-Orive, “US Zombie Firms: How Many and How
Consequential?” FEDS Notes (website), July 30, 2021, https://www
.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/us-zombie
-firms-how-many-and-how-consequential-20210730.htm.
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2010s, European governments made institutional
adjustments that facilitated economic cooperation
while their policymakers held more relaxed political
attitudes toward borrowing in a crisis.
The previous two crises were the result of several
factors, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

lax regulation;
poor
corporate
governance
and
risk
management;
excessive borrowing and leveraging;
securitization of risky subprime assets;
a large, interlinked, vulnerable shadow
banking sector;
unsustainable debt and current account
deficits incompatible with a common currency;
thinly capitalized banks;
the European Central Bank’s unwillingness to
address immediately and fully the weakened
capital structure of European banks; and
the absence of a European lender of last resort.2

The pandemic-induced crisis, in contrast, was not
the result of bad economic behavior governments
would need to bail out. Consequently, the crisis
posed few political impediments to massive
2. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report (Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Office, 2011), xviii–xxv; Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis:
Who is to Blame? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Jeffry Frieden
and Stefanie Walter, “Understanding the Political Economy of
the Eurozone Crisis,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017):
371–90; and Giancarlo Corsetti et al., “The Euro Crisis in the
Mirror of the EMS: How Tying Odysseus to the Mast Avoided
the Sirens but Led Him to Charybdis,” Open Economies Review
31, no. 2 (April 2020): 219–36.
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government intervention and expenditures for
European governments.3
While government support and legal restrictions
have kept many businesses viable that would
otherwise have failed, this assistance has created the
risk many “zombie firms” will enter the economic
recovery from the pandemic unable to compete and
invest effectively.4 These firms, depending on their
sector and the scope of their assets, could either serve
as a drag on economic growth or pose a vulnerability
should firm ownership change to a non-European
entity, especially one from China.
Impact of the Pandemic: Reduced Economic Activity
and Shutdowns
The COVID-19 outbreak in Europe in February
and March 2020 came as an exogenous shock to
economies that had been anticipating modest
growth in 2020, with the major uncertainty being the
final contours of the British exit from the EU.5 The
deterioration in macroeconomic statistics was mainly
observed in a collapse in growth during the first half
of 2020. European state support staved off or deferred
insolvencies and limited increases in unemployment.
3. Sam Fleming, Miles Johnson, and Ian Mount, “EU Rescue
Package: Borrowing to Prevent a North-South Split,” Financial
Times, July 24, 2020.
4. Ryan Banerjee, Joseph Noss, and Jose Maria Vidal Pastor,
“Liquidity to Solvency: Transition Cancelled or Postponed?”
BIS Bulletin, no. 40 (March 2021): 1.
5. International
Monetary
Fund
(IMF),
Tentative
Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery? (Washington, DC: IMF, January
2020), 9; European Central Bank, Eurosystem Staff Macroeconomic
Projections for the Euro Area (Frankfurt: European Central Bank,
December 2019), 3–5; and Bank of England, Monetary Policy Report
(London: Bank of England, January 2020), 3, 5–6.
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The European economic collapse did not occur in a
vacuum: Worldwide economic growth was negative
for the first three quarters of 2020, with the most
serious drags being large decreases in consumption
and investment in the advanced economies. The
only positive contributor to world growth in the
second and third quarters was Chinese economic
activity, though some doubt the Chinese economy
grew in 2020 as Beijing claimed it had.6 See table 2-1
for the gross domestic product of major European
economies, 2020–21.7
Table 2-1. Gross domestic product for major European
economies, 2020–21

Gross Domestic Product

Unemployment

Country

IMF
2020
(Proj.)

2020
Actual

2020
Q1
Actual

2020
Q2
Actual

2020
Q3
Actual

2020
Q4
Actual

Mar.
2020

Jan.
2021

Euro area

1.3

-6.6

-3.4

-10.5

11.3

0.3

7.1

8.2

Germany

1.1

-4.9

-2.0

-9.7

8.7

0.5

3.8

4.5

France

1.3

-8.2

-5.9

-13.2

18.5

-1.5

7.4

7.9

Italy

0.5

-8.9

-5.7

-12.9

15.9

-1.8

7.5

10.3

United
Kingom

1.4

-9.9

-3.0

-18.8

16.0

1.3

4.0

4.9

Labor-intensive industries with a heavy in-person
component—such as retail, entertainment, recreation,
6. IMF, Policy Support and Vaccines Expected to Lift
Activity (Washington, DC: IMF, January 2021), 2; and
Shehzad H. Qazi, “The Great Chinese Rebound? Not So Fast,”
Barron’s, January 26, 2021, https://www.barrons.com/articles
/the-great-chinese-rebound-not-so-fast-51611622798.
7. IMF, Tentative Stabilization, 9; IMF, World Economic
Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries (Washington, DC: IMF,
April 2021), 35; and “FRED Economic Data,” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (website), n.d., https://fred.stlouisfed.org.
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accommodations, and services—suffered serious
financial losses during the pandemic.8 These
industries require high levels of face-to-face contact,
making transitioning to remote or virtual operations
difficult. Transport, the one capital-intensive
industry to suffer losses on a similar scale, had
major in-person elements and linkages to the
hard-hit tourism, leisure, and recreation industries.9
The automotive and airline industries were idled
for an extended period, with production stoppages
lasting more than a month and a suspension of most
commercial flights across Europe.10
Other related industries have experienced a
more varied response. In the ports sector, the initial
curtailment of domestic consumption, cancellation
of cruises, and decrease in trade led to a reduction
in capacity use at European ports.11 Container
port traffic at some of Europe’s busiest and largest
ports—Le Havre, Zeebrugge, Antwerp, Rotterdam,
8. Natalia Martin Fuentes and Isabella Moder,
“The Scarring Effects of COVID-19 on the Global
Economy,” VoxEU (website), February 5, 2021, https://voxeu
.org/article/scarring-effects-covid-19-global-economy.
9. Fuentes and Moder, “Scarring Effects.”
10. Jan Maarten de Vet et al., Impacts of the COVID-19
Pandemic on EU Industries, PE 662.903 (Luxembourg: European
Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy
Department for Economic, Scientific, and Quality of Life Policies,
March 2021), 17–21.
11. Mike Wackett, “Antwerp Weathers the Pandemic
Storm—Benelux
Box
Ports
Report
Mixed
Results,”
Loadstar (website), July 29, 2020, https://theloadstar.com
/antwerp-weathers-the-pandemic-storm-benelux-box
-ports-report-mixed-results/; and UN Conference on Trade
and Development, COVID-19 and Maritime Transport: Impact
and Responses, Transport and Trade Facilitation Series no. 15
(Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2021).
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Bremerhaven, and Hamburg—dropped 10 percent
between July 2019 and May 2020.12 The port of
Amsterdam closed to passenger traffic in March 2020,
leading to a 94.6 percent decline in its cruise-ship
subsidiary’s turnover and a 91 percent reduction in
cruise ships serviced, including the cancellation of
100 percent of the port calls for the profitable
sea-cruise segment.13 At the Port of Hamburg, tonnage
dropped across all categories of shipping, including
container vessels (-8 percent) and cruise ships
(-74 percent).14
On the whole, capital-intensive sectors where
direct human interaction was less essential to
operations, such as agriculture, public administration,
and information and communications technology,
experienced a comparatively lower reduction in
profitability because they were able to mitigate the
effects of the pandemic.15 The pandemic still affected
operations, particularly as normally taut supply
chains proved to be inadequately resilient to sudden
alterations. Though information and technology
companies as a group showed modest gains in the
pandemic, hardware sales, particularly for networks
and storage, declined.16
When the first wave of the pandemic began
to recede somewhat during the summer of 2020,
12. Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics,
“RWI/ISL-Container Throughput Index,” May 2021, https://
www.isl.org/public/containerumschlag-index/202-5
/containerumschlag-Index_20210527.xlsx.
13. Port of Amsterdam, 2020 Annual Report (Amsterdam:
Port of Amsterdam, 2021), 12–13, 21, 25, 76.
14. “Vessel Calls,” Port of Hamburg (website), 2020, https://
www.hafen-hamburg.de/en/statistics/calls/.
15. Fuentes and Moder, “Scarring Effects.”
16. de Vet et al., Impacts, 33.

14

European demand began to rebound. Though gross
domestic product remained down, it had begun to
recover year-on-year in the third quarter of 2020
while unemployment stabilized. Ports began to make
a comeback, albeit more strongly in some activities
than others. By September 2020, port capacity use
among some of Europe’s largest and busiest ports
had returned to its pre-pandemic levels, with north
European ports recovering three months later.17
Notably, though container traffic recovered as product
demand reasserted itself, other sectors of the maritime
infrastructure sector remained depressed.
Government Responses
European policy responses to the COVID-19
pandemic have fallen into two phases. In the first
phase, reactive, governments responded to the social
and economic fallout of the sudden emergence and
rapid progression of the disease. This response
focused on ensuring emergency health-care funding,
supporting employment, and alleviating financial
pressures on endangered firms.
In the second phase, proactive, governments
are attempting to take a strategic approach to the
recovery so they can best situate their economies for
future competition. This strategy has many of the
hallmarks of an embryonic industrial policy aimed
at providing a range of state supports to crucial
sectors and objectives. At a minimum, this strategy
promises a range of EU and national state support
for environmentally focused infrastructure and
information technologies. The strategy also hints at
17. Institute of
“Throughput Index.”

Shipping
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the prospect of developing deeper capacity to limit
non-EU encroachment in EU markets and ownership
of EU-developed technologies.
The response to the pandemic thus contrasts with
the aftermath of both the Great Recession and the
eurozone crisis in which many European companies
and governments, hungry for capital, welcomed
external investment from foreign companies and
external state-owned enterprises. The proportion of
foreign-controlled listed companies by asset value
in the EU jumped from 20 percent in 2009 to over
40 percent by 2014.18 Due to long-standing economic
linkages and large accumulations of assets over
decades, the lion’s share of foreign direct investment
in the EU came from the United States, Canada,
Norway, and Switzerland. But the share of Chinese
foreign direct investment stocks in the EU grew
rapidly, from 0.3 percent in 1995 to 1 percent in
2005, 2 percent in 2015, and past 3 percent in 2018
(€202 billion), and the majority is from Chinese
state-owned firms.19
European leaders could simply allow the market
to limit employment and rely upon the state’s
unemployment system to aid workers in dealing with
the economic consequences of the pandemic. But
most European states responded to the pandemicinduced recession by implementing various furlough,
short-work, and payroll compensation schemes to
maintain ties between workers and their employers.
18. European Commission, Foreign Direct Investment in
the EU, Staff Working Document no. 108 (Brussels: European
Commission, March 2019), 8.
19. European Court of Auditors, The EU’s Response to
China’s State-Driven Investment Strategy, Review no. 3
(Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2020), 20–22.
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These policies accepted the fundamental soundness
of the economic system before the exogenous shock of
the pandemic. This acceptance provided a temporary
cushion whereby firms could retain access to skilled
workers and avoid the transaction costs entailed in
recruiting and hiring new workers.20
At the intergovernmental level, the European
Commission, in cooperation with member states’
economics ministers, swiftly suspended European
restrictions on annual deficits and public debt, relaxed
restrictions on state aid to businesses, and broached
the controversial idea of collective borrowing at
the European level for the first time.21 In just over a
month, individual European governments approved
€1.9 trillion in state aid, with the majority coming
from Germany.22 See figure 2-1 for the extent of

20. Delphine Strauss and Chris Giles, “Applications for
UK’s Job Retention Scheme Slow,” Financial Times, April 23, 2020.
21. Council of the EU, “Statement of EU Ministers of
Finance on the Stability and Growth Pact in Light of the
COVID-19 Crisis,” press release, March 23, 2020, https://www
.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/03/23
/statement-of-eu-ministers-of-finance-on-the-stability-and
-growth-pact-in-light-of-the-covid-19-crisis/; Javier Espinoza,
“Brussels Lays Out Terms for Companies Handed State Aid:
Competition Concerns,” Financial Times (website), April 16, 2020,
2; and “EU-Kommission will corona-eurobonds,” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 21, 2020, 17.
22. Sam Fleming and Javier Espinoza, “EU Members Clash
Over State Aid as Richer Countries Inject More Cash,” Financial
Times, May 1, 2020.
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state fiscal measures in 2020 in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.23

Figure 2-1. Fiscal measures in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, 2020

Across Europe, the aviation industry received
large amounts of state funding and guarantees for
beleaguered airlines and grounded fleets. Germany
spent €9 billion bailing out Lufthansa, receiving 20
percent ownership in exchange. France took an equity
stake of 13 percent in Air France-KLM Group, which
was later expanded to 30 percent in exchange for a
€4.7 billion cash injection. And British Airways PLC
received a £300 million government-backed loan,
23. IMF, “Fiscal Monitor: Database of Country Fiscal
Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” IMF
(website), April 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf
-and-covid19/~/media/Files/Topics/COVID/FM-Database
/SM21/revised-april-2021-fiscal-measures-response-database
-publication-april-2021-v3.ashx.
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with similar measures taken in many other European
countries.24 Though other support tended to be less
targeted, many EU members deferred taxes and social
insurance contributions from companies, temporarily
lowered their value-added taxes (similar to sales
tax in the United States), and made arrangements to
limit insolvencies and debt collection.25 In contrast,
though European governments engaged in a range
of monetary and fiscal interventions in the Great
Recession, they did not impose insolvency holidays.
Naturally, the result was a typical recessionary surge
in insolvencies.26
The potential disparity between wealthier
countries like Germany and France that are able to
bail out their domestic industries and more financially
pressed EU member states like Italy and Spain that
might not have similar means to subsidize their
firms threatened to undermine efforts at European
solidarity. Coupling additional European-level
spending with more liberal attitudes toward national
spending enabled the EU to address the immediate
concerns about mitigating the economic consequences
24. CAPA—Centre for Aviation, “COVID-19 Prompts
Dramatic Increase in State Aid to (Some) European Airlines,”
Airline Leader, September 8, 2020, https://centreforaviation
.com/analysis/airline-leader/covid-19-prompts-dramatic
-increase-in-state-aid-to-some-european-airlines-536591;
and Reuters, “France to Become Biggest Air France Shareholder
with Capital Hike,” CNBC (website), April 6, 2021, https://www
.cnbc.com/2021/04/06/france-to-become-biggest-air-france
-shareholder-with-capital-hike.html.
25. IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, “Fiscal Monitor:
Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to
the COVID-19 Pandemic,” IMF (website), April 2021,
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19
/Fiscal-Policies-Database-in-Response-to-COVID-19.
26. Banerjee, Noss, and Pastor, “Liquidity to Solvency,” 2.
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of the pandemic as well as allowing individual
members the flexibility to use their own resources to
address national concerns. Alongside the €1.1 trillion
budget for 2021–27 approved in July 2020, leaders
of the EU agreed on a €750 billion recovery fund,
dubbed “Next Generation EU,” that was funded
for the first time by mutualized EU debt—so-called
“corona bonds.”27
This extensive array of traditional and emergency
state support for businesses has had the desired effect.
Firms have remained in business, typically with
their workers on their payrolls, even as they have
little turnover. Direct government payments have
subsidized wages and sustained operations; loose
financing terms have kept open lines of credit; and
payment holidays for utilities, rents, and other costs
have reduced outflows of cash. Governments have
also taken equity positions in companies that have
begun to experience financial distress. Increasingly
liberal insolvency regulations, including a suspension
of bankruptcy procedures for certain periods of time,
have combined to reduce the rate of insolvencies in
major European countries. So far at least, all of these
measures have prevented non-EU investors, especially
those from China, from acquiring European assets
at bargain prices or from governments desperate for
debt reduction.

27. Ben Hall, “Brussels Trades Tricky Path between
‘Resilience’ and Protectionism,” Financial Times, June 4, 2020,
5; and Tobias Tesche, “The European Union’s Response to the
Coronavirus Emergency: An Early Assessment,” LEQS Paper
no. 157/2020, London School of Economics and Political Science,
June 2020, 22, https://www.lse.ac.uk/european-institute/Assets
/Documents/LEQS-Discussion-Papers/LEQSPaper157.pdf.
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Emerging Economic Challenges
As the European economy begins to recover,
many components of governments’ supportive policies
are beginning to relax. As government spending and
regulations taper off, whether companies will be able
to return to a path of profitability or the debt loads
and financial delays have merely deferred their days
of financial reckoning remains an open question. Are
Europe’s businesses ready to be resurrected with
a consolidation of their financial positions and a
return to vibrant competition, or are they “zombie”
corporations, still operating but with unsustainable
debt loads and an avalanche of promised
obligations that will sap them of the capital needed
for reinvestment?28
Initially used as a means of ensuring corporate
survival during the pandemic, European governments
have sought to use capital injections, equity stakes,
and direct grants to ensure their companies are well
capitalized with competitive products and reliable
customer bases. The intent is to allow companies to
prepare to emerge from the pandemic in a position
at least as strong as when they entered it. In addition,
support from the EU recovery fund provides an
avenue for cheap access to capital and reduces the
need for companies to look for both private and
foreign sources of investment. In turn, this option
addresses European concerns that non-EU enterprises
might take advantage of weakened companies to
obtain inexpensive access to European technology.
These worries were particularly apparent at the start of
28. “The Corporate Undead,” Economist 436, no. 9213
(September 26, 2020): 69–70.
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the pandemic crisis and especially focused on foreign
state-owned enterprises, such as those from China.29
Receding Threats or Rise of the Zombies?

During the pandemic, restrictions on insolvencies
and extensive state intervention led to the development
of a “bankruptcy gap” between the unemployment
rate and corporate insolvencies.30 Historically,
unemployment and corporate failures have tended to
move in tandem: Unemployment and bankruptcies
have declined during periods of economic growth
and risen during downturns. The massive scope of
government assistance to firms led to a break in this
relationship during the pandemic-related economic
lockdowns. Despite far-reaching measures to preserve
employment, the unemployment rate in the eurozone
pushed rapidly upward from 7.1 percent in March
2020 to a peak of 8.7 percent by August 2020.31 One
year into the pandemic recession, even greater state
intervention on behalf of firms was so successful,
insolvencies across a sample of 13 advanced economies
were down 28 percent from the start of the crisis.32 This
contrasted with the traditional surge in bankruptcies
expected during a typical recession, which on average
increased 13 percent one year after the downturn
commenced; this was a dramatic contrast with the
29. Sam Fleming, Javier Espinoza, and Michael Peel, “EU
Seeks to Curb State-Backed Foreign Rivals,” Financial Times,
June 2, 2020, 1.
30. Banerjee, Noss, and Pastor, “Liquidity to Solvency,” 2.
31. Eurostat, “Unemployment by Sex and Age—
Monthly Data,” European Commission (website), n.d.,
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset
=une_rt_m&lang=en.
32. IMF, Policy Support, 8–9.
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26 percent explosion in business failures during the
global financial crisis of a decade ago.33
Germany’s experience exemplified this trend.
In February 2021, German insolvencies were down
24 percent from where they had been 12 months
previously; see figure 2-2 for German unemployment
and insolvencies from 2003 to 2021.34 Though many
companies were saved from unnecessary bankruptcy,
several companies that were facing insolvency
under normal conditions also experienced a reprieve
from their creditors. Simply based on the average
pre-pandemic enterprise insolvency rate, Germany
likely has a backlog of at least 3,000 insolvencies
as it exits the crisis, and Spain and Italy are each
expected to have more than Germany.35 Similarly,
France experienced a drop of 40 percent in corporate
bankruptcies in the year after March 2020, with
an equally large proportion of potentially delayed
insolvencies.36
Similar
deferrals
of
financial
judgment occurred across Europe, with European
33. IMF, Policy Support, 8–9.
34. “52411-0002: Insolvency Proceedings: Germany,
Months, Proceedings Filed,” Statistisches Bundesamt (website),
n.d., https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis//online?operati
on=table&code=52411-0002&bypass=true&levelindex=0&levelid
=1622235621324#abreadcrumb; and “Registered Unemployment
Rate for Germany,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (website),
updated December 14, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series
/LMUNRRTTDEM156S.
35. Chris
Bryant,
“We
Can’t
Hold
Off
the
Bankruptcy Wave Forever,” Bloomberg (website), May 5, 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-05
/europe-can-t-hold-off-the-bankruptcy-wave-forever.
36. Bank of France (Banque de France), “Corporate
Bankruptcies—France, April 2021,” Stat Info (website),
May
2021,
https://www.banque-france.fr/en/statistics
/business-failures-france-2021apr.
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Central Bank chief Christine Lagarde comparing
the reduction in insolvencies to the receding sea
water just before the arrival of a tsunami.37 With
European fiscal restrictions suspended through
2022, EU governments still have latitude to support
strategic industries and companies.38

Figure 2-2. The German bankruptcy gap

But the duration of this support is clearly finite.
Whenever the insolvency reprieve ends, the tidal
wave foreseen by Lagarde may make landfall as
companies that would have failed regardless of
the pandemic-induced recession face an inevitable
reckoning. This mass failing may create opportunities
for non-EU investors like China to obtain European
37. Martin Arnold, “EU Warned About Insolvency
‘Tsunami’,” Financial Times, April 29, 2021, 4.
38. Sam Fleming, “Brussels to Keep Stability and Growth
Pact on Ice for Another Year,” Financial Times, March 3, 2021, 4.
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assets at bargain prices. These risks may be less
formidable in cases where European governments
took equity positions in companies; such a role
provides a degree of direct influence over operations
and potential future partners that did not previously
exist. During the 2007–09 financial crisis, for example,
the US government used a variety of financial and
legal mechanisms to restructure General Motors and
Chrysler to consolidate product lines; encourage cost
savings and debt reduction; promote the development
of more fuel-efficient automobiles; and, in the case
of Chrysler, find an acceptable strategic investment
partner in Fiat SpA.39
Summary
The COVID-19 pandemic created both a public
health crisis and an economic crisis in Europe.
In the early 2010s, a combination of institutional
shortcomings, divergent national interests, and policy
preferences across the EU and its member states were
impediments to resolving the financial and euro crises.
Furthermore, these impediments contributed to a slow,
stagnant recovery, creating space for extraterritorial
actors such as China to play an important role in the
recapitalization of struggling companies and in bailing
out European governments looking to shed inefficient
public sector capabilities to reduce debt.
39. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on
the American Automotive Industry,” Office of the Press
Secretary, White House (website), March 30, 2009, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-american-automotive-industry-33009; and Thomas
Klier and James Rubenstein, “Detroit Back from the Brink? Auto
Industry Crisis and Restructuring 2008-11,” Economic Perspectives
36, no. 2 (July 2012): 35–54.
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The pandemic-induced economic crisis developed
differently. Many of the institutional limitations that
had prevented effective collective action before have
now been resolved. Lessons learned a decade ago
enabled the vast exercising of governments’ fiscal,
monetary, regulatory, and policing powers in support
of workers and firms over the last year and a half.
The nature of the public-health crisis largely aligned
national interests in opposition to the virus. Although
public officials’ attitudes toward different policies
varied, they were usually subordinated to resolving
the common, overarching health and economic crises.
As the pandemic recedes, weaning some
companies from public support will pose difficulties
for European governments and create potential
financial vulnerabilities for some heavily indebted
companies. With an expected tightening of state-aid
rules in late 2021, some EU governments will begin
unwinding the positions they took in companies
during the crisis, which will place them under
pressure to find buyers for their stakes and which
could open the door to Chinese investment. As
Europe moves forward on its path to recovery, its
policymakers must be careful how they tread,
particularly as China aspires to fulfill a carefully
crafted strategy vis-à-vis Europe, which is the subject
of the next chapter.
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3. CHINA’S STRATEGY AND POLICY
TOWARD EUROPE TODAY
Roger Cliff
©2022 Roger Cliff

The most fundamental goal of China’s leadership
in Beijing is to maintain their position as the rulers of
China. Leadership’s principal strategy for achieving
this goal consists of two main elements: ensuring the
people of China experience ever-rising standards
of living and creating the perception leadership are
restoring China to its supposed rightful place in the
world as one of the most powerful, wealthiest, most
advanced, and most respected nations. Implementing
this strategy entails ensuring continued robust growth
rates for China’s economy, transforming China into a
world leader in technology, developing an increasingly
capable military, making progress toward recovering
territories viewed as part of China but lost during its
period of weakness during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries (Taiwan most importantly as
well as the islands of the South and East China Seas),
and increasing China’s prestige and influence in the
international community.1
1. Roger Cliff, A New US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific
(Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020), 34–46; Minxin
Pei, Exploring Emerging Domestic Drivers of Chinese Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United
States, April 2014); Yang Jiemian, From Geo-Strategy to OmniStrategy: Interactions between China, Europe and the United States
(Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States,
February 2014); and Ties Dams, Xiaoxue Martin, and Vera
Kranenburg, ed., China’s Soft Power in Europe: Falling on Hard
Times (Brussels: European Think-Tank Network on China, April
2021), 5.
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Europe has the potential to affect all of these goals.
China’s leadership, moreover, appears to perceive
Europe as increasingly important to the achievement
of the goals because the amounts of resources,
personnel, and attention China has devoted to Europe
have increased substantially over the past decade.2
The principal objectives of China’s strategy and
policy toward Europe appear to be to expand the
economic benefits China derives from Europe, acquire
European technology for both economic and military
purposes, and increase China’s influence in Europe.
Increased influence, in turn, can be used to affect
European policy on issues important to Beijing. These
issues include international recognition of Taiwan,
the South China Sea, and criticism of China’s humanrights record as well as European policy toward
other regions of the world, such as the Middle East
and Central Asia, that also affect China’s interests.
Increased influence can also be used to derive
additional economic benefits for China or to increase
the willingness of European governments to allow the
sharing of European technology with China.3
Beijing seeks to achieve these objectives through
a range of mechanisms, including official diplomatic
relations; public diplomacy; trade; scientific,
educational, and cultural exchanges; Chinese media
operations; funding of public policy organizations
and events in Europe; cultivating relations with
influential Europeans; investment; construction and
2. Francois Godement and Abigail Vasselier, China at
the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations (London:
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), 21–22; and
Francois Godement, “China’s Relations with Europe,” in
China and the World, ed. David Shambaugh (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020), 266.
3. Jiemian, Geo-Strategy to Omni-Strategy.
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operation of infrastructure; and cyber operations.
Many nongovernmental interactions involving China
are simply the result of individual people and
organizations pursuing their own personal and
organizational interests.
In other cases, however, individuals and
organizations may be taking actions at the behest of
the Chinese government, or at least in the belief their
actions are consistent with the Chinese government’s
desires and intentions. This assessment appears to
be increasingly accurate: In recent years, the Chinese
government has been reining in the activities of
private companies and individuals, arresting many
of the heads of private companies, as well as causing
these heads to otherwise disappear from public view.4
Official Government-to-Government Relations
China’s diplomatic relations primarily seek to
broaden and enhance China’s other interactions
with Europe, including trade; investment; and
scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges. Since
2012, for example, China has been seeking to reach
a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with
the EU.5 An agreement in principle was reached in
December 2020, but, due to a deterioration in EU-China
4. Frederico Mollet, China’s Industrial Grand Strategy and
What It Means for Europe (Belgium: European Policy Centre, 2021);
Fergus Ryan, “China Takes on Its Tech Leaders,” War on the
Rocks, August 26, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08
/china-takes-on-its-tech-leaders/; and Emily Feng, “The Latest
Target in China’s Crackdown on Entrepreneurs is an Outspoken
Billionaire,” NPR (website), May 15, 2021, https://www
.npr.org/2021/05/15/996241784/.
5. “EU-China Agreement: Milestones and Documents,”
European Commission (website), January 22, 2021, https://trade
.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2115.
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relations, in May 2021 the European Parliament voted
to suspend the ratification of the agreement.6 Another
important focus of China’s official diplomatic relations
with Europe is pressuring Europe and deflecting
criticism over issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang,
Hong Kong, and human rights.7
Public Diplomacy and Influence Operations
Aside from its diplomats’ direct interactions
with European governments, China has increasingly
engaged in public diplomacy efforts in Europe.
Chinese diplomats write op-eds and letters to the
editor for publication in European media outlets and
sit for interviews with European media. The Chinese
government also sometimes takes out advertisements
in European media. More recently, Chinese diplomats
have become highly active on social-media platforms
such as Twitter and Facebook. Their postings are
often amplified by thousands of fake accounts that
repost the statements. Whether these activities can
accurately be characterized as diplomatic efforts may
be arguable, however, as the aggressive tone of many

6. Jorge Liboreiro, “MEPs Vote to Freeze Controversial
EU-China Investment Deal,” Euronews (website), updated
June
24,
2021,
https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/20
/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-controversial-eu-china
-investment-deal.
7. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 84–86;
Godement, “China’s Relations with Europe,” 255–56, 267–68;
Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in Europe, 13;
and Rudolf Furst, “China’s Soft Power in the Czech Republic:
Almost a Fiasco,” in Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft
Power in Europe, 24.
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of the postings seems more likely to alienate rather
than persuade European audiences.8
Cyber Operations
China also seeks to achieve its goals in Europe
through cyber operations. China is well known for
using cyber operations for industrial espionage and
intellectual property (IP) theft.9 These operations are
also possibly being used to lay the groundwork for
potential future sabotage. In addition, China uses
cyber operations to track Chinese dissidents and
fugitives living in Europe.10
China is less well known than Russia for using
cyber operations to influence politics and policies in
Europe. China’s use of cyber operations is less well
known not because it is less active in this area, but
because its style is less oriented toward disinformation
and undermining partner-nation governments. If
China’s cyber-enabled influence operations follow the
pattern seen in North America and Australia, they are
primarily targeted at overseas Chinese communities
via Chinese-language social media. These operations
include efforts to discredit pro-democracy activists,
vilify the Taiwan independence movement, and
mobilize support for political candidates seen as more
favorable toward China. Because these operations
8. Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in
Europe, 7, 9–13; Furst, “Czech Republic,” 23; and Godement,
“China’s Relations with Europe,” 259.
9. European
Commission,
Directorate-General
for
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, The Scale
and Impact of Industrial Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets Through
Cyber (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2019).
10. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 86–87.
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are primarily conducted in Chinese-language media,
European observers may be unaware of them.11
Trade
One of the most substantial aspects of ChinaEurope relations is trade. In 2020, overall trade in
goods between China and Europe amounted to $930
billion—20 percent of China’s overall trade and
equivalent to about 6 percent of China’s gross domestic
product. Thus, trade with Europe is an important
source of wealth for China. The volume of this trade
appears to result primarily from individual businesses
in both places seeking market opportunities, rather
than from policies of the Chinese government targeted
at Europe.
The only Europe-wide trade agreement China has
reached, for example, is the 1985 Agreement on Trade
and Economic Cooperation between the European
Economic Community and the People’s Republic of
China, which contains no concrete provisions other
than a general declaration both parties will accord
each other “most-favoured-nation” treatment. Under
the principle of “most favoured nation” and as
spelled out in World Trade Organization agreements,
countries cannot normally discriminate between
their trading partners. If one country is granted a
lower customs duty rate for one of its products, all
World Trade Organization members must receive
the same treatment for the product in question.12
11. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 60–61, 80, 86;
and Cliff, New US Strategy, 43.
12. Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
between the European Economic Community and the People’s
Republic of China, European Economic Community-P.R.C.,
April 3, 1978, L. 250/2.
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The only European countries with which China has
reached free-trade agreements are non-EU countries
Switzerland, Iceland, and Georgia, which collectively
represent less than 4 percent of China’s total trade
with the continent.13 Although China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) incorporates Asia, Africa, and Oceania,
it is explicitly intended to strengthen China’s economic
linkages with Europe by expanding transportation
capacity and capabilities to facilitate trade.14
Though the magnitude of China’s trade with
Europe may be driven primarily by economic factors,
the Chinese government leverages the importance
to Europe of this trade. Specifically, Beijing exerts
political influence by denying or threatening to deny
European countries access to the Chinese market in
retaliation for actions to which the Chinese government
objects. These actions include hosting visits by the
Dalai Lama, criticizing China over human rights, and
engaging in high-level governmental interactions
with Taiwan. After a visit by the Dalai Lama to the
president of Lithuania in 2013, for example, China
imposed restrictions on the import of Lithuanian
13. Council of the European Communities and Government
of the People’s Republic of China, “Agreement on Trade and
Economic Cooperation Between the European Economic
Community and the People’s Republic of China,” Official Journal of
the European Communities, L 250, 19.9 (1985): 2-7; National Bureau
of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China
Statistics Press, 2020); International Monetary Fund (IMF),
“Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS),” IMF Data (website), updated
November 23, 2021, https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14
A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85; and “China FTA Network,”
Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (website), n.d.,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml.
14. Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and
Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle, WA:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
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agricultural products. Similarly, after Ireland signed
a US-led statement criticizing China’s human-rights
record in 2016, Beijing threatened sanctions on Irish
beef exports.15
This tactic has been generally effective, even though
trade with the EU is more important to China than
trade with China is to the EU; although goods trade
with Europe represents about 15 percent of China’s
overall exports, goods trade with China represents
only about 4 percent of the EU’s total exports.16
Beijing has convinced European governments not to
host official visits by the Dalai Lama, and a number
of European countries no longer confront China over
human-rights issues. Six years after the Norwegian
Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace
to jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, the Norwegian
government effectively promised not to do such a
thing again by declaring it “attaches high importance
to China’s core interests and major concerns, will
not support actions that undermine them, and
will do its best to avoid any future damage to the
bilateral relations.”17
Apart from explicit pressure by the Chinese
government and its diplomats, European companies
that do business with China are often Beijing’s most
influential agents. The main pro-China lobby in the
Czech Republic, for example, is said to be the Czech
15. Furst, “Czech Republic,” 24; Godement, “China’s
Relations with Europe,” 255–56; Godement and Vasselier, China
at the Gates, 75, 79, 80, 84–86.
16. IMF, “Exports, FOB to Partner Countries,” IMF Data
(website), updated June 25, 2021, https://data.imf.org/regular
.aspx?key=61013712; Furst, “Czech Republic,” 24; Godement,
“China’s Relations with Europe,” 255–56; and Godement and
Vasselier, China at the Gates, 75, 79, 80, 84–86.
17. Godemont, “China’s Relations with Europe,” 256.
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company PPF Group N.V., which has significant
business interests in China. As another example,
European book publishers often self-censor—for
example, by not publishing content Beijing may
perceive as being politically sensitive—to ensure their
products will have access to the Chinese market.18
Scientific, Educational, and Cultural Exchanges
Scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges are
an important mechanism by which China acquires
European technology, access, and influence. In
practice, most of these exchanges are unidirectional,
with China acquiring European knowledge or talent
while sharing little of its own and disseminating
its political and cultural perspectives in Europe
while preventing European countries from doing so
in China.19
Chinese companies with varying levels of
ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have
established a rapidly growing number of research
and development (R&D) partnerships in Europe.20
These partnerships range from R&D collaborations
with European companies to partnerships with
European universities and involvement in EU
research programs. Sometimes collaboration also
18. Tom Phillips, “Cambridge University Press Accused of
‘Selling Its Soul’ Over Chinese Censorship,” Guardian (website),
August 18, 2017, https://www.theguardiancom/world/2017/
aug/19/cambridge-university-press-accused-of-selling-its-soul
-over-chinese-censorship; and Furst, “Czech Republic,” 23.
19. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 47–49.
20. “Is China a Global Leader in Research and
Development?” China Power (blog), Center for Strategic
International Studies, updated January 28, 2021, https://
chinapower.csis.org/china-research-and-development-rnd/.
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occurs through EU-China governmental entity
partnerships, foreign R&D centers in Europe or China,
joint laboratories, or special grants or fellowships for
individual researchers.21 Although this cooperation
can benefit Europe through the joint development
of new products, services, and knowledge, China
often manipulates these arrangements to access
European IP, technologies, and talent—sometimes
unbeknownst to European officials. This manipulation
provides another way for China to build up its firms
as global leaders in emerging industries or to cultivate
indigenous technologies in place of foreign ones.
These strategic initiatives often target advanced
technology, such as aerospace and artificial
intelligence, packaged as fundamental advancements
to benefit all societies involved. But these dual-use
capabilities have military and strategic implications,
allowing China to undermine Europe’s economic
competitiveness and its military and technological
edge. Sometimes, entities involved in R&D are directly
or indirectly linked to China’s People’s Liberation
Army.22 Because these Chinese R&D investments are
not included in most European regulatory regimes,
they can be used to mask conflicts of interest,
undesirable commercial activity, and even national
security risks posed by Chinese involvement.23
Similarly, Chinese companies and state-backed
entities invest in talent acquisition, recruitment,
21. Agatha Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update
(Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 2020).
22. Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s
Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
23. “China’s R&D Strategy,” European Commission
(website), n.d., https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight
/topic/expanding-influence-east-southindustry-science
-innovation_en.
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and development programs; the CCP treats this
investment as a form of technology transfer.24 The
Chinese government claims to have recruited almost
60,000 overseas professionals from 2008 to 2016.25
In Europe, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France are primary targets because of their leading
talent pools, advanced industries, and cuttingedge technologies. These programs, including the
Thousand Talents Plan, use grants and other funding
to draw in highly specialized foreign scientists and
technology experts to work on dual-use technologies
at Chinese research institutions, including those with
ties to the Chinese military to deepen civil-military
fusion.26 The programs also provide opportunities for
European scientists to work with Chinese companies,
raising concerns over research and the improper
acquisition of IP by China, with commercialization of
the subsequent products undercutting the companies
or individuals that developed it in Europe.
24. James Jin Kang, “The Thousand Talents Plan is Part
of China’s Long Quest to Become the Global Scientific Leader,”
Conversation (website), August 31, 2020, https://theconversation
.com/the-thousand-talents-plan-is-part-of-chinas-long-quest-to
-become-the-global-scientific-leader-145100;
Godement
and
Vasselier, China at the Gates, 22–23, 40, 45, 47; and Godement,
“China’s Relations with Europe,” 258.
25. Alex Joske, “Hunting the Phoenix: The Chinese
Communist Party’s Global Search for Technology and Talent,”
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (website), August 20, 2020,
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hunting-phoenix.
26. Ellen Barry and Gina Kolata, “China’s Lavish Funds
Lured US Scientists. What Did It Get in Return?,” New York
Times (website), February 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/02/06/us/chinas-lavish-funds-lured-us-scientists
-what-did-it-get-in-return.html; and Kratz et al., Chinese FDI
in Europe.
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In many cases, such programs are facilitated
through Chinese investment in “overseas talent
recruitment workstations” designed to exploit
the open scientific communities in Europe.27 The
CCP has a highly centralized control mechanism
for these centers and often contracts individuals
or front organizations (for example, community
centers) to manage these facilities inside European
countries.28 This methodology generally allows the
centers to evade traditional investment screening.
The centers offer attractive incentives, including
substantial
financial
bonuses
for
successful
recruitment. According to anecdotal evidence, after
becoming involved, European participants have been
manipulated, coerced, or bribed by Chinese actors
to steal technology, facilitate espionage, or influence
their home institution on China’s behalf through a
range of overt and covert means.29
In the cultural realm, China has established
China Cultural Centers in most European countries.
These centers promote Chinese culture through
activities such as art exhibitions, calligraphy classes,
and festivals during traditional Chinese holidays. In
addition to these generic activities, Beijing organizes
social and cultural exchanges specific to individual
European countries. For example, China has promoted
an Ancient Civilizations Forum with Greece, Italy,
and other countries. In the case of Portugal, China has
emphasized its long-standing relationship with the
country through Macao, formerly a Portuguese colony.
The Chinese government also promotes interactions
at the subnational level. For example, many cities in
27.
28.
29.
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China have established “sister city” relationships with
European cities.30
One of China’s best-known cultural exchange
vehicles is its Confucius Institutes. Currently,
Europe has over 170 Confucius Institutes. In 2017,
the National Association of Scholars counted 103
Confucius Institutes in the United States. But as of
August 2021, this number had dwindled to just 38.31
The institutes are programs on university campuses
that focus primarily on Chinese-language instruction,
although they also sponsor some cultural programs.
The Chinese government pays for the instructors
and administrators at Confucius Institutes and
provides the teaching materials they use. As a result,
the Chinese government controls the content of the
courses taught by instructors and administrators,
shaping European university students’ understanding
of China. In addition, because Confucius Institutes
allow universities to offer Chinese-language classes at
no cost to the university, they provide China with a
degree of financial leverage over the host universities.
For example, if a European university that hosted
a Confucius Institute wished to hold a conference
on a topic that was objectionable to Beijing (such as
conceptions of national identity in Taiwan), China
could threaten to defund the institute and withdraw its
instructors.32 Most recently, Chinese state employees
30. Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in
Europe, 8.
31. “How Many Confucius Institutes Are in the United
States?” National Association of Scholars (website), updated
December
10,
2021,
https://www.nas.org/blogs/article
/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.
32. Godement, “China’s Relations with Europe,” 259;
Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 80–81; and Dams,
Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in Europe, 7–8.
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of Confucius Institutes in Europe have been accused
of espionage. In some cases, these incidents have
led European universities to curtail or cut ties with
Confucius Institutes.33
Chinese Media Operations
Another means by which Beijing seeks to influence
discourses about China in Europe is through its
government-controlled media organizations, which
include China Global Television Network, China
Radio International, and Xinhua News Agency. These
media organizations broadcast in local languages
in several European countries, including France,
Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic.34
A related, and probably more effective, approach
involves China providing content to European media
outlets, which then broadcast or publish it as if China’s
news providers were just another independent news
source like the Associated Press or the BBC. Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, for example, has an arrangement
with Xinhua whereby Xinhua pays to post its articles
on Deutsche Presse-Agentur platforms. The official
news agencies and television stations of several other
European countries, including Italy, Greece, Malta,
and Romania, have content exchange relationships
33. Stuart
Lau,
“Belgian
University
Closes
Its
Chinese State-Funded Confucius Institute after Spying Claims,”
South China Morning Post (website), December 11, 2019, https://
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3041617
/belgian-university-closes-its-chinese-state-funded-confucius;
and “Parliamentary Questions,” European Parliament (website),
December 10, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo
/document/E-9-2020-006751_EN.html.
34. Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in
Europe, 7–10; Furst, “Czech Republic,” 23; and Godemont, “
China’s Relations with Europe,” 259.
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whereby Chinese media organizations provide a
significant portion of these outlets’ coverage of China.
Any content these organizations provide to China, on
the other hand, is carefully edited and censored. China
Daily, China’s official English-language newspaper,
gets its China Watch supplement placed in newspapers
and magazines throughout Europe, including the Daily
Telegraph in the United Kingdom, Le Figaro in France,
Handelsblatt in Germany, El País in Spain, Le Soir and
De Standaard in Belgium, and Zemia in Bulgaria. In
addition, Chinese investors have purchased local
media outlets in some European countries, ensuring
they will provide China-friendly coverage. Reciprocal
activities by European news organizations are
impossible in China.35
Funding of Public Policy Organizations and Events
Another way in which Beijing attempts to influence
policies and perceptions in Europe is through the
funding of public-policy organizations and events.
In Brussels, for example, think tanks, conferences,
and seminars dealing with international relations and
economics or Asia often receive sponsorship from
China’s EU diplomatic mission.36 Similarly, a June
2017 report entitled EU-China: Mending Differences,
which was issued on the eve of an EU-China summit
35. Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in
Europe, 9–10; Furst, “Czech Republic,” 23; Godement, “China’s
Relations with Europe,” 259–60; and Godement and Vasselier,
China at the Gates, 81–82.
36. “Follow the New Silk Road: China’s Growing Trail
of Think Tanks and Lobbyists in Europe,” Corporate Europe
Observatory (website), April 8, 2019, https://corporateeurope
.org/en/2019/04/follow-new-silk-road-chinas-growing-trail
-think-tanks-and-lobbyists-europe.
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by Euractiv, an independent, pan-European media
network, was sponsored by China’s mission to the EU
in Brussels. In Hungary, China has even established
the first Chinese-controlled think tank to be registered
in Europe, the China-CEE Institute in Budapest.37
Cultivating Relations with Influential Individuals
China’s funding of European think tanks is related
to another way in which it seeks to develop influence
in Europe: cultivating relations with prominent
Europeans. China accomplishes this feat through
several means. One is offering positions at Chinese
corporations and Chinese-funded think tanks to
former high-ranking European officials. Such officials
have included former prime ministers, foreign
ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors, and EU
commissioners. Another way of cultivating influential
individuals is to invite academics, think-tank
members, and regional politicians on multiday tours of
China in which they visit high-tech corporations and
laboratories, meet with government officials important
to their work, travel to scenic tourist destinations, and
receive high-quality accommodations and food.38
Investment
One of China’s most important mechanisms
for acquiring economic benefits, technology, and
influence in or from Europe is investment. Europe is
a major destination for China’s outbound investment.
37. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 65, 78, 110;
Furst, “Czech Republic,” 22.
38. Godement, “China’s Relations with Europe,” 260;
Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 77–78, 85; and Furst,
“Czech Republic,” 22.
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Excluding investment in Hong Kong and the British
Virgin Islands (on the grounds they are not the final
destination of most Chinese funds invested in them),
28 percent of China’s outbound direct investment in
2019 went to Europe—more than any other continent
besides Asia. Chinese corporations and individuals are
estimated to have bought or invested a total of $335
billion in European assets between 2008 and 2019.39
Chinese investment in Europe appears to be
focused on acquisitions in strategic technology
areas, including integrated circuits, broadband
communications, machine tools, robots and artificial
intelligence,
biopharmaceuticals,
shipbuilding,
automobiles, space, and the aviation industry.
Most of these areas are targets of the Made in
China 2025 initiative, a state-led industrial initiative
that seeks to make China dominant in global
high-tech manufacturing.40 China’s focus on these
areas suggests acquiring technology in sectors in
which the Chinese government seeks to improve
China’s capabilities is often one of the motivations for
Chinese acquisitions in Europe.41
In some cases, however, the goal of Chinese
acquisitions in Europe may be to acquire a strategic
business advantage or to acquire technology by more
indirect means. For example, in 2013, a company
owned by the city of Yantai purchased a French
company, Manoir Industries, that specializes in steel
39. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical
Yearbook; and Godement, “China’s Relations with Europe,” 258.
40. Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (website), June 1, 2015,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025.
41. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 40, 43–44,
46, 52; and Cliff, New US Strategy, 36.
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tubing and needles for the civilian nuclear industry.
After buying other industry-critical companies in
Europe and India, by 2017, Manoir Industries was
close to having a monopoly on the supply of critical
parts in nuclear-waste treatment plants, a capability
China had long sought to acquire from France.
This position could be used to extract monopoly rents
or to convince the government of France to license
nuclear-waste treatment technology to China.
As another example, in 2016, HNA Group, the
corporate parent of Hainan Airlines, acquired Avolon,
an Irish aircraft leasing company. The following year,
Avolon bought US-based CIT Group’s aircraft leasing
business, thereby becoming the world’s third-largest
aircraft leasing company. The resulting buying power
may have enabled Avolon to negotiate more favorable
aircraft purchase terms from the Boeing Company
and Airbus SE.42 In addition, Chinese investment in
Europe might be used to promote Chinese standards
in areas such as 5G cellular technology, transport, and
business arbitration.43
Beijing also uses investment in Europe, or the
promise of such investment, to exert political influence.
This influence is used for different purposes. One
purpose is to affect directly the policies of European
governments on issues important to Beijing. In
response to a visit to Belgium by the Dalai Lama and
visits to Taiwan by local Belgian officials in 2016, for
example, Chinese officials threatened to withdraw
investments from the country.
The influence derived from actual or promised
investment is also used to circumvent or weaken the
EU by offering investment to individual European
42.
43.
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countries rather than competing in transnational
or EU-wide tenders. This strategy has been used to
soften or prevent criticism of China over issues such
as human rights or the South China Sea as well as
for purely economic purposes, such as obtaining
more favorable terms for Chinese investments than
would be possible if China went through EU public
tender processes.44
Chinese investment-related activities in Europe
include state-led and ostensibly private foreign
investment and acquisitions, joint ventures with
European and US firms, complex webs of Chinese
venture capital (VC), and forced technology transfer.
The following subsections provide an overview of
some of the primary Chinese investment tactics.
Though these categories are not comprehensive, for
the purpose and scope of this analysis, they capture
China’s most frequent and impactful investment
activities in Europe.
Direct Investments and Acquisitions by Chinese
State-Owned Entities
Dating back to the late 1990s and early 2000s,
China has used explicitly state-owned entities, such
as sovereign wealth funds and so-called “national
champion companies,” to carry out investments and
acquisitions proactively in Europe.45 Though Chinese
capital may appear welcoming to European companies
44. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 16, 18, 50,
65–68, 77, 85.
45. Daniel Michaels, “Behind China’s Decade of
European Deals, State Investors Evade Notice,” Wall Street Journal
(website), September 30, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/behind-chinas-decade-of-european-deals-state-investors-evade
-notice-11601458202.
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and countries in need of stimulus, China’s deals often
come with strings attached. The deals usually give
Chinese stakeholders full or partial ownership or
influence over IP, related resources, and know-how.
As part of these deals, large sums or market access to
China are often offered in exchange for production
control over key components, operating control of
facilities, or forced technology transfer to the Chinese
stakeholders.46 The terms sometimes also mandate
the use of Chinese labor, which both undercuts the
benefits to the local European economy and places
often-sensitive technology and operations directly in
Chinese hands.47
In the United States, similar initiatives have
allowed Chinese entities—and, by extension, the
Chinese government—to access facility operations
information, product designs, sensitive technological
or operational data, and key techniques via explicit
and implicit information sharing or people-to-people
exchanges.48 In the case of technology, China’s
typical strategy is to reverse engineer or replicate
the targeted IP or capability and reproduce it as the
country’s own.49 This strategy can involve replacing
46. Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe.
47. Jakob Hanke Vela, “Trade Deal Allows Chinese Staff
to Work in EU for 3 Years,” Politico (website), January 13, 2021,
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-investment-deal
-allows-chinese-staff-work-3-years/.
48. Keith Bradsher, “How China Obtains American Trade
Secrets,” New York Times (website), January 15, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/china-technology
-transfer.html.
49. China Innovation Project, “Made in China 2025
Explained,” Newsletter (blog), Harvard University, accessed
May 24, 2021, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/innovation/
made-china-2025-explained.
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the European company that originated the IP in the
Chinese domestic market and subsequently displacing
it in the global market with its new, often cheaper,
version of the capability.50
As part of a decade-long pattern, the Chinese
government has been directly involved in the
acquisition of hundreds of European companies,
including some in the high-tech, transportation,
infrastructure, and energy sectors.51 But this model
of overt, state-led foreign direct investment has been
dropping sharply in Europe, partly due to China’s
retrenchment and partly due to Europe’s recognition
of China’s predatory investment tactics (which will be
addressed in depth in chapter 4 of this study).52
The risks of these explicitly state-driven activities
are now widely understood in Europe. Many
European countries and the EU have introduced new
screening procedures and restrictions on large foreign
investments and acquisitions in strategic sectors,
including sensitive technologies (which will be

50. Stew Magnuson, “DSEI JAPAN NEWS: Expert Details
What China Does after Stealing IP,” National Defense Magazine,
November 22, 2019, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine
.org/articles/2019/11/22expert-details-what-china-does-after-it
-steals-ip.
51. Michaels, “European Deals”; and “The Future of
Chinese Investment in Europe,” Stratfor Worldview,
February 25, 2021, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article
/future-chinese-investment-europe.
52. GP Bullhound, Inc., “Asia Insights: Q1 Wrap-Up from
One of the First Markets to Reopen” (PowerPoint presentation, GP
Bullhound, Inc., London, UK, May 2020), https://docsend.com
/view/55r4qmv6s5wnf3h5?hsCtaTracking=320f4359-fd0b-4be1
-ac0b-29402daada8e%7C4338ba75-0a0d-4cce-b3d5-ea569358eff5.
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addressed in greater detail in chapter 5 of this study).53
Nevertheless, and as suggested in the preceding
chapter, China’s exploitation of the adverse impact of
the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on
European economies and companies to buy distressed
European assets at bargain rates remains a risk.54
Investments by Chinese Entities Not Explicitly Tied
to the State
China also allows nominally private companies
to play an important role in the government’s plans
to access foreign technology.55 By using Chinese
companies not directly or explicitly tied to the state to
negotiate investments and acquisitions, the Chinese
government has been able on occasion to evade
greater scrutiny in Europe. Through these companies,

53. Sarah Erickson, “Recent Developments in EU Foreign
Investment Screening,” Strategic Technologies Blog, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (website), April 19, 2021,
https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog
/recent-developments-eu-foreign-investment-screening.
54. Elisabeth Braw, “China Is Bargain Hunting—and
Western Security Is at Risk,” Foreign Policy, April 15, 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/15/china-is-bargain
-hunting-and-western-security-is-at-risk/.
55. Loletta Chow, “Transformation and Opportunities:
How Chinese Enterprises Go Abroad amid the New Normal
of COVID-19?,” Ernst and Young (website), October 19, 2020,
https://www.ey.com/en_cn/china-overseas-investment
-network/how-chinese-enterprises-go-abroad-amid-the-new
-normal-of-covid-19.
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China targets acquisitions that appear commercial on
the surface but that could have military applications.56
The Chinese government influences these
companies at various levels.57 Independent reports and
investigations have illuminated government pressure
for companies to build backdoors into products,
networks, or facilities for data theft or government
use.58 The rise in commercial Chinese acquisitions
has continued alongside the Chinese government’s
state-directed industrial and cyber espionage. These
practices have further blurred the lines between statecontrolled and state-influenced firms, making doing
business with Chinese companies more challenging
for Europe.
Chinese Venture Capital in Europe
As scrutiny of Chinese companies with both direct
and indirect ties to the state has increased, China has
adapted its investment activity in Europe to obscure its
56. Peter Chase and Justus Windwehr, “The EU,
Export Controls, and Minding the National Security Gap,”
German Marshall Fund of the United States (website),
January 29, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/news/eu-export
-controls-and-minding-national-security-gap.
57. Liisi Karindi, “How China Is Buying Influence
in Europe,” China Observers in Central and Eastern
Europe (website), July 7, 2020, https://chinaobservers.eu
/how-china-is-buying-influence-in-europe/.
58. Catalin Cimpanu, “FBI Warns US Companies about
Backdoors in Chinese Tax Software,” ZDNet (website),
July 24, 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-warns-us
-companies-about-backdoors-in-chinese-tax-software/; and Swati
Khandelwal, “China Demands Tech Companies to Give Them
Backdoor and Encryption Keys,” Hacker News (website),
February 3, 2015, https://thehackernews.com/2015/02/iphone
-china-backdoor.html.
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sources of capital further and enhance the appearance
of independence from the state. Chinese investors
are becoming more selective, in part to dodge the
CCP’s clamp down on risky investments abroad by
Chinese firms and in part to avoid backlash from
European governments and media.59 Instead of large,
attention-grabbing investments, Chinese companies
are focusing on investments into and acquisitions of
smaller European companies that give them access to
underrated or nascent technologies, components of
technologies, processes, facilities, or talent.
A growing trend in the technology sector involves
using multiple layers of Chinese VC firms to invest in
European start-ups, which are particularly attractive
given their outsize role in innovation and rapid
technology development. Because European startups require significant external capital to grow, they
offer China opportunities to influence and penetrate
them early in their growth cycle. Such VC investments
could allow China to access nascent technology that
could have military applications before these start-ups
can be formally acquired and spotted by European
investment screening tools or before the technology
can be incorporated into European defense systems
and considered classified.60
Many Chinese VC firms also invest in European
start-ups through Western VC firms, in which they
participate as limited partners. As limited partners,
Chinese entities sometimes have access to the
59. Laurens Cerulus et al., “Chinese Tech Companies
Could Face Trouble in Europe,” Politico (website), August 8, 2020,
https://www.politico.eu/article/meet-china-inc-s-firms-that
-could-face-trouble-in-europe-2/.
60. Sabrina Korreck, Exploring the Promises and Perils of
Chinese Investments in Tech Startups: the Case of Germany (New
Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, March 10, 2021).
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technology in which they invest without having their
names made public at any stage.61 Because these
Western firms are not always obliged to disclose
their limited partners, determining how many or
which European start-ups have received Chinese VC
is difficult.
More examples are also surfacing in which big
Chinese firms acquire smaller Chinese companies
and use the smaller companies to make acquisitions
of even smaller European companies in possession of
key technologies.62 In some cases, Chinese companies
make incremental investments or reinvestments in
their European subsidies that are not included in the
original transaction value to avoid most investment
thresholds and screenings (the proposed United
Kingdom investment screening system, discussed
in chapter 5, may be an emerging exception to

61. Elisabeth Braw, “How China Is Buying Up the West’s
High-Tech Sector,” Foreign Policy (website), December 3, 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/03/how-china-is-buying
-up-the-wests-high-tech-sector/; Heather Somerville, “China’s
Penetration of Silicon Valley Creates Risks for Startups,” Reuters
(website), June 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-usa-china-techinvesting-insight/chinas-penetration-of
-silicon-valley-creates-risks-for-startups-idUSKBN1JP08V; and
China International Capital Corporation Limited and Rhodium
Group, Reaching New Heights: an Update on Chinese Investment
into Europe (Washington, DC: Baker & Mackenzie, March 2016).
62. Ding Han and Nikolaus Von Jacobs, “Chinese
Investment in Post-Pandemic Europe,” M&A Review (website),
September 16, 2020, https://ma-review.com/chinese-investment
-in-post-pandemic-europe/; and Don Weinland, “Chinese Firms
Are Quietly Pursuing a New Global Strategy,” Economist,
November 8, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world
-ahead/2021/11/08/chinese-firms-are-quietly-pursuing-a-new
-global-strategy.
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this trend).63 Because many of these deals involve
relatively small amounts of money, European industry
and officials have struggled to grasp the scale of
this issue.
Finally, a relatively newly emerging trend among
top Chinese VC and private equity firms is to set
up separate entities that invest in publicly traded
stocks, particularly in the United States and Europe.64
The threat here is twofold. First, Chinese stakeholders
use their shares to exert influence over companies and
organizations, including silencing their leaders on
political and public-policy issues. This phenomenon
could have spillover effects in the security realm.
For example, a company could be coerced to refuse
to comply with Western security investigations,
resilience requirements, or other national securityrelated requests from allied governments. Second, for
larger investments, companies could be pressured to
engage in the technology transfer of, sharing of, or
even theft of IP against their best interests.65

63. Thilo Hanemann, Rhodium Group, and Mikko Huotari,
EU-China FDI: Working Towards More Reciprocity in Investment
Relations (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies,
April 17, 2018).
64. Juro Osawa, “China Qiming Venture Launches
$500 Million Fund to Invest in Listed Companies,”
Information (website), May 25, 2021, https://www
.theinformation.com/articles/chinas-qiming-venture-launches
-500-million-fund-to-invest-in-listed-companies.
65. Carlos Tejada, “Beg, Borrow, or Steal: How Trump
Says China Takes Technology,” New York Times (website),
March 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22
/business/china-trump-trade-intellectual-property.html.
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Penetration of Raw Material Supply Chains
Over the past two decades, China has developed
a quasimonopoly on the provision of rare-earth
elements (REEs) to the European market through both
mining and refinement. These elements include 15
lanthanides on the periodic table as well as scandium
and yttrium. Although the United States dominated the
REE market 40 years ago, China’s strategic emphasis
on developing the REE supply chain, growing
US environmental concerns over REE extraction and
processing, and the manufacturing base’s shift from
the United States to other countries has shifted REE
supply chains abroad.66 Since then, China has flooded
the market with cheap prices and labor, nearly
eliminating competition.67 Now, China controls more
than 80 percent of global REE production.68
China possesses more natural reserves of rareearth elements than any other country in the world.
In addition, to expand its control of supply, Chinese
state-backed companies have acquired or made major
investments in mines across other REE-rich nations
66. Sabri Ben-Achour, “The US Is Trying to Reclaim
Its Rare-Earth Mantle,” April 30, 2021, Minnesota Public
Radio Marketplace (website), hosted by Kai Ryssdal, podcast,
https://www.marketplace.org/2021/04/30/the-u-s-is
-trying-to-reclaim-its-rare-earth-mantle/.
67. Reuters Staff, “Explainer: China’s Rare Earth
Supplies Could Be Vital Bargaining Chip in US Trade War,”
Reuters (website), May 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-china-rareearth-explainer-idUSKCN1T00EK.
68. NetworkNewsWire, “Importance of Rare Earth
Elements (REEs) Soars as Demand Increases,” Cision PR
Newswire (website), March 16, 2021, https://www.prnewswire
.com/news-releases/importance-of-rare-earth-elements-rees
-soars-as-demand-increases-301248259.html.
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in Africa, South America, and Asia.69 China has also
invested heavily in its refinement capabilities and
facilities.70 Currently, only three major REE production
facilities are located outside of China. Because Europe
lacks any indigenous capability to produce REE
products, it completely relies on China for both supply
and production and refinement.
Without these raw materials, major European
companies and governments cannot produce or
operate critical technologies. This reliance on REEs has
a disproportionate impact on European countries with
large or fast-growing high-tech and manufacturing
sectors, namely Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Knowing the stakes, China uses its access to
and domination of REE supply chains for political
and economic coercion in Europe. For example,
by threatening to cut off REE supplies, China has
pressured foreign governments and companies not
to publicly criticize the Chinese government on

69. K.M. Goodenough et al., “Europe’s Rare Earth
Element Resource Potential: an Overview of REE Metallogenetic
Provinces and Their Geodynamic Setting,” Ore Geology Reviews
72, no. 1 (September 2015).
70. Elliot Smith, “Why Europe Needs to Monitor China’s
Rare Earths Threat,” CNBC (website), June 6, 2019, https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/06/06/rare-earths-why-europe-needs-to
-monitor-chinas-threat.html; and June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s
Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why We Should Care,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute (website), October 7, 2020,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/chinas-monopoly-on
-rare-earth-elements-and-why-we-should-care/.
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policy issues, such as human-rights abuses.71 China
also uses this advantage to sway large trade and
commercial deals in its favor.72 Increasingly, Chinese
REE producers—the six major producers are China
Minmetals Rare Earth Co. Ltd.; Chinalco Rare Earth
& Metals Co.; Guangdong Rising Nonferrous Metals
Group Co., Ltd.; China Northern Rare Earth Group
High-Tech Co. Ltd.; China Southern Rare Earth Group;
and Xiamen Tungsten Co., Ltd.—are engaging in cartel
-like behavior to set prices artificially and limit foreign
consumers’ access to supply for China’s economic and
security benefit.73
Use of Selective Forums
Two important vehicles for translating potential
investment into political influence have been China’s
BRI and its 16+1 format with Central and Eastern
European countries. (In 2019, the 16+1 format
became 17+1 when Greece joined, but the format
reverted to 16+1 in 2021, when Lithuania withdrew.)74
Launched in 2013, the BRI is China’s much-touted
71. Panos
Mourdoukoutas,
“China
Threatens
to
Cut Rare Earths
Supplies to the US—Bad Idea,” Forbes
(website), March 16, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites
/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/05/16/china-threatens-to-cut
-rare-earths-supplies-to-the-us-bad-idea/?sh=340fa7d27486.
72. Reuters Staff, “China’s Rare Earth Supplies.”
73. Tom Daly and Shivani Singh, “China Rare Earth Prices
Soar on Their Potential Role in Trade War,” Reuters (website),
June 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade
-china-rareearths/china-rare-earth-prices-soar-on-their
-potential-role-in-trade-war-idUSKCN1T70IB.
74. Stuart Lau, “Lithuania Pulls Out of China’s ‘17+1’ Bloc in
Eastern Europe,” Politico (website), May 21, 2021, https://www
.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern
-central-europe-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/.
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effort “to strengthen China’s economic linkages
with the rest of Asia, Europe, Africa, and Oceania,”
explains Roger Cliff. According to Cliff, “Although
the initiative entails a range of activities such as free
trade agreements, currency-swap agreements, policy
coordination, and people-to-people exchanges,
most attention has been given to its infrastructure
projects in areas such as transportation, energy, and
telecommunications. Banks controlled by the Chinese
government have pledged nearly $1 trillion in loans
for BRI projects.”75
The 16+1 format (officially known as the
“Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern
European Countries”) refers to interactions between
China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries.
The centerpiece of the relationship is annual summits
that have been held since 2012 among the heads of
government of the participating countries, but many
other activities and enterprises involving China and
the other countries are also billed as being part of
the initiative. These activities and enterprises include
ministerial and technical dialogues and meetings; joint
conferences; a Virtual Technology Center in Nanjing;
and a Technology Transfer Center in Bratislava,
Slovakia; as well as sports, music, films, martial
arts, books, theaters, and folk-art events. Central
and Eastern European countries have been eager to
participate in these activities because of the promise
of China investing its considerable capital in their
economies as well as China’s potential as a market
for their exports. In addition, Chinese banks have
been willing to loan money to Central and Eastern
European governments for projects the EU and
75.

Cliff, New US Strategy, 36.
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Western commercial banks have assessed as being too
risky or not profitable.76
The influence derived from these programs appears
to be limited and waning, at least in some parts of
Europe, primarily because participating countries
have not reaped significant benefits. The BRI projects
that have been proposed in Europe, for example,
are far less ambitious than the huge infrastructure
investments announced for countries elsewhere in the
world. Likewise, the dialogues and cultural events
associated with the 16+1 mechanism have not been
accompanied by significant actual investment in these
countries. Nevertheless, both China and the Central
and Eastern European governments have attempted
to exaggerate the magnitude of the investments by
including previously announced investment plans
and loans that were never implemented. Since 2013,
for example, China has been repeating a pledge for a
$10 billion (now $11 billion) credit line, but very few
funds have been disbursed.77 Indeed, the majority
of Chinese investment in Europe is in Western
76. Emilian Kavalski, “China’s ‘16+1’ Is Dead? Long Live
the ‘17+1,’” Diplomat (website), March 29, 2019, https://the
diplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171/;
Dams, Martin, and Kranenburg, China’s Soft Power in Europe, 8–9;
Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 48, 64–66, 70–71, 83;
and Malgorzata Jankowska, The Great Puzzle: China in Central and
Eastern Europe (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, DE: George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies, March 2019).
77. Godement and Vasselier, China at the Gates, 18–19, 32,
38, 66–67, 72, 79; Furst, “Czech Republic,” 24; Tamas Matura,
Chinese Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: a Reality
Check (Budapest: Central and East European Center for Asian
Studies, April 2021); Jankowska, The Great Puzzle; Godement,
“China’s Relations with Europe,” 259; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook; and Stuart Lau,
“Lithuania Pulls Out.”
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European countries such as France, Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, not Central and Eastern
European countries.
Chinese Investment Trends in Europe Today
Starting in the early 2010s, Chinese investment in
Europe began to increase significantly. This increase
was part of a broader trend in Chinese investment:
By 2014, Chinese outbound foreign direct investment
(OFDI) had exceeded inbound foreign direct
investment for the first time, which was significant
given China’s status at the time as a developing
country.78 Nonetheless, Europe was particularly
attractive because it represented a relatively friendlier
investment environment compared to the United
States, which has increasingly viewed Chinese
investment through a national security lens, and
because Europe comprised advanced economies that
were useful to Beijing’s strategy, as outlined earlier in
this chapter. Additionally, Chinese investors found
significantly undervalued assets in Europe because
governments there were forced to privatize in the
name of shedding debt. In sum, Chinese investment in
Europe rose from roughly €700 million in completed
transactions in 2008 to a peak of €37.3 billion in
completed transactions in 2016, before once again
declining to €11.7 billion by 2019.79
These investments—especially in terms of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A)—were mostly concentrated
in a few key countries, with the United Kingdom (30
78. Alicia García-Herrero, “China’s Outward Foreign
Direct Investment,” Bruegel (website), Blog Post, June 28, 2015,
https://www.bruegel.org/2015/06/chinas-outward-foreign
-direct-investment/.
79. Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe.
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percent), France (18 percent), Germany (13 percent),
and Italy (11 percent) receiving the lion’s share.80
Nonetheless, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and other smaller countries
also saw Chinese investment grow significantly in
the wake of the Great Recession and eurozone crises.
Moreover, although most Chinese investment in
Europe before the Great Recession was concentrated in
the financial services sector (50 percent) and the natural
resources industry (35 percent), Chinese investment
since then has been far more diversified. For example,
utilities infrastructure received the largest portion—
roughly 18 percent—while electronics and electrical
equipment rose from 0.3 percent ($33 million) in
the years before the Great Recession to 5.6 percent
($2 billion) in the years afterward. This shift aligned
well with Chinese strategic objectives and policies,
including Made in China 2025.
Most of these investments—roughly 60 percent—
were made by Chinese state-owned enterprises,
which are directly tied to the central government and,
hence, to the CCP.81 The same applies to investments
in Europe made by the Chinese sovereign wealth
fund, known as the China Investment Corporation.
Ostensibly, private Chinese firms have increasingly
invested in Europe as well. But the 2017 National
Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China
80. Yuan Ma and Henk Overbeek, “Chinese Foreign
Direct Investment in the European Union: Explaining Changing
Patterns,” Global Affairs 1, no. 4–5 (October 2015): 441–54.
81. Matt Schrader, “China Is Weaponizing Globalization,”
Foreign Policy (website), June 5, 2020, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2020/06/05/china-globalization-weaponizing-trade
-communist-party/; and Felicty M. Yost, “Divisive Economic
Device? Understanding China’s Choice to Create a Sovereign
Wealth Fund,” Cornell International Affairs Review 4, no. 2 (2011).
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further blurred the line between private entities and
the Chinese state, obliging the former to be a potential
espionage tool of the latter.82
Chinese OFDI into Europe began to decrease
after 2016 though, as Chinese authorities began to
scrutinize such investments more closely. This higher
scrutiny occurred in part to ensure investments were
aligned with national interests and in part to avoid
or eliminate irrational risk taking, investments in
“trophy assets” like sports clubs, and investments
made to move funds offshore.83 Ultimately, and
somewhat belatedly, Chinese authorities unveiled
regulations in October 2017 that were designed to
codify these restrictions, resulting in the classification
of OFDI into three categories: encouraged, restricted,
and prohibited transactions. These regulations, jointly
issued by the National Development and Reform
Commission of the People’s Republic of China, the
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China, the People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
were known as “the Opinions on Further Guiding and
Regulating the Direction of Outbound Investments.”

82. Murray Scot Tanner, “Beijing’s New National
Intelligence Law: from Defense to Offense,” Lawfare
(blog),
July
20,
2017,
https://www.lawfareblog.com
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83. Cindy Lo et al., “China’s New Restrictions on Outbound
Investments and Remittance,” Allen & Overy, December 30,
2016,
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and
-insights/publications/chinas-new-restrictions-on-outbound
-investments-and-remittance; and David M. Blumental et al.,
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Encouraged investments included:
•
•

projects related to the BRI;
high-tech businesses, advanced manufacturing
enterprises, and overseas R&D centers;

•

oil, gas, mineral, and energy resource projects;

•

agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and
fisheries; and

•

service sectors, such as commerce, culture, and
logistics.

Restricted investments included:
•

real estate, hotels, cinemas, the entertainment
sector, and sports clubs;

•

equity investment funds or investment
platforms that lacked an underlying operating
business; and

•

outdated
and
obsolete
equipment and technologies.

manufacturing

Finally, prohibited investments included:
•

the export of core military technologies and
products without Chinese approval; and

•

technologies, techniques, and products that
were banned for export from China.

These new controls as well as the imposition
of investment screening mechanisms by some
European countries (which chapter 5 addresses in
detail) led to a drop in Chinese OFDI in Europe and
elsewhere through the late 2010s.84 The downturn in
84. Derek Scissors, China’s Global Investment Vanishes under
COVID-19 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,
July 2020).
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Chinese OFDI in Europe brought about by these two
factors was then compounded by the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
As a result, Chinese investment in the EU plus the
United Kingdom fell in 2020 to $6.5 billion (completed
foreign direct investment), down from $11.7 billion in
2019, which was already lower than in 2018. Overall,
both the value and the number of Chinese investment
deals in the EU were lower than they had been in
previous years. (The figures for all of Europe—that
is, including non-EU members—were slightly larger
in 2020 at $7.2 billion, down from $13.4 billion in
2019.)85 These annual figures, however, are somewhat
deceiving. The figures cited above are aggregate, yearon-year comparisons. If the data is disaggregated
by quarter, Chinese investment in Europe appears
to begin to rebound starting in the fourth quarter
of 2020.86
The late 2020 rebound in Chinese investment in
Europe resulted from several factors. First, the overall
cost for Chinese entities to invest overseas fell after
the US Federal Reserve Board introduced a massive
monetary stimulus to boost the US economy.87
Specifically, the board cut the federal funds rate to
lower the cost of borrowing; made up to $2.3 trillion
85. Agatha Kratz, Max Zenglein, and Gregor Sebastian,
Chinese FDI in Europe: 2020 Update (Berlin: Mercator Institute
for China Studies, June 2021); and Alicia Garcia Herrero and
Jianwei Xu, “China’s M&A Activity Enlivens with Clear
Focus on EU,” Asia Times (website), March 30, 2021,
https://asiatimes.com/2021/03/chinas-ma-activity
-enlivens-with-clear-focus-on-eu/.
86. Asia-based economist employed by a European
investment bank, interview by the author, April 9, 2021.
87. Asia-based economist employed by a European
investment bank, e-mail message to author, July 8, 2021.
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n lending available to support US households,
employers, financial markets, and state and local
governments; and took several other steps to ensure
adequate liquidity in the US economy.88 These moves
had spillover effects beyond the United States’ borders.
Like those of other countries, Chinese companies
tend to finance their acquisitions in big offshore
markets in US dollars. Increased dollar liquidity
and lowered dollar borrowing costs functioned as
a rising tide that lifted many boats, not simply those
in the United States. Officials at the Federal Reserve
have indicated they may begin the process of ending
stimulus policies in late 2021, after which borrowing
costs will increase.89 When financing their investments
in US dollars, Chinese firms (as well as those of other
countries) found it cheaper to borrow, incentivizing
investment abroad.
Additionally, China’s fast domestic recovery and
much laxer global financial conditions and the buying
opportunities in COVID-19-hit countries contributed
to the turnaround in Chinese investment in Europe
in late 2020.90 As a result, both the value and number
of the announced deals during the fourth quarter of
2020 were only moderately lower than in the last
quarter of 2019.
Chinese acquisitions in Europe in the last year
have tended to target medium-sized enterprises, and
they have tended to be more strategic—that is, deals
88. Jeffrey Cheng et al., What’s the Fed Doing in Response to
the COVID-19 Crisis? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
March 30, 2021).
89. Nick Timiraos, “Fed Signals Asset Purchases Likely to
Slow This Year,” Wall Street Journal (website), updated August
18, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-debated-timing
-mechanics-of-stimulus-pullback-at-july-meeting-11629309648.
90. Herrero and Xu, “China’s M&A Activity.”
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have been concentrated in a limited number of key
sectors, mostly involving higher-end technology as
well as infrastructure and some industrial sectors that
rely on advanced technology, such as robotics and
auto manufacturing. (The EU defines “medium-sized”
as companies that have fewer than 250 employees and
annual turnover below €50 million or a balance sheet
below €43 million.)91 Notable deals in 2020 included
GLP’s acquisition of the Goodman Group logistics
and warehouse portfolio in Poland and other Central
European countries; the China Evergrande Group’s
acquisition of National Electric Vehicle Sweden;
Tianjin Zhonghuan Semiconductor’s acquisition of
a 29 percent stake in Maxeon Solar Technologies,
Ltd., in France; and the China Railway Construction
Corporation Limited’s acquisition of the Spanish
engineering and construction firm Aldesa Group.92
Geographically, the top European recipients of
Chinese investment in 2020 were France, Germany,
Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In terms of the Chinese entities buying up
European assets, state-owned enterprises have
become less important over time. From 2014 to 2017,
state-owned investment typically made up more than
half of total Chinese investment in Europe. Since then,
investment by state-owned enterprises has been more
91. Tracy Wut et al., Reassessing the Landscape for
Chinese Investment in North America and Europe (Chicago:
Baker & McKenzie, April 2021); Asia-based economist
employed by a European investment bank, interview by the
author, April 9, 2021; Herrero and Xu, “China’s M&A Activity”;
and Kratz, Zenglein, and Sebastian, Chinese FDI in Europe.
92. Wut et al., Reassessing the Landscape for Chinese
Investment; and Asia-based economist employed by a European
investment bank, interview by the author, April 9, 2021.
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muted.93 But this distinction is largely meaningless,
considering the 2017 national intelligence and security
law referenced previously.
Looking ahead to 2022 and beyond, the outlook
among experts is mixed. Some expect the slower
momentum of M&A activity seen during most of
2020 to continue, at least initially, in part thanks
to somewhat high asset valuations, which make
investments more expensive. Other factors that may
contribute to a slower pace of M&A activity include the
gradual strengthening of regulatory barriers in Europe
and continued disruption caused by COVID-19.94
Moreover, more liquidity is available in the European
market today thanks to expansionary fiscal policies,
including tax cuts and increased government spending
on projects such as infrastructure improvements.
These policies are meant to boost the economy and
fend off an even deeper recession, meaning public
and private entities may feel less pressure to secure a
non-European lender of last resort, at least over the
next two years.95
In contrast, others expect the rebound seen in late
2020 to continue, perhaps robustly, especially if the
Chinese economy continues to emerge strongly from
the pandemic and Beijing continues to view its OFDI
in Europe as beneficial to export ties and a means to

93. Wut et al., Reassessing the Landscape.
94. Wut et al., Reassessing the Landscape; and Kratz,
Zenglein, and Sebastian, Chinese FDI in Europe.
95. Atlantic Council, Trends in 2020 & Beyond: Assessing
Chinese Investment in North America and Europe, Atlantic
Council (website), April 19, 2021, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=A1mslscq8qU.
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other ends, such as technology transfer.96 Already,
evidence suggests Beijing is loosening controls on
capital outflows, primarily to reduce the possibility of
speculative bubbles (a speculative bubble is a sharp,
steep rise in prices fueled by market sentiment and
momentum) in China as well as to make Chinese
companies more competitive abroad.97 This loosening
of controls makes it more likely Chinese entities will
look overseas for investment opportunities, including
among the advanced economies of Europe.
On a related point, any increase in Chinese OFDI
flows into Europe is likely to be in terms of M&A
activity, even though not many bargains are available,
at least in Western Europe, given the stronger position
of most Western European governments and firms.
Less likely is significant investment in new productive
capacity or so-called “greenfield investments,” given
Chinese desires to buy mature, advanced European
96. Derek Scissors, China’s Coming Global Investment
Recovery: How Far Will It Go? (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 2021); Herrero and Xu, “China’s M&A
Activity”; “Global M&A Industry Trends: Fierce Competition
Ahead for Dealmakers Shaping the Post-Pandemic Economy,”
PwC (website), January 3, 2021, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en
/services/deals/trends.html; and Atlantic Council, Trends in
2020 and Beyond.
97. Bloomberg News, “China Mulls Easing Capital
Controls on Offshore Investments,” BloombergQuint (website),
updated February 21, 2021, https://www.bloombergquint
.com/markets/china-mulls-easing-capital-controls-on
-offshore-investments;
Asia-based
economist
employed
by a European investment bank, interview by the author,
April 9, 2021; Alexis Crow, “Trends in 2020 & Beyond”; and
Karen Yeung, “China’s Strict Capital Controls May Be Eased
to Allow Investment Abroad As Bubble Risks Grow,” South
China Morning Post (website), March 4, 2021, https://www
.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3124029
/chinas-strict-capital-controls-may-be-eased-allow-investment.
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companies in furtherance of Beijing’s national
security goals. Paradoxically, as European sensitivity
to Chinese investment grows—a subject the next
chapter addresses in depth—greenfield investment
may attract less scrutiny, but this kind of Chinese
investment is more likely in developing economies.
Most global M&A activity in the coming year or two
is expected in the technology and health-care sectors;
here, European companies are set to attract more than
60 percent of the technology deals in value terms.98
Summary
Based on the significant resources, personnel,
and attention China has devoted to Europe over the
last decade, Beijing perceives Europe as increasingly
important to the achievement of the former’s goals.
These goals include maintaining robust growth rates
for China’s economy, transforming China into a
world technology leader, developing an increasingly
capable military, making progress toward recovering
territories that are viewed as part of China but were lost
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and increasing China’s prestige and influence in the
international community. More specifically, Chinese
leaders apparently hope to expand the economic
benefits China derives from Europe, acquire European
technology for both economic and military purposes,
and increase China’s influence in Europe.
China pursues these goals and objectives through
several policies, including official diplomatic
relations; public diplomacy; cyber operations; trade;
98. UN Conference on Trade and Development, Investment
Trends Monitor, no. 38 (Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and
Development, January 2021).
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scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges;
Chinese media operations; the funding of public
policy organizations and events in Europe; cultivating
relations with influential Europeans; and investment.
Chinese investment in Europe focuses on integrated
circuits, broadband communications, machine tools,
robots and artificial intelligence, biopharmaceuticals,
shipbuilding, automobiles, space, the aviation
industry, and infrastructure. Not coincidentally, many
of these industries are part of the Made in China 2025
initiative, through which Beijing hopes to dominate
global high-tech manufacturing.
Chinese investment in Europe peaked in 2016
and has fallen since then. The outlook for 2022 and
beyond is mixed. Some expect the slower momentum
of Chinese investment activity to continue, thanks to
high asset valuations and the gradual strengthening of
regulatory barriers in Europe. In contrast, others expect
recent signs of a rebound to continue, especially if the
Chinese economy continues to emerge strongly from
the pandemic, Beijing continues to pursue technology
transfer in Europe, and Chinese authorities continue
to loosen capital outflows and as Beijing develops
tactics to elude European regulations. Even if a recent
rebound appears to be underway—with Chinese
investment and related activity in Europe expanding
in the wake of the pandemic-induced recession—
European sensitivity toward and concern over the
same is likely to continue. The next chapter examines
the shift in European attitudes toward China over the
last several years.
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Just as China’s economic relationship with Europe
has blossomed over the last decade and looks set to
grow once again in some respects, European attitudes
toward China have significantly evolved over the
same period. Overall, Europeans have become more
skeptical of China, especially during the coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Though the main
driver of this change is economic and has to do with
the changing calculus of the benefits of commercial
engagement with China, several other external factors
have also contributed. These factors include European
dissatisfaction with the country’s increasingly
authoritarian turn under President Xi Jinping, the
country’s deteriorating human-rights record, and
Beijing’s growing assertiveness abroad against the
backdrop of deepening Sino-American competition.
A crucial turning point in the evolving European
debate came in March 2019 when an official EU
strategy document labeled China for the first time as a
“systemic rival” (in addition to calling it an “economic
competitor” and a “partner”).1 The same month,
French President Emmanuel Macron declared “the
time of European naivete” toward Beijing’s ambitions

1. Filip Šebok, “Partner, Competitor, Rival. How to
Understand EU’s Conflicting China Policy?,” MapInfluenCE
(website), May 4, 2021, https://mapinfluence.eu/en/partner
-competitor-rival-how-to-understand-eus-conflicting-china
-policy/.
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was over.2 In 2020, China’s uncertain handling of the
initial phase of the COVID-19 outbreak and Beijing’s
assertiveness in its aftermath further reinforced
skepticism toward China in Europe. But the pandemic
and the finalization of negotiations between Brussels
and Beijing on the aforementioned Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment (CAI) in December 2020
have highlighted the widening gap between those
in the European debate who still favor continued
pragmatic engagement on trade and those who wish
to see a more robust approach toward China.
Europe’s Evolving Perceptions of China
Historically speaking, European public opinion
of China has been either slightly positive or slightly
negative, not extreme in either way. China’s fast
economic rise and its culture have tended to be
perceived as nonthreatening to most Europeans,
a factor that has likely been amplified by China’s
geographical distance and a long-held European belief
in the inevitability of liberal democracy spreading the
world over.
Even so, views of China have tended to vary
somewhat within Europe. Until around 2017,
perceptions of China were positive, especially in many
Central, Eastern, and Southern European countries.
Among Central and Eastern European countries, many
hoped China would fund infrastructure projects—
for example, through the 16+1 format. Similarly, in
Southern Europe, China’s rise was initially greeted as
an important new source of foreign direct investments
2. Michael Peel, “Macron Hails ‘End of Europe Naïveté’
towards China,” Financial Times (website), March 22, 2019, https://
www.ft.com/content/ec9671ae-4cbb-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62.
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after the global financial crisis. Though most
Europeans still generally regard trade with China as
positive, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and
Southern Europe tend to have more favorable views of
Chinese investments and the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) than those in Western Europe. As recently as
2018, in a survey of perceptions among business and
political elites in the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal,
and Serbia, China’s growing business presence was
still seen as overwhelmingly positive.3
This view has changed. Across the board,
Europeans have gradually become more skeptical
of China in recent years. One pan-European poll
from late 2020 found views of China in 13 European
countries were predominantly unfavorable (the 13
countries were the Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).4
Western and Northern European countries tend
to have the most negative views, and Central and
Eastern Europeans have the most positive views,
with Southern Europeans somewhere in the middle.
Countries with the most negative views included
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. On the opposite end were
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain. Even among
countries like Hungary, whose government has
sought to maintain close diplomatic ties to Beijing,
public opinion has turned more negative. Moreover,
3. Philippe Le Corre, China’s Rise as a Geoeconomic
Influencer: Four European Case Studies (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, October 2018).
4. Richard Q. Turcsányi et al., European Public Opinion on
China in the Age of COVID-19: Differences and Common Ground
across the Continent (Olomouc, CZ, and Bratislava, SK: Palacký
University Olomouc and Central European Institute of Asian
Studies, 2020).
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European publics generally have low regard for Xi
Jinping’s leadership. According to the Pew Research
Center, most survey respondents have no confidence
at all in Xi’s actions in the global arena, with Sweden
and Denmark being the most skeptical; see figure 4-1
for the percentage of Europeans with unfavorable
views of China categorized by country.5 Even so,
Europeans overwhelmingly still think cooperation
with China is necessary to tackle global issues such as
climate change, pandemics, and underdevelopment
in Africa.

Figure 4-1. Percentages of Europeans with unfavorable views
of China

5. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang,
Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 6, 2020); and
Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, People around the
Globe Are Divided in Their Opinions of China (Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center, December 5, 2019).

72

European Attitudes toward Chinese Economic Statecraft
Until around 2016, most European industrial and
political leaders still predominantly viewed China
through a commercial lens, expecting deeper economic
integration and believing the impact of globalization
would eventually lead to greater economic and
political openness. Since China joined the World
Trade Organization in 2001, European trade with
China has rapidly expanded. China’s fast economic
growth—becoming the world’s second biggest
economy in 2010 and even surpassing the United
States as the EU’s biggest trading partner in goods
in 2020—means selling to and accessing the Chinese
market became a key imperative for many European
export businesses during the past two decades.6 This
change in dynamics especially affected German auto
manufacturers, for whom China is today the leading
export market. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, this
period of forging deepening trade ties with China was
heralded as the “golden era” of Sino-British relations.7
Europeans were not completely unaware of the
economic challenges posed by China’s rise. For
instance, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China in
its annual reports has for many years raised the issue
of the unlevel playing field European businesses
operating in China are facing compared with Chinese
companies in Europe. In Europe, Chinese companies,
6. “China Overtakes US as EU’s Biggest Trading Partner,”
BBC News (website), February 17, 2021, https://www.bbc.com
/news/business-56093378.
7. Reuters Staff, “China, Britain to Benefit from ‘Golden Era’
in Ties – Cameron,” Reuters (website), October 17, 2015, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-britain/china-britain
-to-benefit-from-golden-era-in-ties-cameron
-idUSKCN0SB10M20151017.
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which are often subsidized by Beijing to begin with,
have largely unfettered access to the common market.
Meanwhile, in China, European companies suffer from
delayed information relative to domestic companies,
tenders announced via obscure channels, and unfair
and corrupt awarding and appeals processes.
Moreover, the EU’s strategy toward China from
2016 pointed to several bilateral economic challenges.
Concerns cited were forced technology transfers,
excessive state subsidies, intellectual property theft,
and limited market access for European companies in
many industries. The EU has gradually lost patience
with China’s inability to deliver on better market
access for European companies while simultaneously
developing a greater consciousness of Chinese
predatory economic practices in Europe.
Two oft-cited wake-up calls were Chinese
appliance company Midea Group’s takeover of the
German robotics firm KUKA and the China National
Chemical Corporation’s acquisition of the Swiss
agrichemical company the Syngenta Group, both in
2016. These and other similar takeovers highlighted
the long-term risks to European competitiveness in
critical technology areas that are part of Beijing’s
ambitious Made in China 2025 initiative. Particularly
in Western European countries with a strong research
and innovation base and high-tech industries,
China’s deliberate targeting of strategic sectors and
infrastructure for political, economic, and military
gains has come to be seen as constituting an almost
existential economic challenge, fundamentally
undermining European economic strength.
Reflecting this sentiment, a seminal report from
the German business lobbying group Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie in January 2019 called
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China a “systemic competitor.” The Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie, or Federation of German
Industries, is the umbrella organization of German
industry and industry-related service providers.
The organization represents 38 industrial-sector
federations and has 15 regional offices in the German
federal states. The organization speaks for more than
100,000 private enterprises that employ around eight
million people.8 Echoing these shifting attitudes,
the EU labeled China as a “systemic rival” in a
March 2019 strategy paper referenced earlier in this
chapter. Along similar lines, in 2020, a report from the
Confederation of European Business, a pan-European
business lobbying group in Brussels, also mentioned
China’s “systemic challenges” and the need for a level
economic playing field with China.9
The BRI represents another instance of Europe’s
changing perceptions of China’s economic rise. Both
the EU and many of its member states have grown
more cautious and apprehensive about Beijing’s
intentions behind the BRI and about how some of
its projects are being implemented. This wariness is
especially prevalent in vulnerable Balkan countries
such as Montenegro, which has assumed unhealthy
levels of Chinese debt, and Serbia, which has become
a political ally of China.
Concerns leveled against BRI projects have to do
with China’s lack of respect for labor, environmental,
8. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, “Strengthen the
European Union to Better Compete with China,” Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie (website), January 10, 2019, https://
english.bdi.eu/article/news/strengthen-the-european
-union-to-better-compete-with-china/.
9. BusinessEurope, The EU and China—Addressing the
Systemic Challenge: a Comprehensive EU Strategy to Rebalance the
Relationship with China (Brussels: BusinessEurope, 2020).
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and human-rights standards; insufficient transparency
and open procurement; and debt sustainability.10
Moreover, Brussels views the 16+1 format as a tool
for Beijing to divide EU countries and influence
EU decision making. China has had some isolated
successes in this regard. For example, in June 2017,
Greece—then led by a leftist government—blocked
an EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council
criticizing China’s human-rights record, and in July
2016, Greece and Hungary sought to block an EU
statement on the South China Sea.11 More recently, in
the spring of 2021, Hungary attempted to block two
EU statements on human-rights abuses in Xinjiang
and Hong Kong.12
Some of the governments that willingly signed up
for the BRI are now growing dissatisfied with the lack
of Chinese follow-through and specific construction
project terms. For example, six regional leaders
10. Jyrki Katainen, “European Commission Vice-President
Jyrki Katainen Speech at Belt and Road Forum Leaders’ Round
Table,” press release no. 170516_17, Delegation of the European
Union to China (website), May 16, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu
/delegations/china/26154/european-commission-vice
-president-jyrki-katainen-speech-belt-and-road-forum-leaders
-round_en.
11. Robin Emmott and Angeliki Koutantuo, “Greece
Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights at UN,”
Reuters (website), June 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human
-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP; and Robin Emmott, “EU’s
Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions,” Reuters
(website), July 15, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article
/southchinasea-ruling-eu-idUSL8N1A130Y.
12. John Chalmers and Robin Emmott, “Hungary Blocks EU
Statement Criticizing China over Hong Kong, Diplomats Say,”
Reuters (website), April 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com
/world/asia-pacific/hungary-blocks-eu-statement-criticising
-china-over-hong-kong-diplomats-say-2021-04-16/.
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decided to skip the most recent 16+1 summit chaired
by Xi in February 2021, and, as noted, Lithuania
recently left the group altogether.13 In Greece, China
Ocean Shipping Company, Limited also recently
encountered strong local opposition from shipowners,
labor unions, and local politicians, even though
port capacity in Piraeus has expanded under the
company’s auspices.14 Countries that hoped to benefit
from BRI investments in underserved areas, such as
infrastructure, energy, and transportation, have been
disappointed with China’s lack of results.
One notable exception to this trend is Hungary,
which remains China’s closest partner inside the EU,
even though few examples of successful Chinese
infrastructure projects in the country are discernible
and nascent opposition to closer HungarianChinese ties has emerged.15 The highly touted $1.1
billion railway between Budapest and Belgrade has
encountered numerous problems, resulting in delays
and corruption allegations.16 But the main reason for
Hungary’s close relations with China has less to do
13. Stuart Lau, “China’s Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the
Cold Shoulder,” Politico (website), February 9, 2021, https://
www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade
-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.
14. Jens Kastner and Giannis Seferiadis, “COSCO Faces
Backlash As It Moves to Tighten Grip on Greek Port,” Nikkei Asia
(website), December 29, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business
/Transportation/COSCO-faces-backlash-as-it-moves-to-tighten
-grip-on-Greek-port.
15. “Budapest Protest against China’s Fudan University
Campus,” BBC News (website), June 5, 2021, https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-europe-57372653.
16. Andreea Brînză, “China and the Budapest-Belgrade
Railway Saga,” Diplomat (website), April 28, 2020, https://
thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-the-budapest
-belgrade-railway-saga/.
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with any affection for Beijing and more to do with
Chinese investments enabling Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán’s kleptocratic regime.17 Additionally, Budapest
occasionally leverages its ties to China against
Brussels, pointing out it has political alternatives.
Today, few in the EU have any remaining illusions
about China’s economic rise. As a result, desire is
growing to shore up the continent’s trade defenses
against unfair Chinese practices in the name of
bolstering European sovereignty. Efforts to fulfill
this vision include tightening investment screening
mechanisms, which the next chapter addresses in
depth, as well as curbing Chinese subsidies, limiting
Chinese access to the European procurement market,
and restricting technology transfers.18 Even member
states that are traditionally known to be staunch free
traders, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, have
eventually come around to at least tolerating these
somewhat more protectionist measures.
At the same time, European businesses are not
keen to abandon lucrative trade and investment deals
with China either. Given China’s role as a leading
global economic powerhouse and concerns about US
economic nationalism, many in European business and
political establishments favor continued engagement
with China on trade, albeit with a greater emphasis
on reciprocity and a level playing field. These voices
17. Erik Brattberg et al., Chinese Influence in Southeastern,
Central, and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in
Four Countries (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 13, 2021).
18. Philippe Le Corre and Erik Brattberg, “How the
Coronavirus Pandemic Shattered Europe’s Illusions of China,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 9, 2020,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/09/how-coronavirus
-pandemic-shattered-europe-s-illusions-of-china-pub-82265.
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also reject the notion of economic decoupling, which
has become increasingly popular among some
policymakers in Washington.19
Leading the proengagement camp in Europe is
Germany, the only European country with a sizable
trade surplus with China. Former German Chancellor
Angela Merkel was the instrumental force behind
bringing the negotiations on the CAI to a close in
late December 2020.20 Pressure on Berlin, however, is
mounting both from other member-state capitals who
are concerned with Germany and France—the largest
and most important economies in the EU—pursuing
their own China strategy on behalf of the EU and from
within the German political system, especially the
Green Party of Germany.
Backlash during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Without a doubt, China’s image in Europe
has been severely damaged during the COVID19 pandemic. Beijing’s poor handling of the initial
outbreak, attempts to deny the origin of the virus,
and aggressive diplomacy during the pandemic have
19. Daniel Michaels, “European Business Leaders
Want a Stronger Hand With China, Not Decoupling,” Wall
Street Journal, July 4, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/european-business-leaders-want-a-stronger-hand-with-china
-not-decoupling-11625454000; and European Union Chamber
of Commerce in China and Mercator Institute for China
Studies, Decoupling: Severed Ties and Patchwork Globalisation,
January 2021, https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2021-01
/Decoupling_EN.pdf.
20. Hans Von Der Burchard, “Merkel Pushes EU-China
Investment Deal Over the Finish Line Despite Criticism,”
Politico (website), December 29, 2020, https://www.politico.eu
/article/eu-china-investment-deal-angela-merkel-pushes-finish
-line-despite-criticism/.
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reinforced unfavorable opinions of China across
the continent.
The COVID-19 pandemic provided both an early
challenge and an opportunity for China in Europe. In
early 2020, as Europe became one of the pandemic’s
earliest epicenters, China actively stepped in to
provide assistance to bolster its soft power, promote
itself as a generous and responsible international
actor, demonstrate the West’s relative inability to
respond to the virus, and distract Europe from China’s
own handling of the virus. These Chinese “mask
diplomacy” efforts in Europe included donations of
planeloads of masks, ventilators, testing kits, and
other medical equipment to the European countries
that had been hit hardest by the pandemic initially,
such as Italy and Spain.21 Although China scored some
isolated early diplomatic wins, such as generating
praise from European leaders like Italy’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs Luigi di Maio and Spanish Prime
Minister Pedro Sánchez, its tactics mostly backfired
as more European leaders began to push back against
China’s public relations offensive.22
21. Brian Wong, “China’s Mask Diplomacy,” Diplomat
(website), March 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03
/chinas-mask-diplomacy/.
22. Matthew
Karnitschnig,
“China
Is
Winning
the Coronavirus Propaganda War,” Politico (website),
March 18, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus
-china-winning-propaganda-war/; Jacopo Barigazzi, “Italy’s
Foreign Minister Hails Chinese Coronavirus Aid,” Politico
(website), March 13, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article
/italys-foreign-minister-hails-chinese-caronavirus-aid/;
and Martin Arostegui, “Chinese Virus Aid to Europe Raises
Long-Term Concerns,” Voice of America, March 23, 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus
-outbreak/chinese-virus-aid-europe-raises-long-term-concerns.
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More recently, China has also engaged in so-called
“vaccine diplomacy,” consisting primarily of vaccine
donations, a strategy that has served to increase
Chinese leverage, especially in some already Chinafriendly countries like Hungary and Serbia.23 China has
also conditioned the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines
on favorable foreign policy decisions in recipient
countries. For instance, evidence has emerged Beijing
threatened to withhold vaccines unless Ukraine
dropped its support for an investigation into humanrights violations in Xinjiang.24
The pandemic has also corresponded with a sharp
uptick in Chinese so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy”
efforts in Europe as part of a global public relations
ampaign.25 These efforts have included more overt
Chinese influence operations and disinformation tactics
with sinister narratives, such as the virus originated
in Italy or the United States.26 Chinese diplomatic
spokespersons, ambassadors, and mouthpiece media
outlets have also waged an assertive and oftentimes
even aggressive pushback against European
23. Grzegorz Stec and Lucrezia Poggetti, “Beijing’s
Vaccine Diplomacy Bears Fruit in Central and Eastern Europe,”
in MERICS EU-China Briefing (Berlin: Mercator Institute for
China Studies, February 24, 2021).
24. Jamey Keaten, “AP Exclusive: Diplomats Say China
Puts Squeeze on Ukraine,” AP News (website), June 25, 2021,
https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-china-europe
-ukraine-health-a0a5ae8f735b92e39c623e453529cbb9.
25. Kathy Gilsinan, “How China Is Planning to Win Back the
World,” Atlantic (website), May 28, 2020, https://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation
-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/.
26. Javier C. Hernández, “China Peddles Falsehoods
to Obscure Origin of COVID Pandemic,” New York Times
(website), January 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/12/06/world/asia/china-covid-origin-falsehoods.html.
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governments, media, nongovernmental organizations,
and experts Beijing disagrees with. These tactics have
clearly backfired and have turned both European
public and elite opinions toward China even more
negative. For example, the EU’s High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Josep Borrell Fontelles, spoke about the need for
the EU to engage in a “battle of narratives” against
China, and European Commission President Ursula
von der Leyen publicly criticized China for carrying
out cyberattacks against European hospitals during
the pandemic.27
At the same time, the EU has showed a lack of
resolve by allegedly watering down the findings of
a special report on disinformation and propaganda
produced by the European External Action Service
during the pandemic and by allowing an op-ed from
the EU ambassadors in Beijing to be censored by
Chinese authorities.28 Key leaders such have also been
hesitant in publicly condemning China’s targeting
27. European External Action Service, EEAS Special
Report: Disinformation on the Coronavirus—Short Assessment of the
Information Environment (Brussels: European External Action
Service, March 19, 2020); and Laurens Cerulus, “Von der Leyen
Calls Out China for Hitting Hospitals with Cyberattacks,”
Politico (website), June 22, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article
/eu-calls-out-china-for-hitting-hospitals-with-cyberattacks/.
28. “EU Waters Down Report on China’s Coronavirus
Propaganda,” New York Times (website), updated April 30, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/world/coronavirus
-world-tracker.html; and Michael Birnbaum, “EH defends
Handling of China Relations after Beijing Censors Op-Ed Written
by Bloc’s Ambassadors,” Washington Post (website), May 7, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/eu-defends
-handling-of-china-relations-after-beijing-censors
-op-ed-by-blocs-ambassadors/2020/05/07/fd2ac638-9066-11ea
-9322-a29e75effc93_story.html.
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of prominent European civil society groups, like
the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a German
think tank.
According to a mid-2020 Pew Research Center
study, more than half of surveyed European countries
were critical of China’s handling of the COVID-19
pandemic.29 Most critical were countries like Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, whereas Southern
European countries like Italy and Spain were split
evenly. According to a May 2020 poll conducted
by Körber-Stiftung, 36 percent of Germans viewed
China less favorably after the outbreak of the virus
than they had before.30 Along similar lines, a study
by the European Council on Foreign Relations found
48 percent of respondents in nine European countries
thought their views of China had become more
negative during the pandemic, with several countries
depicting the highest level of negative opinions toward
China ever recorded.31 The slightly less negative views
in Southern Europe could be explained by these
countries having been hit the hardest by the pandemic
and China stepping in early to provide assistance.
Even so, China’s assistance there has misfired too,
with local concerns about Chinese propaganda and
29. Silver, Devlin, and Huang, Unfavorable Views of China.
30. Joshua Webb and Ronja Scheler, “Adapting to a New
Normal, German Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in Times of
COVID-19,” in The Berlin Pulse: German Foreign Policy in Times of
COVID-19 (Berlin: Körber-Stiftung, May 2020).
31. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “Europe’s
Pandemic Politics: How the Virus Has Changed the Public’s
Worldview,” European Council on Foreign Relations (website),
June 24, 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary
/europes_pandemic_politics_how_the_virus_has_changed_the
_publics_worldview.
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faulty Chinese products highlighting the risks of
overreliance on China for critical medical supplies.
China, the Uyghurs, and Hong Kong
China’s appalling human-rights record has
increasingly come into the spotlight in the European
debate and currently serves as another key driver
of more negative perceptions of the country.
Commensurate with the deteriorating humanrights situation within China, European media
and nongovernmental organizations have devoted
more attention to reporting on the suppression of
the Uyghur population in Xinjiang and China’s farreaching state surveillance system. During 2020, the
introduction of a new national security law and the
curtailing of civil liberties in Hong Kong sparked an
outcry in Europe.32
Moreover, China’s belligerent response to
European criticism of its human-rights record,
including attempts to silence independent critics
and threats, intimidation, and fabricated allegations,
has clearly backfired. As a result, pressure on
European leaders to take a firmer line against Beijing
on human rights is growing. Lawmakers in the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the European Parliament have been speaking up
more about China’s dismal human-rights record
and pushing for new sanctions against responsible
officials and greater supply-chain due diligence.
For instance, in Germany, both the Green Party and
prominent members of the Christian Democratic
32. Grace Tsoi and Lam Cho Wai, “Hong Kong Security Law:
What Is It and Is It Worrying?,” BBC News (website), June 30,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838.
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Union party have become outspoken critics of Berlin’s
tendency to publicly downplay human-rights issues
to avoid provoking Chinese retaliation against
European companies.33
In March 2021, when the EU followed the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in imposing
Magnitsky Act-style sanctions (in 2012, following
the death of Sergei Magnitsky in Russia in 2009, the
United States enacted a law sanctioning foreign
individuals who have committed human-rights
abuses or been involved in significant corruption)
against Chinese officials over human-rights abuses
in Xinjiang, Beijing immediately responded with its
own countersanctions against European officials,
including five members of the European Parliament.34
This move was interpreted in Europe as completely
nonproportional and unacceptable. For some experts,
this event was a watershed moment that highlighted
the limits of the approach favored by European
Commission trade negotiators and some European
leaders of pragmatically engaging China on trade
issues through efforts like the CAI with the hope of
gradually transforming China’s behavior. As a result
of the strong backlash against China’s sanctions,
and as noted earlier, the CAI is currently moribund
33. Noah Barkin, “Rethinking German Policy towards
China,” Chatham House (website), May 26, 2021, https://
www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/rethinking-german
-policy-towards-china.
34. Council of the European Union, “EU Imposes Further
Sanctions over Serious Violations of Human Rights around the
World,” press release, March 22, 2021, https://www.consilium
.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes
-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights
-around-the-world/.
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following a vote in the European Parliament in May
2021 to freeze the agreement.
China as a Security Challenge
European capitals increasingly see China as a
direct challenge to the rules-based international order
and, in some cases, a security threat against European
interests—though not in the same way Washington
sees China (that is, as a rising military rival). This view
of China is driven by growing Chinese assertiveness in
the Indo-Pacific—for example, claims of sovereignty
over the South China Sea and Taiwan, the debate over
5G security risks pertaining to Chinese technology
giant Huawei, the rise in Chinese state-sponsored
cyberattacks and espionage activities, and the quest
of Chinese state-owned companies for control over
critical infrastructure. At the same time, according to
a survey administered by the European Council on
Foreign Relations, most EU member states still prefer
to view China as a competitor rather than as a rival (or
partner, for that matter).35
Though China is not seen as a direct military threat
against European security in the same way Russia is, the
growing security concerns over China are nevertheless
reflected in the number of European national security
documents, foreign policy declarations, and annual
reports of national intelligence services that mention
China as a security challenge. For example, the
February 2021 annual report of the Estonian Foreign
Intelligence Service published identified a “growing
threat” from Chinese intelligence.36 In addition, NATO
35. Krastev and Leonard, “Europe’s Pandemic Politics.”
36. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International
Security and Estonia 2021 (Tallinn, EE: Välisluureamet, 2021).
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has identified China as a potential future threat, with
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg calling on the
alliance to help confront China’s growing power.37 In
the 2021 Brussels summit communiqué, the alliance
for the first time referred to China as constituting a
“challenge.”38 The closer strategic ties between Russia
and China also constitute a major worry, especially
among countries in Northern and Central and Eastern
Europe, which view Russia as their dominant security
threat. Finally, several European countries—including
the United Kingdom, France, and more recently,
Germany—have begun thinking more about how they
can contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific.
Summary
European attitudes toward China have changed
dramatically over the last five to 10 years. This shift
is the result of Chinese actions within Europe and
beyond. In many respects, the Chinese have sown
the seeds of their own declining soft power across
most European countries. This downward trend is
not necessarily destined to continue. As discussed in
chapter 9, “Learning from Latin America,” and chapter
37. Stuart Lau, “NATO Report Says China Could Pose
Military Threat to Europe and US,” South China Morning
Post, December 2, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china
/diplomacy/article/3112179/nato-report-says-china-could
-pose-military-threat-europe-and; and Catherine Philip, “We
Must Confront Threat of China, Says NATO Chief Jens
Stoltenberg,” Sunday Times (website), March 25, 2021, https://
www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-must-confront-threat-of-china
-says-nato-chief-jens-stoltenberg-fv36m2rr5.
38. NATO HQ, “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” press
release no. 086, NATO (website), June 14, 2021, https://www
.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
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10, “Learning from Africa,” Beijing is very capable of
learning and adapting to overcome obstacles.
With evolving European attitudes toward China
on the issues of security, human rights, the pandemic,
and predatory statecraft, political leaders have
slowly and steadily adapted their policy approaches
toward China. The next chapter provides a brief
overview of how European leaders at the state and
intergovernmental level have shifted their approach
toward Chinese investment in Europe in particular.
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As a result of the changes in European attitudes
toward China, countries across the continent as well as
intergovernmental organizations like the EU have had
a variety of regulatory, legal, and policy responses.
This chapter focuses on how European countries and
the EU have responded to Chinese investment across
the continent.
Providing Liquidity Alternatives
Recently, the EU and its member states have
arguably made substantial progress in providing
a liquidity alternative to China for the European
countries confronting rising debt. For example,
Germany established a €100 billion fund to provide
liquidity in exchange for equity stakes in companies
that are in danger of imminent takeover.1 At the
collective level, a landmark 2020 EU budget deal will
provide €312 billion in grants and €360 billion in loans
for cash-strapped member states.2
But EU budget negotiators discarded a proposal
for a €26 billion solvency fund that would have
1. European Commission, “Commission Approves German
Fund to Enable up to €500 Billion of Liquidity and Capital
Support to Enterprises Affected by the Coronavirus Outbreak,”
press release, July 8, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1280.
2. Laura Greenhalgh and Lili Bayer, “Politico’s Guide to the
EU Budget Deal,” Politico (website), July 21, 2020, https://www
.politico.eu/article/politico-guide-to-the-eu-budget-deal
-mff-2021-2027/.
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directly benefited distressed European companies.
Nonetheless, the roughly €750 billion in recovery
funds is a marked shift from the austerity approach
adopted in the 2010s in response to the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis, as discussed in chapter 2. One
study estimated the recovery fund would add between
1.5 percent and 4.1 percent to gross domestic product
over the next five years.3 In late 2020, the recovery
fund was approved by EU institutions in conjunction
with the 2021–27 multiyear budget, but it then had to
be approved by all member states. By May 2021, all
27 EU member states had completed their national
approval processes.
Due to the depth of the pandemic-induced
recession in Southern Europe and the size of their
respective economies, Italy and Spain will be the
largest beneficiaries of the recovery fund, each
receiving nearly €70 billion.4 The funds will pay for
major infrastructure work and environmental projects,
such as developing a network of recharging stations
for electric vehicles. Money has also been set aside to
improve high-speed telecommunications and datastorage facilities.

3. Sylvain Broyer et al., “Next Generation EU Will Shift
European Growth into a Higher Gear,” S&P Global Ratings
(website), April 27, 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/ratings
/en/research/articles/210427-next-generation-eu-will-shift
-european-growth-into-a-higher-gear-11929949.
4. Agence France-Presse, “European Union Approves
Covid-19 Recovery Plan to Launch in June,” France24
(website), January 6, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en
/europe/20210531-european-union-to-launch-covid-19
-recovery-plan-in-june.
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Fending Off Foreign Subsidies
Members of the EU providing financial support—
that is, state subsidies—to European companies
(if the aid undermines fair competition in the
European market) has been illegal for many years.
But the same EU rules have not applied to foreignsubsidized companies or entities. In practice,
this disparity in the application of rules means
Chinese governmental authorities have been
relatively free to subsidize Chinese entities that are
buying up European companies or bidding on public
procurement offerings.
Although the extent of foreign subsidies in Europe
is not entirely known—largely thanks to a lack of
transparency—subsidies of one form or another are
significant and widespread. An Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development study of
the worldwide semiconductor industry found of 21
large firms examined, total government support—
including grants, tax concessions, below-market loans,
and below-market equity investment (particularly
common in the case of China)—between 2014 and
2018 totaled over $50 billion.5
At the same time, non-EU, non-North American
investment in Europe has grown in recent years,
including investment by state-owned enterprises.
If these entities are subsidized in some way, they
gain unfair and distorting advantages when they
look to invest in European companies or compete in
public procurement offerings. For example, these
entities may be able to offer lower-cost bids. From
5. Trade and Agriculture Directorate Trade Committee,
Measuring Distortions in International Markets: The Semiconductor
Value Chain, TAD/TC(2019)9/FINAL (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, November 21, 2019), 8.
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the EU’s perspective, lower-cost bids undermine
competitiveness, harm innovation, and possibly result
in lost European jobs.6
After studying this issue in depth, the European
Commission released a proposed regulation in May
2021 that would give it the power to investigate
financial contributions granted by public authorities of
a non-EU country that benefit companies engaging in
an economic activity in the EU.7 The regulation would
also give the commission the power to fine offending
entities, accept redressive plans proposed by entities,
and prevent deals from closing and bids from being
accepted. The commission would rely on notifications
from member states of pending acquisitions and
public procurements above certain value thresholds,
but it would also have the power to initiate its own
investigations regardless of value if it suspected a
subsidy had been granted. The regulation would
apply to both non-EU companies and European
subsidiaries of non-EU companies.
Investment Screening Tools
Investment screening is a process by which
a governing authority examines a prospective
investment against a given set of criteria to judge
whether the investment should be approved. Today,
the US investment screening system is arguably the
most rigorous such system in the West. The process
6. European Commission, “White Paper on Levelling
the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies” (white paper,
European Commission, June 17, 2020), 22.
7. Silvia Amaro, “EU Announces New Powers to Restrict
Takeover Bids by Foreign Entities,” CNBC (website), May 5,
2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/05/eu-announces-new
-powers-to-restrict-takeover-bids-by-foreign-entities.html.
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involves a thorough examination by a group of
representatives from nine US government agencies
and other government observers known as the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS). These agencies are the Department
of the Treasury (chair), the Department of Justice, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative,
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
In addition, the White House participates via the
Office of Management and Budget, the Council of
Economic Advisors, the National Security Council,
the National Economic Council, and the Homeland
Security Council. The committee investigates when
a foreign entity or US entity with significant foreign
ownership or investment attempts to acquire or make
a significant investment in a US company.8
A CFIUS filing and review process are required
for any foreign investments, regardless of whether
the prospective investment will provide the investor
with a controlling stake or a noncontrolling stake, in
certain US businesses that “[p]roduce, design, test,
manufacture, fabricate, or develop one or more critical
technologies” in 28 specified categories (see table 5-1).9

8. Reuters Staff, “US National Security Panel Killed Eight
Deals in 2019, Trump Ended One,” Reuters (website), July 30,
2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cfius-2019-report
/u-s-national-security-panel-killed-eight-deals-in-2019-trump
-ended-one-idUSKCN24V3KK.
9. Regulations Pertaining to Certain Investments in the
United States by Foreign Persons, 31 U.S.C. § 800 (2020).
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Table 5-1. Critical technology categories of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States
1. Internet protocol or
telecommunications service

15. Certain refineries

2. Certain Internet exchange points

16. Certain crude-oil storage facilities

3. Submarine cable systems

17. Certain liquified natural gas
import or export terminals or certain
natural gas underground storage
facilities

4. Submarine cable landing systems

18. Systemically important financial
market utilities

5. Data center at a submarine landing
facility

19. Certain financial market
exchanges

6. Satellites or satellite systems
servicing the DoD

20. Technology providers in the
significant service provider program

7. Industrial resources manufactured 21. Any rail line designated as part
or operated for a Major Defense Ac- of the DoD Strategic Rail Corridor
quisition Program
Network
8. Any industrial resource
manufactured pursuant to a DX
priority-rated contract

22. Certain interstate oil pipelines

9. Any facility that manufactures
certain specialty metals, chemical
weapons, carbon alloy and steel
plates, and other specified materials

23. Certain interstate natural gas
pipelines

10. Any industrial resource that had
been funded by the Defense
Production Act, Industrial Base
Fund, Rapid Innovation Fund,
Manufacturing Technology Program,
Defense Logistics Agency
Warstopper Program, or Defense
Logistics Agency surge and
sustainment

24. Any industrial control system
used by interstate oil or natural gas
pipelines

11. Electric energy storage systems

25. Certain airports

12. Any electric storage system
linked to the bulk electric system

26. Certain maritime ports or
terminals

13. Electric energy generation,
transmission, or distribution for
military installations

27. Public water systems

14. Any industrial control system
used by bulk power systems or a
facility directly supporting a military
installation

28. Any industrial control system
used by public water systems or
treatment works
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The committee also has the responsibility to
review and address any national security concerns
that arise from certain noncontrolling investments
involving foreign persons.10 Noncontrolling investments are subject to a review if they would grant
the foreign investor board observer rights; access to
technical material not available to the public; or substantive decision-making authority in a US company
in the technology, data, or infrastructure sectors.11
Finally, the CFIUS also has the authority to review
and address certain real-estate transactions in close
proximity to a military installation or US government
facility or property that is related to national security.
Because an equivalent process does not yet exist
in many European countries, a significant portion
of Chinese venture capital (VC) investments in
European technology start-ups has gone unchecked,
especially when multiple layers of Western and nonWestern firms are involved. Furthermore, although
the EU has recently expanded overall investment
scrutiny, only limited coordination occurs bilaterally
between member states and at the NATO or EU level,
particularly for companies in advanced technology

10. “CFIUS Overview,” Cooley (website), updated
May 25, 2021, https://www.cooley.com/services/practice
/export-controls-economic-sanctions/cfius-overview.
11. Private-sector Washington-based lawyer handling
CFIUS cases, interview by the author, April 20, 2021.

95

sectors.12 Consequently, many European countries
lack an appropriate vetting regime and must “reinvent
the wheel” and duplicate efforts.
Eighteen of the 27 EU member states (up from 14
in summer 2020) plus the United Kingdom have some
type of investment-screening process or mechanism
in place.13 The 18 countries include most of the EU’s
larger economies—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland—and several of the smaller ones.
The following sections outline the screening processes
of the focus countries in this study.
Belgium
In recent months, Belgium has made progress
toward complying with European Commission
guidance and establishing a countrywide foreign
investment screening mechanism, which it currently
lacks.14 The Federal Public Service Justice and Federal
12. David Meyer, “With an Eye on China, Europe
Mulls Restrictions on Foreign Takeovers and Investments,”
Fortune
(website),
May
5,
2021,
https://fortune
.com/2021/05/05/eu-china-europe-restrictions-foreign
-takeovers-investments-margrethe-vestager/; and Sarah Erikson,
“Recent
Developments
in
EU
Foreign
Investment
Screening,” Strategic Technologies Blog, April 19, 2021,
https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog
/recent-developments-eu-foreign-investment-screening.
13. European Commission, “List of Screening Mechanisms
Notified by Member States,” European Commission (website),
updated December 3, 2021, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/html/157946.htm.
14. European Commission, “Guidance to the Member States
Concerning Foreign Direct Investment and Free Movement of
Capital from Third Countries, and the Protection of Europe’s
Strategic Assets, Ahead of the Application of Regulation (EU)
2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation)” (Communication from the
Commission, C-2020-1981, Brussels, March 25, 2020).
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Public Service Economy (Belgium’s ministry of justice
and ministry of the economy, respectively) have led
efforts to build a countrywide process, and legislation
to create an Investment Screening Commission
was introduced in the lower chamber of the Belgian
Federal Parliament in February 2021.15 The proposed
law would organize a committee of representatives led
by the Federal Public Service Economy and including
representatives from the Federal Public Service
Foreign Affairs, Federal Public Service Mobility and
Transport, Ministry of Defence, Federal Public Service
Finance, and Federal Public Service Health to protect
Belgium’s sensitive industries, such as health care,
critical infrastructure, and advanced technology.
In addition, the committee would be joined by two
representatives from the region of the country in
which the proposed investment would occur.
The proposed screening process would include
mandatory notification of any proposed investment
from a non-EU member state. The proposed process
would not be retroactive, however, so major Chinese
investments in Belgian transportation infrastructure—
discussed in the next chapter—would remain in place,
despite the national security risks they have generated.
The proposed committee would be responsible for
designating the investments that warranted further
investigation and the ones that would be approved
15. Lars Bové, “La Belgique va passer au crible les
investissements étrangers,” L’Echo (website), April 30, 2021,
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique
/economie/la-belgique-va-passer-au-crible-les-investissements
-etrangers/10302439.html; and “Future Screening of Foreign
Direct Investments Takes Shape in Belgium,” Osborne Clarke
(website), May 11, 2021, https://www.osborneclarke.com
/insights/future-screening-foreign-direct-investments-takes
-shape-belgium.
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upon reception of the notification. If the committee
found closer review was necessary, the proposed
investment would undergo a six-month investigation.
Once the investigation ended, the committee would
rule to approve, add conditions to, or block the
investment. If a ruling were not made within the
six-month time frame, the investment would be
automatically approved.
Although investment screening does not yet exist
at the central government level in Belgium, the Belgian
region of Flanders has established its own processes,
reflecting the highly devolved nature of Belgian
government. The Flemish screening process, however,
is rudimentary and not comprehensive. For instance,
the government of Flanders screens only foreign
investments in the public sector.16 Moreover, the
Flemish screening process occurs after the investment
has occurred.17 Additionally, screening by the Flemish
government occurs only if the Flemish Parliament
deems an investment a potential threat to public order
and security. Finally, the screening process follows no
schedule and has no deadlines for the investment to
be approved or rejected.18
France
Foreign investment screening in France targets
investments in companies that concern “public
16. Screening buitenlandse directe investeringen (Brussels:
Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen, May 2020), 13–15.
17. “Future Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Takes
Shape in Belgium,” Osborne Clarke (website), May 11, 2021,
https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/future-screening
-foreign-direct-investments-takes-shape-belgium.
18. Screening buitenlandse, 13–15.
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order, public safety or national defense interests.”19
Proposed investments are screened if they involve
the acquisition of 25 percent or more of a French
company.20 Once an investment application is filed
with the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the
French government conducts an informal interagency
analysis. If the proposed investment passes this initial
screening, it then proceeds to a second, more formal
screening phase aimed at assessing any threat posed
to public safety or security.
The French screening process exempts proposed
investments from EU or European Free Trade
Association countries, even if they exceed the
25 percent threshold. The European Free Trade
Association includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
and Switzerland.21 In 2020, French authorities added
biotechnology companies to those subject to foreign
direct investment (FDI) screening. The authorities
also amended the threshold from 25 percent to
10 percent for companies that fall under critical
sectors or produce critical technologies, such as

19. European Trade Commission, “Monetary and
Financial Code: Legislative Section,” European Trade
Commission (website), n.d., https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib
/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158692.pdf.
20. Screening buitenlandse, 21–22.
21. “COVID-19: Control of Foreign Direct Investments in
France,” Morgan Lewis (website), May 7, 2020, https://www
.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/05/covid-19-control-of-foreign
-direct-investments-in-france-cv19-lf#_ftn3.
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biotechnology, but this change was only temporary
and expired in December 2021.22
France has no mandatory screening for proposed
investments outside the critical sectors. For example,
advanced manufacturing companies are not deemed
critical. The first phase of the investment screening
process lasts up to 30 business days, during which
time the Ministry of the Economy and Finance reviews
the initial notification. If further analysis is necessary,
the ministry has an additional 45 business days to
investigate and notify the prospective investor.
Germany
In Germany, the Foreign Trade and Payments Act
and Ordinance outline different review processes for
different kinds of foreign investment, all overseen by
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate
Action. Investment screening is triggered according
to the given industry, the given types of products or
services, and the degree of voting rights the investor
would acquire. So-called “cross-sectoral screening”
covers acquisitions wherein a non-EU resident would
gain direct or indirect control of at least 25 percent
or more of the voting rights in a German company.
For certain companies in the health-care sector and
emerging technologies, such as semiconductors,
22. William Horobin, “France Moves to Stop Foreign
Investors Preying on Weakened Firms,” Bloomberg Quint
(website), April 29 2020, https://www.bloombergquint.com
/onweb/france-moves-to-stop-foreign-investors-preying-on
-weakened-firms; and Reuters Staff, “France Extends Tougher
Screening on Foreign Investments through 2021,” Reuters
(website), December 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com
/business/finance/exclusive-france-extends-tougher-screening
-foreign-investments-through-2021-2020-12-18/.
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artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and
quantum technology, the threshold triggering an
investigation drops to 20 percent, and for critical
infrastructure and certain media companies, the
threshold is even lower, at 10 percent.
So-called “sector-specific screening” covers all
acquisitions in which a foreigner—including persons
or companies from other EU member states, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, or Norway—would gain direct or
indirect control of at least 10 percent of any German
company that produces a limited set of listed goods—
particularly, certain military equipment. In both cases,
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate
Action, in addition to any other federal ministries
that may be relevant to the case at hand, decides to
approve, amend, or prohibit the proposed transaction.
Germany’s screening mechanisms are more
oriented around safeguarding critical industries
and defense interests than most. The process for
screening cross-sectoral investments suffers from a
major weakness—the exclusion of EU member states
from the screening process. Nonetheless, German
officials maintain they have systems in place to detect
predatory indirect acquisitions in which the direct
acquirer does not deal in the purchased company’s
business operations but passes the control to an
individual or entity from a third, non-EU country.23
Greece
Greece lacks a formal FDI screening mechanism,
which reflects in part the Greek government’s desire to
23. Geoffrey P. Burgess et al., Foreign Direct Investment
Rules in Selected European Countries—An Overview (New York:
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, June 16, 2020), 4–6.
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use investment to improve the economy. Despite EU
pressure, Athens has made no moves toward adopting
investment screening mechanisms. That said, Greece
has placed equity restrictions on airport operations
and limits on foreign ownership in electricity and
media that are more restrictive than those of most
other EU countries.24
Nonetheless, and considering the contraction
of the Greek economy in the wake of the eurozone
debt crisis, the government in Athens has been keen
to promote investment aggressively. For example,
Greece has enacted laws designed to allow the
government to expedite licensing for investments
to promote job growth.25 To reduce the burdens
of bureaucracy as well as corruption, the Greek
government established an Investor’s Ombudsman
program under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. For investment projects exceeding €2 million,
the ombudsman helps to overcome delays or obstacles
in the way of investment.26
For investments deemed “strategic,” the General
Secretariat for Strategic and Private Investments
manages licensing procedures to make the process
easier and more attractive for FDI.27 Strategic
investments are investments related to infrastructure,
24. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2020
Investment Climate Statements: Greece (Washington, DC:
Department of State, 2020).
25. Enterprise Greece, Brief Guide of the Procedure of
Acceleration and Transparency of Implementation of Private Strategic
Investments (Athens: Enterprise Greece, 2017).
26. “Investor’s
Ombudsman—Service
Description,”
Enterprise Greece, n.d., https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr
/en/invest-in-greece/ombudsman/investor-ombudsman.
27. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Investment
Climate Statements.
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manufacturing, energy, tourism, transport and
communications, health services, waste management,
high-end technology and innovation, education, the
culture sector, and any other sector in which the total
investment cost exceeds €100 million.28
Hungary
Hungary employs its investment screening
processes to protect a wide range of sensitive
industries, such as dual-use technology, sectorspecific manufacturing, and various infrastructure
operations related to public order and security.29 The
review process begins with a mandatory notification
of planned investment submitted to the Ministry of
Interior, which oversees the screening process and can
issue approvals or prohibitions.
Hungarian law applies the screening process to
any proposed investment that would provide an
investor 25 percent control or more; the threshold is
lowered to 10 percent in the case of public companies.
Investors subject to screening include only those from
outside the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, or Norway.30
If the Ministry of Interior determines an acquisition
violated the terms of Hungary’s screening process, it
many impose a noncompliance fine and reverse the
transaction.31
In June 2020, the Hungarian government enacted
measures intended to strengthen its screening
28. Enterprise Greece, Brief Guide, 5.
29. “Foreign Direct Investment: Hungary,” Van Bael & Bellis
(website), August 1, 2021, https://www.vbb.com/insights/FDI
/Hungary.
30. Act LVII of 2018 on Controlling Foreign Investments
Violating Hungary’s Security Interests, 2018, 1(a)–1(b).
31. “Foreign Direct Investment.”
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processes. Administered by the minister for innovation
and technology, the new, temporary screening process
examined any investments in industries of “strategic”
importance that exceeded 350 million Hungarian
forint (roughly $1.2 million). These industries included
a wide variety of commercial activities—chemical
production, motor vehicle repair, telecommunications,
weapons and ammunition, air conditioning, food
production, health services, construction, sewerage
services, building materials production, air transport
services, and tourist accommodation services.32 The
new measures applied to all investments, both foreign
and domestic. These strengthened measures, however,
expired in June 2021, and Hungary’s previous
screening system was reinstated.
Italy
The permanent primary law for FDI screening
in Italy is Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012, no. 21, often
called “the Golden Power.”33 The Golden Power
law allows the Italian government to block non-EUbased investors from acquiring 10 percent or more
of any Italian asset in defense or national security,
transportation, energy, telecommunications, critical
32. “Government Decree 289/2020 (17 June): Defining the
Activities Required for the Economic Protection of Companies
Having Their Seat in Hungary,” Hungarian Official Gazette, no. 145
(2020), unofficial translation, reprinted in European Commission
(website), n.d., https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020
/july/tradoc_158834.pdf.
33. “Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012: Norme in materia di
poteri speciali sugli assetti societari nei settori della difesa e della
sicurezza nazionale, nonche’ per le attivita’ di rilevanza strategica
nei settori dell’energia, dei trasporti e delle comunicazioni,”
Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana 63, no. 21 (March 2020).
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infrastructure, sensitive technology, nuclear or space
technology, and 5G technology.34
More recently, Italy enacted Decreto-Legge 8 aprile
2020, no. 23, a law that tightened investment screening
provisions by including the financial sector and all
other sectors identified in 2019 by the EU, extending
screening provisions to certain transactions by
EU-based investors, and giving the government new
authorities to investigate nonnotified transactions.35
The second of these three new provisions expired
on June 30, 2021, because it was tied directly to the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Notification of the transaction filing must be made
to the Department for Administrative Coordination.
An interagency group led by the prime minister’s
office reviews acquisition applications and makes
recommendations for the Council of Ministers’
decisions. The review cycle lasts 45 business days
and can be extended by 10 business days if additional
information is required from the filing entity or by
20 business days if the information is required from
34. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Investment
Climate Statements.
35. European Parliament and Council of the EU,
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for
the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union,
LI 79/1 (March 19, 2019); “Decreto Legge 23/2020: Misure urgenti
in materia di accesso al credito e di adempimenti fiscali per le
imprese, di poteri speciali nei settori strategici, nonche interventi
in materia di salute e lavoro, di proroga di termini amministrativi
e processuali,” Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana 161, no. 94
(April 8, 2020); and Simon Clark and Ben Dummett,“Coronavirus
Accelerates European Efforts to Block Foreign Takeovers,”
Wall Street Journal (website), April 10, 2020, https://www.wsj
.com/articles/coronavirus-accelerates-european-efforts-to
-block-foreign-takeovers-11586516403.
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a third party. The Italian government can approve,
completely block, or impose conditions on the
proposed transaction.
Netherlands
In April 2020, the Netherlands updated its
investment screening process by passing the
Implementation Act on Foreign Direct Investment.36
Previously, investment screening was relatively limited
and conducted under the terms of the Electricity Act,
the Gas Act, and the Dutch Telecommunications Act.37
Under the terms of the 2020 law, an investment
approval request is mandatory for transactions
involving vital processes, infrastructure, or processes
related to sensitive technologies, but no standard
notification threshold for screening exists. Examples
of sectors subject to this screening are nuclear and
defense, mining, electricity, and drinking water. For
investments in these sectors, a prospective investor
must submit an approval request to the minister of
economic affairs and climate policy, regardless of the
investor’s nationality. This latter point is a unique
feature relative to most other European countries’
FDI screening mechanisms, which generally focus on
nondomestic or non-EU investors.
36. “Screening Regulation Implementing Act for Foreign
Direct Investments,” Government of the Netherlands (website),
n.d., https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0044449/2020-12-04.
37. “Electricity
Act
1998,”
Government
of
the
Netherlands
(website),
n.d.,
https://wetten.overheid.nl
/BWBR0009755/2019-01-01; “Gas Law,” Government of the
Netherlands
(website),
n.d.,
https://wetten.overheid.nl
/BWBR0011440/2019-01-01; and “Telecommunications Act,”
Government of the Netherlands (website), n.d., https://wetten
.overheid.nl/BWBR0009950/2020-10-01/#Hoofdstuk14a.
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The review process, overseen by the Ministry
of Finance, lasts eight weeks and can extend to six
months if an in-depth review is needed. The process
is also retroactive; the government may review
all relevant investments from June 2, 2020.38 Most
recently, the Dutch government proposed a new bill—
the Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions Safety
Assessment Act—on June 30, 2021, to protect sensitive
technologies more broadly from foreign investment.39
Poland
Poland’s FDI screening mechanism is based on
the 2015 Act on the Control of Certain Investments.40
An additional amendment to combat predatory
investment activity stemming from the pandemic
recession came into force in mid-2020 and will remain
so only until July 24, 2022.41 The amended law now
38. Burgess et al., Foreign Direct Investment Rules.
39. “Wet
veiligheidstoets
investeringen,
fusies
en overnames” [Investment, Mergers and Acquisitions
Safety Assessment Act], Tweede Kamer [Dutch House of
Representatives], June 30, 2021, https://www.tweedekamer
.nl/kamerstukken/wetsvoorstellen/detail?id=2021Z1236
0&dossier=35880; and Reuters,“Netherlands to Introduce
‘Security Check’ for Takeovers,”Reuters (website), June
25,
2021,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe
/netherlands-introduce-security-check-takeovers-2021-06-25/.
40. “Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 2015 r. o kontroli niektórych
inwestycji,” Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, 2015, http://
isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20150001272.
41. “Ustawa z dnia 19 czerwca 2020 r. o dopłatach do
oprocentowania
kredytów
bankowych
udzielanych
przedsiębiorcom dotkniętym skutkami COVID-19 oraz o
uproszczonym postępowaniu o zatwierdzenie układu w
związku z wystąpieniem COVID-19,” Internetowy System Aktów
Prawnych, 2015, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails
.xsp?id=WDU20200001086.
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requires approval for FDI from outside the EU,
Iceland, Lichtenstein, or Norway in certain publicly
traded Polish firms involved in critical infrastructure,
software development, energy, oil and gas, chemicals,
defense, telecommunications, medicine, and food.42
An investment approval request is necessary for
any investment that would provide an investor with
20 percent control or more of a listed company.
The Polish Competition Authority is responsible for
receiving investment approval requests. The authority
conducts an initial review for up to 30 days, during
which it clears the transaction or decides to issue a
formal control procedure. If necessary, a secondary
review known as a “formal control procedure” lasts
up to 120 days and results in a decision on whether to
permit or deny the requested investment.43
Depending on the field of activity, different
government ministers may be drawn into the review
process. The three usually included are the minister of
state assets, the minister of national defence, and the
minister of maritime economy and inland navigation.
Additionally, Poland has a consultative committee
of 22 authorities, mostly ministers appointed by
the prime minister, that provides nonbinding
recommendations on investment screening to the
competition authority.44
42. Marcin
Alberski
and
Piotr
Dynowski,
“Poland
Adopts
Restrictions
on
Certain
Foreign
Investments,” Bird & Bird (website), June 2020, https://
www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2020/poland
/poland-adopts-restrictions-on-certain-foreign-investments.
43. Alberski and Dynowski, “Poland Adopts Restrictions.”
44. “Foreign Direct Investment: Poland,” Van Bael & Bellis
(website), October 15, 2020, https://www.vbb.com/insights
/FDI/Poland.
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom updated its FDI screening
process with the passage of the National Security and
Investment Act 2021, which will enter into force on
January 4, 2022. This latest update makes screening
mandatory for many sectors, which are expected
to include advanced materials, advanced robotics,
artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications,
computing hardware, critical suppliers to government,
critical suppliers to emergency services, cryptographic
authentication, data infrastructure, defense, energy,
military and dual-use, quantum information
technology, satellite and space technology, synthetic
biology, and transportation.45 For other sectors,
notification of a proposed investment is voluntary.
If the prospective investor will acquire 25 percent
or more of the voting rights in a company, it must
notify the government. Moreover, if an existing
shareholder proposes to acquire more control and will
therefore surpass the 25, 50, or 75 percent threshold,
the shareholder must notify the government. Finally,
if a prospective investor will acquire sufficient voting
rights to enable or prevent the passing of a company
resolution, the investor must notify the government.
In any case, the United Kingdom’s government
can still intervene in the public interest to initiate
an investigation for up to six months following
initial notification, and the government may do so
regardless of whether the investment is from foreign
45. United
Kingdom
Department
for
Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Guidance: Check If You
Need to Tell the Government about an Acquisition
That Could Harm the UK’s National Security,” Gov.uk,
July 20, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/national-security
-and-investment-act-guidance-on-acquisitions.
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or domestic sources. If the United Kingdom’s
government decides to scrutinize a transaction
further following an initial notification, the
government has up to 30 working days to complete a
detailed national security assessment. This deadline
can be extended further by 45 working days or even
longer, if necessary.
The 2021 law also created a new government
agency, the Investment Security Unit within the
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy, to oversee the review process.46 Initial
investigations last 30 business days, and the secretary
of state may issue an intervention notice if he or she has
reason to suspect additional investigation is necessary
in the public interest. The Investment Security Unit
reports to the secretary of state, who decides to either
permit the transaction or make a referral for additional
investigation. This more in-depth investigation lasts
up to 24 weeks and can be extended an additional 45
days; thereafter, the secretary makes a final decision on
whether to permit or block the proposed investment.47
Elsewhere in Europe
Elsewhere in Europe, investment screening
mechanisms vary widely in terms of the kinds of
investments screened, the sectors deemed worthy
of screening, the threshold that triggers a review,
46. National Security and Investment Bill, H.C. Bill 210
(November 11, 2020).
47. “National Security and Investment Bill Guide: How
the Regime Functions,” National Security and Investment
Regime (website), n.d., https://assets.publishing.service.gov
.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/934438/process-flow-chart-for-businesses.pdf.
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and the design of the screening procedures.48 For
example, according to John R. Deni and Jake Shatzer,
“Denmark’s regulations apply only to companies that
manufacture war materiel or those that own electrical
cables or hydrocarbon pipelines.”49 Similarly, “Latvia’s
regulations apply to companies involved in electronic
communications, broadcast television and radio,
natural gas, electricity, or heating networks.”50
In Slovakia—a known target of China’s efforts to
transfer technology, especially through universities—
the new investment screening law only covers
energy, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, and chemicals.51
Transport and infrastructure are left out. Moreover,
48. Ashley Feng and Sagatom Saha, “The EU Needs a Better
Way to Screen Chinese Investment. It Should Look to France,”
World Politics Review (website), February 28, 2019, https://www
.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27532/the-eu-needs-a-better
-way-to-screen-chinese-investment-it-should-look-to-france .
49. John R. Deni and Jake Shatzer, “China’s Economic
Statecraft in Europe during the Pandemic,” War on the Rocks,
October 16, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/chinas
-economic-statecraft-in-europe-during-the-pandemic/ ;
“Bekendtgørelse
af
lov
om
krigsmateriel
m.v.,”
Retsinformation,
October
22,
2012,
https://www
.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2012/1004;; and “Bekendtgørelse
af lov omkontinentalsoklen og visse rørledningsanlæg på
søterritoriet,”Retsinformation, September 21, 2018, https://www
.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2018/1189.
50. Deni and Shatzer, “China’s Economic Statecraft”; and
“Nacionālās drošības likums,” Likumi, January 12, 2001, https://
likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011.
51. Matej Šimalčík, “Slovak Universities Have a China
Problem . . . And They Don’t Even Know It,” China observers
in Central and Eastern Europe (website), March 15, 2021,
https://chinaobservers.eu/slovak-universities-have-a-china
-problem-and-they-dont-even-know-it/;; and “Časová verzia
predpisu účinná od 01.03.2021,” Slov-Lex, updated March 1, 2021,
https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2011/45
/20210301.html.
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the law places the responsibility for initial screening
decisions in the hands of the Ministry of Economy
of the Slovak Republic, which may review whether a
foreign investment in Slovakia disrupts public order
or national security.
Spain recently passed legislation requiring
government approval for any foreign investment
exceeding 10 percent in domestic assets in strategic
industries.52 Most of these restrictions do not apply
to investors that appear to be from the EU, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, or Norway.
Several other EU members, such as Sweden and
Ireland, still lack FDI screening mechanisms, and
both countries are home to advanced technological
industry and manufacturing.53 The Swedish Defence
Research Agency found 56 companies in high-tech,
heavy manufacturing, and other relevant sectors had
been sold to Chinese entities since 2018, all of which
is consistent with Made in China 2025.54 And Ireland

52. Juan Manuel de Remedios and Carlos Daroca,
“Restrictions on Foreign Investments Imposed by the Spanish
Government,” White & Case (website), March 23, 2020, https://
www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/restrictions-foreign
-investments-imposed-spanish-government.
53. Jonas Hallberg, “Foreign Investment Screening in
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark,” in YSEC Yearbook
of Socio-Economic Constitutions, eds. Steffen Hindelang and
Andreas Moberg (New York: Springer Science+Business
Media, May 2020), 209–26; and Dennis Mitzner, “Sweden
Is a Tech Superstar from the North,” TechCrunch (blog),
January
26,
2016,
https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/26
/sweden-is-a-tech-superstar-from-the-north/.
54. American official at the US Embassy in Stockholm,
interview by the author, February 19, 2021.
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hosts some of the world’s leading artificial intelligence
academic and research centers.55
In an attempt to address the patchwork of
investment screening tools across the continent, the
EU introduced an investment screening framework in
April 2019 designed to add additional scrutiny “over
purchases by foreign companies that target Europe’s
strategic assets.”56 This new approach is largely
advisory. The framework does not empower the EU
to block investments coming into the member states,
nor does the framework require the member states to
screen incoming foreign investments at the national
level or coordinate their policies or approaches.
Additionally, the EU can only examine investment
activity reported to the EU by member states. To date,
the reporting has yielded little consistency, and the
information provided to the European Commission
is highly dependent on the member state and the
relevant industry sector.57
Table 5-2 captures the status of national investment
screening regulations and processes across Europe.
Although European countries have improved over the
last several years, gaps clearly remain.

55. David Gaule, “The New Cel-Tech Tiger: How Ireland
Emerged as a European Technology Leader,” Nerd Life (blog),
New Relic, March 17, 2017, https://newrelic.com/blog/nerd-life
/dublin-ireland-european-technology-leader.
56. European Commission, “EU Foreign Investment
Screening Regulation Enters into Force,” press release, April 10,
2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail
/en/IP_19_2088.
57. American official assigned to the US Mission to the EU,
interview by the author, November 13, 2020.
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Table 5-2. Assessment of screening mechanisms in focus
countries
Country

National
Investment
Screening
System?

Investment
Threshold(s)

Protected Sectors

Mandatory
Notification
for Protected
Sectors?

Applies to
Investors from
within EU/EEA
Also?

Deciding
Authority

Investing
Screening
Risk
Assessment

Proposed:
Yes, when
thresholds
met

No

Proposed:
Ministry of
Economy

High (until
proposed
law enters
into force,
then
Medium)

Belgium

No

Proposed: 10
percent

Proposed: health,
energy, transportation,
data processing
and storage,
critical technology,
nanotechnology,
biotechnology, AI,
and the aerospace
industry, energy,
raw materials, and
food safety the access
to and
control of sensitive
information; and
media.

France

Yes, but
tightened
system
expires
December
2022

25 percent
control (10
percemt until
December
31, 2021 for
investments
in listed
companies)

Defense- and security-related sectors;
water supply; gas;
electricity; transportation; AI; robotics;
semiconductors;
media and press
activities; food safety;
quantum IT; and
energy storage

Yes, when
thresholds
met

No

Ministry of
Economy
and Finance

Medium

Yes

25, 20, or
10 percent,
depending
on sector

Healthcare;
semiconductors;
AI; additive
manufacturing;
quantum IT;
critical
infrastructure; media

Yes, when
thresholds
met

Yes, but only in
limited set of
circumstances
(for example,
military
hardware)

Ministry for
Economic
Affairs and
Energy

Medium

No

NA

Some equity
restrictions on airport
operations and limits
on foreign ownership
in electricity and
media

NA

NA

NA

High

Yes

25% percent
(lowered to
10 percent in
the case of
public
companies)

Dual-use
technology,
sector-specific
manufacturing, and
various infrastructure
operations
relating to public
order and security

Yes, when
thresholds
met

No

Ministry of
the Interior

Medium

Germany

Greece

Hungary
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Table 5-2. Assessment of screening mechanisms in focus
countries (continued)
Investment
Threshold(s)

Protected Sectors

Mandatory
Notification
for Protected
Sectors?

Applies to
Investors from
within EU/EEA
Also?

Deciding
Authority

Investing
Screening
Risk
Assessment

Yes

10 percent

Defense/national
security,
transportation,
energy,
telecommunications,
critical infrastructure,
sensitive technology,
nuclear and space
technology, 5G
technology, finance,
et al.

Yes, when
thresholds
met

No

Council of
Ministers

Low

Netherlands

Yes

ALL
investments
in protected
sectors must
be notified

Defence, energy,
telecommunication,
drinking water,
nuclear energy,
mining, underground
gas storage

Yes

Yes

Ministry of
Finance

Low

Poland

Yes, but
tightened
system
expires
June 2022

20 percent
for listed
companies
(through
June 2022)

Listed companies
involved in critical
infrastructure,
software development,
energy, oil and gas,
chemicals, defense,
telecommunications,
medicine, and food

Yes, when
thresholds
met

No (through
June 2022)

Competition
Authority

Medium

25 percent
(and again
at 50 percent
and 75
percent)

Proposed:
advanced materials,
advanced robotics,
AI, civil nuclear,
communications,
computing hardware,
critical suppliers to
government, critical
suppliers to the
emergency services,
cryptographic
authentication,
data infrastructure,
defense, energy,
military and
dual-use, quantum
IT, satellite and
space technologies,
synthetic biology, and
transportation

Yes, when
thresholds
met

Yes

Department
for Business,
Energy and
Industrial
Strategy

Low (as of
Jan 2022)

Country

Italy

United
Kingdom

National
Investment
Screening
System?

Yes (new
law
effective
Jan 2022)
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Summary
Due to shifting perceptions across Europe and some
improvements at the state and intergovernmental
levels, the European investment environment has
changed significantly over the last decade. Tightening
investment screening tools, making European liquidity
available for European companies, and cracking down
on subsidized competitors from outside the EU have
helped Europe strengthen its stance relative to China’s
predatory statecraft.
Serious flaws remain in the approaches of
the EU and many of its member states. The most
glaring shortcomings are the investment screening
tools available to member-state governments, the
strength and durability of these tools, and the lack of
EU-wide outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI)
requirements and regulations. These shortcomings
provide Beijing vectors through which to undermine
European security—especially the security of
European infrastructure that is relevant to US and
allied military operations in and through Europe as
well as European defense technology and related
raw materials. The next two chapters address these
areas of risk.
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6. SECURITY RISK: INFRASTRUCTURE
John R. Deni
©2022 John R. Deni

Infrastructure is the physical and organizational
structures and facilities needed for the operation of a
society or enterprise. Examples include transportation
systems, water supply and sewage management
systems, and power and heating generation and
distribution systems.
The EU defines critical infrastructure as assets,
systems, or parts thereof that are “essential for the
maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety,
security, economic, or social well-being of people, and
the disruption or destruction of which would have a
significant impact in a Member State of the EU as a
result of the failure to maintain those functions.”1 The
EU further defines European critical infrastructure
as infrastructure of a member state, especially in the
energy or transportation sectors, that, if disrupted
or destroyed, “would have a significant impact on at
least two Member States.”2 Member states of the EU
have the responsibility to identify their own critical
infrastructure.
The Department of Homeland Security’s
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
identifies 16 infrastructure sectors as critical. The
critical infrastructure sectors are the ones that have
assets, systems, and networks that “are considered so
1. Council of the European Union, “On the Identification
and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the
Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection,” European
Union Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the
European Union, no. 114 (December 8, 2008): 75–82, http://data
.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/114/oj.
2. “Directive 2008/114/EC.”
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vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security,
national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination thereof.”3 See table 6-1 for
the critical infrastructure sectors in the United States.
Table 6-1. Critical infrastructure sectors in the United States
Chemical

Dams

Financial
Services

Information
Technology

Commercial
Facilities

Defense
Industrial
Base

Food and
Agriculture

Nuclear
Reactors,
Materials, and
Waste

Communications

Emergency
Services

Government
Facilities

Transportation
Systems

Critical
Manufacturing

Energy

Healthcare
and Public
Health

Water and
Wastewater Systems

To one degree, each of these sectors is important
from a defense and security perspective. For example,
military enterprises rely on the civilian health system
for training, some routine medical care, maintaining
health-care provider standards, and support in the
event of large-scale contingency operations or a war.
Perhaps more significantly, military personnel rely
on the food and agriculture sector for sustenance and
nutrition.
When one examines the European infrastructure
that might impact US and allied defense and
security if disrupted and that might be the object of
acquisition or investment by Chinese entities, some
sectors matter more than others. For instance, the
3. “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency (website), n.d., https://www.cisa
.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
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ability of military personnel and equipment to move
into and through Europe is vital for the defense of
NATO and US military operations beyond Europe.
Similarly, US and allied military authorities rely on
energy sources in Europe to conduct operations in and
through the continent.
US military forces and its allies also rely on
European water and wastewater systems when
operating in or through Europe. This sector is almost
entirely publicly owned, unlikely to be privatized, and
therefore not very susceptible to Chinese investment.
US military forces that operate in or through
Europe use European information technology
networks—especially 5G technology—as well. This
sector has seen increasing privatization over the last
several years and has been subject to the increased
involvement of Chinese entities, including Huawei
and ZTE Corporation. Debates over 5G, however, have
been the subject of extensive closed-door, transatlantic
discussion, policy community deliberations, and
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epistemic community treatment in recent years.4
Given the thorough treatment of the 5G issue
elsewhere—as well as the growing success the
United States has had in getting European allies and
partners to keep Chinese companies out of their 5G
networks—this study does not devote significant
attention to the issue.5
Countries of Concern
Some European countries’ infrastructure is more
likely to impact US national security than others. This
section briefly discusses the infrastructure that would
have the greatest impact on US national security,
4. US military officer assigned to the US Military
Delegation to the NATO Military Committee, interview by the
author, December 14, 2020; Janka Oertel, “Why the German
Debate on 5G and Huawei Is Critical,” German Marshall Fund
of the United States (website), February 15, 2019, https://
www.gmfus.org/news/why-german-debate-5g-and-huawei
-critical; Andrea Gilli and Francesco Bechis, “NATO and the 5G
Challenge,” NATO Review (blog), September 30, 2020, https://
www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/09/30/nato-and
-the-5g-challenge/index.html; Erik Brattberg and Philippe
Le Corre, Huawei and Europe’s 5G Conundrum,” National
Interest (website), December 27, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org
/feature/huaweiand-europe%E2%80%99s-5g
-conundrum-39972; and Julianne Smith, “Germany’s 5G Debate
Ought Not Be a Referendum on Donald Trump,” War on the
Rocks, February 16, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02
/germanys-5g-debate-ought-not-be-a-referendum-on-donald
-trump/.
5. Nick Wadhams, “US Sees More Support for ‘Clean
Network’ Plan to Counter China,” Bloomberg (website), October 30,
2020, https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/u-s-sees-more
-support-for-clean-network-plan-to-counter-china; and Rob Noel,
“MOUs Secure 5G Networks in European Countries,”
State
Magazine,
January
2021,
https://statemag.state
.gov/2021/01/0121itn02/.
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based largely on extant, planned, or likely military
presence, activities, or lines of communication.
Germany
From the perspective of the United States,
Germany is arguably the most important
European country because of its militarily relevant
infrastructure. Germany is host to the largest number
of American military personnel based in Europe. The
Kaiserslautern Military Community in southwestern
Germany is one of the largest overseas US military
communities, comprising 40,000 servicemembers,
military dependents, and Department of Defense
civilians.6 The US Army 2nd Stryker Cavalry
Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and 41st
Field Artillery Brigade are based in Germany, along
with the US Air Force 52nd Fighter Wing:
Germany is also home to the following vital
overseas military infrastructure.
•

Ramstein Air Base—One of the largest overseas
military facilities and home to the 86th
Airlift Wing.

•

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—The largest
overseas US military medical facility. The center
played a vital role in caring for servicemembers
injured in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it serves
military personnel (and their families) stationed
throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

•

7th Army Training Command in Grafenwöhr
and Hohenfels—The only overseas American

6. “Visitor Information,” US Army Garrison RheinlandPfalz (website), updated July 23, 2020, https://home.army.mil
/rheinland-pfalz/index.php/about/visitor-information.
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military combat training center and home to
advanced, instrumented, live-fire ranges and
maneuver areas.
•

Army prepositioned stock sites in Mannheim
and Dülmen—Home to the equipment of
a division headquarters, division artillery
brigade, and armored brigade.

•

Command headquarters—The headquarters of
the Army component command for Europe and
Africa (Wiesbaden), the Air Force component
command for Europe and Africa (Ramstein),
and United States European Command and
United States Africa Command (Stuttgart).

These units and facilities are well connected to
each other and to ports and airports of embarkation by
extensive road, rail, and river networks. In particular,
the German port of Bremerhaven has played a critical
role in recent years when US forces have deployed to
Central and Eastern Europe for exercises or rotational
deployments.7 The nearby port of Nordenham,
also on the North Sea, has been used to transport
military materiel, such as ammunition and other
specialized goods.
7. Benjamin Northcutt, “DEFENDER-Europe 20 Begins
With 1st Combat Power Arrival,” US European Command
(website), February 20, 2020, https://www.eucom.mil
/article/40182/defender-europe-20-begins-with-1st-combat
-pow; Corinna Baltos, “Vehicles Roll into Poland for
Atlantic Resolve,” US Army (website), January 9, 2017, https://
www.army.mil/article/180429/vehicles_roll_into_poland
_for_atlantic_resolve; and Betty Y. Boomer, “Equipment
Arrival Improves Signal Readiness in Europe,” US Army
(website), May 30, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/188455
/equipment_arrival_improves_signal_readiness_in_europe.
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Belgium and the Netherlands
In addition to Germany, the militarily relevant
infrastructure of Belgium and the Netherlands
plays particularly important roles. Although these
countries do not host US combat maneuver units,
they are home to infrastructure facilities important
for military operations and exercises, US military
support units that facilitate the movement of materiel,
and allied command-and-control units. For example,
the Netherlands is home to Rotterdam, the largest
container port in Europe and an important point of
embarkation and debarkation for US military forces
traveling to or from Germany and points east. The
US armed forces have also used the port of
Vlissingen in the southwestern corner of the country.
Additionally, Eindhoven Airport, which is used by
both civilian and military aircraft and is home to
the Royal Netherlands Air Force transport fleet, has
played an important role in facilitating the transit of
US military materiel between Rotterdam and other
locations in Europe.8 The Netherlands is also host to
an Army prepositioned stock site in Eygelshoven that
has been slated for modernization and expansion.9
Belgium hosts an Army prepositioned stock site
in Zutendaal, which stores and maintains equipment
8. Dutch Aviation Society, “US Army’s 101st AD CAB
Will Move Out Via Rotterdam,” Scramble, March 4, 2021,
https://www.scramble.nl/military-news/us-army-s-101st-ad
-cab-will-move-out-via-rotterdam.
9. Cameron Porter, “Dutch Government Pledges 38
Million Euros to Upgrade US Army APS-2 Site in Netherlands,”
US Army (website), March 25, 2021, https://www.army.mil
/article/244624/dutch_government_pledges_38_million_euros
_to_upgrade_u_s_army_aps_2_site_in_netherlands.
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for a sustainment brigade.10 Additionally, Belgium
plays host to a US Air Force unit assigned to Chièvres
Air Base, near NATO’s military headquarters in
Mons. This unit supports NATO’s Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, who is also the commander of
United States European Command; the rest of the
alliance’s military headquarters; and NATO transient
aircraft. Additionally, the air base recently played
an important role in the facilitation of rotational
deployments and exercises, including as a staging
area for equipment flowing into or out of Europe
through the nearby Belgian port of Zeebrugge.11 Both
Zeebrugge and the larger port of Antwerp, Europe’s
second-largest container port, are important ports of
embarkation and debarkation for US military forces
traveling to and from Central and Eastern Europe.
Italy
Italy is host to significant Army, Air Force, and
US Navy forces. For example, Aviano Air Base,
Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Naval Support Activity
Naples, and Naval Air Station Sigonella are in Italy.
In sum, these facilities and others in Italy are home to
10. Rabia Coombs, “APS-2 Zutendaal Talks Support
Equipment with Belgium Land System Section,” US Army
(website), July 12, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/208378
/aps_2_zutendaal_talks_support_equipment_with_belgium
_land_system_section.
11. Savannah L. Waters, “Helos Galore: 424th ABS Hosts
1st ACB in Support of Atlantic Resolve,” Ramstein Air Base
(website), October 31, 2017, https://www.ramstein.af.mil
/News/Article-Display/Article/1358535/helos-galore
-424th-abs-hosts-1st-acb-in-support-of-atlantic-resolve/;
and
Jacek Siminski, “USAF Deploys Major Fighter Component to
Poland,” Aviationist (blog), April 20, 2021, https://theaviationist
.com/2021/04/20/usaf-deploys-poland/.
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roughly 13,000 military personnel. The Vicenza-based
173rd Airborne Brigade has played an important role
in recent years in conducting rotational deployments
to Eastern Europe in support of deterrence operations
vis-à-vis Russia.
Poland
In recent years, Poland has played an increasingly
important role as a host nation. The country is slated
to expand its role even further thanks to a bilateral
US-Polish basing agreement signed in 2019.12 Although
few US forces are based in Poland on a permanent
basis, the United States and allied countries such as
Croatia, the United Kingdom, and Romania have
sent troops to Poland for rotational deployments in
support of deterrence operations. The Army V Corps
maintains a forward operating element in Poznan, and
the US-led Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup is
based in Orzysz.13 Additionally, the 33rd Air Base in
Powidz is host to an Army prepositioned supply site,
and Drawsko Pomorskie is slated to host a US-Polish
combat training center. Elsewhere, Poland hosts US
air defense, combat aircraft, and unmanned systems
(UxSs) on a rotational basis. Gdynia and Gdansk on
the Baltic Sea and Polish rail lines to Germany facilitate
the movement of US troops and materiel into Poland.
12. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “US, Polish Presidents Sign Pact
to Boost American Military Presence in Poland,” Defense News
(website), September 24, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com
/global/europe/2019/09/24/us-polish-presidents-sign-pact-to
-boost-american-military-presence-in-poland/.
13. John Vandiver, “V Corps Takes Up Position at New
Poland Headquarters,” Stars and Stripes (website), November 20,
2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/v-corps-takes-up
-position-at-new-poland-headquarters-1.652807.
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France
France no longer hosts US military forces as it
did during the early years of the Cold War, but the
country has begun to play an increasingly important
role as home to alternative transshipment options if
US forces are unable to use ports elsewhere for
exercises or operations.14 In particular, US military
forces have recently used the ports of Radicatel (near
Le Havre) and Dunkirk on the English Channel for
exercises and deployments.15
Greece
Finally, US forces have also used Greece, a
gateway to US allies in southeastern Europe, in recent
years for exercises and deployments. In particular,
US forces have used the ports of Alexandroupoli,
Volos, and Thessaloniki for rotational deployments
to Eastern Europe.16 Greece is also home to the port
of Piraeus, which has become the exemplar for
Chinese infrastructure investment in Europe. In
Piraeus, a Chinese firm operates two of the port’s
three terminals through its wholly owned subsidiary,
Piraeus Container Terminal. The same Chinese firm
has operational control of the third terminal via its 51
percent stake in the Piraeus Port Authority. Both the
US Navy (including embarked US Marines) and the
14. US civilian official assigned to the 598th Transportation
Brigade, interview by the author, December 14, 2020.
15. Benjamin Northcutt, “1 ID CAB Arrives in Dunkirk,
France for Atlantic Resolve,” US Army (website), March 8, 2021,
https://www.army.mil/article/244047/1_id_cab_arrives_in
_dunkirk_france_for_atlantic_resolve.
16. US civilian official serving at the American embassy in
Athens, interview by the author, October 5, 2020.
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US Coast Guard have made recent port visits
to Piraeus.17
Chinese Investment in Infrastructure
Through state-owned enterprises and nominally
private entities, China has invested significantly in
European infrastructure over the last decade. Most
observers contend this investment was motivated
by economic interests. For example, infrastructure
investments often provide long-term, stable returns,
which has been the focus of many Chinese investors.18
Additionally, some the Chinese investments in
European infrastructure occurred under the auspices
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enabling China to
bring its goods to European markets more efficiently.19
Moreover, infrastructure asset valuations were
particularly attractive in the wake of the eurozone
sovereign debt crisis and the Great Recession of the
early 2010s, when European governments looked
17. Sam Stephenson, “USS New York, 26th MEU Depart
Piraeus, Greece,” America’s Navy (website), June 12, 2018, https://
www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2249669
/uss-new-york-26th-meu-depart-piraeus-greece/; and Coast
Guard News Wire, “US Coast Guard Visits Partners in Athens,
Greece,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service,
April 29, 2021, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/395239
/us-coast-guard-visits-partners-athens-greece.
18. Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, China Invests
in Europe: Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications (New York:
Rhodium Group, June 2012), 39; and Baker & McKenzie, Bird’s
Eye View: Comparing Chinese Investment into North America and
Europe (New York: Rhodium Group, 2016).
19. Keith Johnson, “Why is China Buying up Europe’s
Ports?” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2018, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2018/02/02/why-is-china-buying-up-europes-ports/.
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to shed state-owned infrastructure assets.20 For
these reasons, from 2000–15, energy and transport
infrastructure were two of the leading sectors in which
China invested in Europe.
Although Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI)
in Europe peaked in 2016, European infrastructure
continues to attract Chinese investment more heavily
than other sectors. For example, in 2019, infrastructure
was the fourth most important sector in Europe for
Chinese investment, just behind Chinese investment
in European consumer products and services,
information and computer technology, and the
automotive sector.21 The following year, although total
Chinese investment in Europe dropped from $13.4
billion to $7.2 billion, logistics and transportation
infrastructure ranked first, attracting 23 percent of
Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI)
in Europe.22 More broadly, and in terms of specific
countries in Europe, Germany ($2 billion), France ($0.7
billion), Poland ($0.8 billion), Sweden ($0.7 billion),
and the United Kingdom ($0.4 billion) received the
most investment from China in 2020 across all sectors.
Economic considerations alone do not drive Chinese
investment in European infrastructure. Given China’s
goals in Europe as discussed in chapter 3, geopolitics
underpin
China’s
infrastructure
investments,
incentivizing both state-owned enterprises and

20. Asia-based economist employed by a European
investment bank, interview by the author, April 9, 2021.
21. Agatha Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update
(Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 2020).
22. Tracy Wut et al., Reassessing the Landscape for Chinese
Investment in North America and Europe (Chicago: Baker &
McKenzie, April 2021).
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nominally independent Chinese companies.23 Chinese
investment in infrastructure is often opaque, even to
government officials in the recipient country.24 Among
other geopolitical objectives, Beijing evidently hopes
to garner political leverage through its infrastructure
investments. In some cases, Chinese infrastructure
investments overseas can be seen as defensive in
nature and designed to give Beijing more control
over supply chains, to increase its self-reliance, and
to reduce the potential leverage of other states.25
Regardless of the offensive or defensive nature,
Chinese investment in European infrastructure has
the potential to strengthen China’s national security at
the West’s expense.
Chinese ownership or operation of infrastructure
in Europe yields three primary types of national
security risk. First, Chinese ownership or operation
of key infrastructure nodes could provide Chinese
officials with intelligence collection opportunities.
These opportunities are not insignificant, and,
given the ubiquity of Chinese investment in Europe,
the scale and size of Chinese collection efforts are

23. Frans-Paul van der Putten, European Seaports and
Chinese Strategic Influence: the Relevance of the Maritime Silk Road for
the Netherlands (Den Haag, NL: Clingendael Institute, 2019); and
Christopher R. O’Dea, “Asia Rising: Ships of State?” Naval War
College Review 72, no. 1 (Winter 2019).
24. US military officer assigned to US European Command,
interview by the author, January 7, 2021.
25. Wade Shepard, “China’s Seaport Shopping Spree:
What China is Winning By Buying Up the World’s Ports,”
Forbes (website), September 6, 2017, https://www.forbes.com
/sites/wadeshepard/2017/09/06/chinas-seaport-shopping
-spree-whats-happening-as-the-worlds-ports-keep-going-to
-china/?sh=5a88f9274e9d.
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potentially unprecedented.26 Observing activity at
transport nodes used by US or allied militaries or
detecting changes in utility usage on or near military
facilities could provide Chinese authorities—or others
Beijing is willing to cooperate with—useful insights
into ongoing or pending military operations.
The second risk, although somewhat less probable
given the current geopolitical environment, is that
Chinese ownership or operation of infrastructure
elements in Europe could be weaponized in some way
to frustrate, limit, or prevent US or NATO use. For
example, the weaponization of infrastructure could
happen through the denial of services, the slowing
of the provision of services, or sabotage. Increasing
the difficulty of the United States or its allies’ use of
European infrastructure for operations in or through
Europe could present serious challenges to Western
security. Such actions could fundamentally affect the
ability of US and allied military forces to travel into,
across, or through Europe; stage for operations; refuel
and replenish supplies; and communicate.
The third risk is Chinese infrastructure investment
in Europe could facilitate greater operational reach
and influence for the Chinese military. Supporting
combat vessels through commercial cargo terminals
is not without its challenges, including the standards
terminals are constructed to as well as the depth of
berths, but Chinese military academics have examined
this problem set.27 For the moment, the Chinese
26. Cristina Gallardo and Stuart Lau, “UK Tools Up against
China’s Intel Gathering,” Politico (website), April 29, 2021, https://
www.politico.eu/article/uk-seeks-to-build-great-wall-against
-chinese-and-russian-espionage/.
27. Isaac Kardon, “Research & Debate—Pier Competitor:
Testimony on China’s Global Ports,” Naval War College Review 74,
no. 1 (Winter 2021).
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military seems most focused on ensuring it has
operational freedom of action within the airspace and
waters immediately adjacent to mainland China—
specifically, the airspace and waters around Taiwan
and in spite of any US intervention.28 Nevertheless,
given the 2017 visit to Piraeus by a Chinese naval force
comprising two surface combatants and a supply ship,
Beijing may make such deployments more common
in the future in an attempt to exploit China’s overseas
holdings for logistical and intelligence value.29 Even if
this risk seems less probable than the previous two, it
could further increase China’s influence and leverage
in Europe.30
The following sections of this chapter try to
discern the extent of these risks for the various types
of infrastructure in which China has invested. These
sections examine seaports and cargo terminal first,
given their importance for moving military vehicles,
fuel, and materiel and hosting naval combatants.
Seaports
In Europe, as in the United States, most seaports
are publicly owned. (As a note, this chapter uses
the terms “seaport” and “port” interchangeably).
28. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual
Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense, August 21, 2020), 9.
29. Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese Naval Fleet Arrives
in Greece for Friendly Visit,” XinhuaNet, July 23, 2017, http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/23/c_136466322.htm;
and Kardon, “Research & Debate,” 144–45.
30. Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, China’s Belt and Road
Implications for the United States (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, March 2021), 63–64.
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By one estimate, 87 percent of European ports are
owned by central, regional, or municipal government
authorities; 7 percent are held by joint public-private
partnerships; and 6 percent are privately held.31
Completely privately held ports are more common
in the United Kingdom than on the continent. Unlike
airports in Europe, the eurozone debt crisis did not
spark privatization in European seaports. But, since
the eurozone debt crisis, European port authorities
have increasingly been structuring themselves as
independent commercial entities. This trend means
most European port authorities are becoming
increasingly driven by financial sustainability, if not
outright profitability.
A port typically has many terminals that are
each designed to handle different types of cargo.
Some port authorities operate all or some of their
terminals, but most ports lease or grant concessions
to one or more port management companies to
operate their terminals.
China is home to three of the world’s 11 largest port
management companies: Hutchison Port Holdings
Limited, China Ocean Shipping Company, Limited
(COSCO), and China Merchants Port Holdings
Company Limited (CMP).32 These companies and
their main competitors from Dubai, Germany, the
Netherlands, Singapore, Taiwan, Switzerland, the
United States, and elsewhere load, unload, and deal
with transshipments. Many terminal operators,
31. European Sea Ports Organisation, Trends in EU Ports
Governance 2016 (Brussels: European Sea Ports Organisation,
2016), 7.
32. Ajay Menon, “11 Major Container Terminal Operators
in the World,” Marine Insight (website), updated December 14,
2021,
https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/11-major
-container-terminal-operators-in-the-world/.
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however, have also purchased stakes in major global
ports, distribution centers, and other parts of the
logistics services supply chain, a trend that began
in the 1990s and continues today. Many shipping
companies have also resorted to alliances and other
forms of horizontal integration with competitors
as another means of lowering costs.33 This vertical
integration facilitates profit maximization and allows
providers to offer more services to customers in an
industry facing low operating margins.34
For example, COSCO—the world’s largest overall
shipping company, third-largest container carrier,
and fifth-largest port terminal operator—owns
minority stakes in container terminals in Antwerp and
Rotterdam. In nearby Zeebrugge, Belgium, COSCO
owns 100 percent of the former APM Terminal,
which is the largest and primary container terminal
in Zeebrugge. In Spain, on which this chapter does
not focus, COSCO also owns stakes in Las Palmas
(minority), Valencia (majority), and Bilbao (majority).
Most recently, COSCO has entered into talks to buy
a minority stake in Hamburg’s Container Terminal
Tollerort, which would make COSCO the first
non-German operator at the country’s main container
port.35 All these ports have been used by US forces in
the recent past.
33. European Sea Ports Organisation, Trends.
34. Theo E. Notteboom and Hercules E. Haralambides,
“Port Management and Governance in a Post–COVID-19 Era:
Quo Vadis?,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 22, no. 3 (September
2020): 330.
35. Andrew Cox, “Cosco in Negotiations to Buy Minority
Stake in Hamburg Container Terminal,” Splash 247.com (website),
June 9, 2021, https://splash247.com/cosco-in-negotiations-to
-buy-minority-stake-in-hamburg-container-terminal/.
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The most (in)famous presence of COSCO in
Europe is in the Greek city of Piraeus, near Athens.
In Piraeus, COSCO operates two of the port’s three
terminals through its wholly owned subsidiary
Piraeus Container Terminal and it has operational
control of the third terminal via its 51 percent stake
in the Piraeus Port Authority. Over the last decade,
Chinese investment and container throughput have
vaulted Piraeus from a relatively small port into the
fourth busiest port in Europe today.
Officials of the US military who are based in
Europe—at military commands such as United
States European Command, US Army Europe and its
subordinate logistics commands, NATO, and defense
attaché offices in US embassies—are increasingly
aware of expanding Chinese ownership of seaports
and other militarily relevant infrastructure facilities
on the continent. Chinese infrastructure investments
in Europe have been a frequent topic of unclassified
and classified briefings for US military leaders in
Europe.36 These leaders may not be able to list specific
infrastructure elements owned by Chinese entities,
but the leaders are increasingly aware of growing
Chinese acquisitions in Europe. Moreover, the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command—
the Army component command under United States
Transportation Command—has a vetting procedure
in place to ascertain foreign influence in ports.37
Additionally, US military operators on the ground
36. Department of Defense (DoD) official based in Europe,
e-mail message to author, September 28, 2020; and Officer assigned
to US Military Delegation to NATO Military Committee,
interview by author, December 14, 2020.
37. US military official assigned to the 598th Transportation
Brigade, interview by author, December 8, 2020.
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are regularly consulted about prospective Chinese
investment in European infrastructure, feeding their
concerns and recommendations to counterparts
at US embassies who can subsequently attempt to
influence the host-nation authorities who are in charge
of approving such investments.38 In practice, and
on some occasions, this knowledge and the vetting
procedures in place have caused US military officials
to avoid using terminals owned and operated by
Chinese companies.39
From a fiscal perspective, shifting the embarkation
or debarkation of US military forces from one port
or one terminal to another would appear to increase
costs. In fact, such changes create an administrative
burden that requires more man-hours to address
and troubleshoot.40 Given the structure of military
shipping contracts and payment terms, shifting from
one seaport facility to another typically does not add
significant contractual cost for US military forces.41
From a capacity perspective, US military officials
maintain they have a wide variety of locations to
choose from in Western Europe for normal, steadystate operations, including exercises and rotational
deployments associated with standing operations,
such as Operation Atlantic Resolve. According to
38. US civilian official assigned to 598th Transportation
Brigade, interview by author, December 14, 2020.
39. DoD official based in Europe, e-mail message to author,
September 28, 2020; DoD official based in Europe, e-mail message
to author, October 30, 2020; and US military official assigned to
21st Theater Sustainment Command, interview with author,
December 8, 2020.
40. US military official assigned to US embassy in Brussels,
interview by author, August 3, 2020.
41. US civilian official assigned to 598th Transportation
Brigade, interview by author, December 14, 2020.
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one official, scores of European ports can receive a
US armored brigade.42
Broadly speaking, independent analyses on port
capacity corroborate the availability of port space. For
instance, one reputable study found container ports
in most parts of the world, including Europe, suffer
from significant overcapacity.43 This situation is likely
to persist over the coming decades because of planned
capacity expansions. The expansion of port capacity is
good news to US military officials who need a variety
of seaport options to avoid reliance on terminals or
ports owned or operated by Chinese companies.
In the event of a large-scale contingency crisis
requiring significant US force projection into Europe,
US forces might be challenged to avoid ports or
terminals owned or operated by Chinese firms or
their subsidiaries. In theory, such a crisis might
increase competition for commercial, humanitarian,
and military access to European ports and require
US forces to use most of the major ports available
to them, which could subsequently provide an
intelligence collection opportunity to Chinese officials
and present other risks, such as those outlined earlier
in the chapter.44

42. US civilian official assigned to 598th Transportation
Brigade, interview by author, December 14, 2020.
43. Jari Kauppila et al., Capacity to Grow: Transport
Infrastructure Needs for Future Trade Growth (Paris: International
Transport Forum, 2016), 33.
44. US military official assigned to American embassy in
Brussels, interview by author, August 3, 2020; US military officer
assigned to United States European Command, interview by
author, January 7, 2021; and US official assigned to US Embassy
in London, interview by author, April 26, 2021.
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Airports
China has also sought to invest in airports
across the continent over the last decade. Some of
the high-profile investments are China’s 10 percent
stake in London’s Heathrow Airport (2009); HNA
Group’s purchase of 82.5 percent of Frankfurt-Hahn
Airport in Germany (2017); and Alibaba Group’s
effort to build a logistical hub around Liège Airport
in Belgium (2018).
Not all Chinese investment in European airports
has endured or been successful. For example, in
late 2019, the Chinese company China Aerospace
International Holdings sold its 49.9 percent stake in
Toulouse-Blagnac Airport in France, which it had
held since 2015 under a privatization deal. In 2016,
China Everbright Limited acquired 100 percent of
Tirana International Airport Nënë Tereza in Albania,
promising to expand the facility.45 Instead, despite
consistent passenger growth until 2020, Everbright
sold the concession in December 2020 to an Albanian
company rather than deepen its commitment.46
Elsewhere, in September 2019, China expressed
interest in the storage facilities at Lajes Air Base in

45. Tirana International Airport, “China Everbright Limited
Acquires 100% of the Shares in TIA,” press release, July 10,
2016, https://www.tirana-airport.com/d/133/china-everbright
-limited-acquires-100-of-the-shares-in-tia.
46. “Albanian Company Takes On the Concession for Tirana
Rinas Airport,” CAPA (website), February 24, 2021, https://
centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/albanian-company
-takes-on-the-concession-for-tirana-rinas-airport-548563.
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the Azores.47 This facility was under lease to the
US Air Force, which was not using it for the most
part. The formerly designated military airport has
one of the largest runways in Europe, capable of
supporting strategic bombers and airlift platforms.
The United States used the airport extensively to
support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the
US presence there has declined in recent years.48
Despite apparent Chinese interest, Portugal appears
unlikely to permit Beijing to gain a foothold there—in
part, because of US concerns.49
Despite Chinese investment in some European
airports, the security threat associated with actions
such as intelligence collection, the hindering of
US or allied military operations, and the facilitation
of greater Chinese military operational activity
remains minimal, primarily because most US and
allied defense establishments rely on military air
bases, which typically remain in government control.
47. Eduardo Baptista, “China-US Tension: Portugal
Feels Washington’s Ire as Beijing Comes Wooing with an
Eye on Strategic Azores,” South China Morning Post (website),
November 2, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china
/diplomacy/article/3106844/china-us-tension-portugal-feels
-washingtons-ire-beijing-comes; and Ruairi Kavanagh, “China
Eyes Azores as Possible Commercial Hub Amid US Concerns,”
South EU Summit, October 11, 2019, https://southeusummit.com
/europe/portugal/china-eyes-azores-as-possible-commercial
-hub-amid-us-concerns/.
48. US official assigned to US embassy in Lisbon,
interview by author, April 19, 2021.
49. Paul Ames, “China’s Atlantic Stopover Worries
Washington,” Politico (website), September 29, 2016, https://
www.politico.eu/article/chinas-atlantic-stopover-terceira
-worries-washington-li-keqiang-united-states/; and US official
assigned to US embassy in Lisbon, interview by author,
April 19, 2021.
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In theory, scanning equipment used at airports,
ports, and border crossings could pose a threat by
revealing cargo container contents and offering an
intelligence collection opportunity. The Chinese
Nuctech Company, Ltd., which is directly tied to the
Chinese government, provides scanning equipment,
including the necessary services, systems, and
software to scan people, baggage, supplies, cargo,
and mail.50 Nuctech systems are connected to
databases containing the personal data of millions
of travelers transiting European airports, including
American servicemembers.
Only a small percentage of containers are scanned
at seaports—perhaps 3 to 5 percent.51 Moreover,
because US military shipments are not taxed at ports,
the commercial scanning of military materiel is even
less likely.
Energy and Other Utilities
In addition to seaports, Western military forces
operating in or through Europe rely to some degree
on civilian energy infrastructure. Although NATO
allies have an extensive pipeline system for petroleum
resources for military forces and facilities, electricity

50. Laurens Cerulus, “Meet the Huawei of Airport Security,”
Politico (website), February 11, 2020, https://www.politico.eu
/article/beijing-scanners-europe-nuctech/.
51. US officer assigned to NATO’s Joint Sustainment and
Enabling Command, interview by author, February 22, 2021;
and Congressional Budget Office, Scanning and Imaging Shipping
Containers Overseas: Costs and Alternatives (Washington, DC:
Congressional Budget Office, June 2016), 9.
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needs are met almost entirely through the civilian
electrical grid.52
From a subsector perspective, Chinese entities
have invested in European fossil-fuel plants,
renewables, nuclear facilities, and power distribution.
Geographically, most Chinese investment in the
European energy sector has focused on the larger,
wealthier countries, such as France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom. But Chinese energy sector
investment has also been rising in Southern Europe,
especially in Greece and Portugal, where pressure
to reduce debt over the last decade compelled (and
continues to compel) the sale or partial sale of stateowned energy infrastructure assets.
For instance, in 2012, State Grid Corporation
of China acquired 25 percent of Redes Energéticas
Nacionais, the national Portuguese electrical grid
operator, for €387 million.53 This acquisition followed
the state-owned China Three Gorges Corporation
(CTG) 2011 purchase of 21 percent of EDP Group,
which was highly indebted and had a virtual
monopoly on the residential retail energy market in
Portugal and parts of Spain.54 More recently, in April

52. “NATO Pipeline System,” NATO (website), March 9,
2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56600.htm.
53. Reuters Staff, “Factbox: Chinese Investments in
Portugal,” Reuters (website), May 14, 2018, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-edp-m-a-china-investment-factbox
/factbox-chinese-investments-in-portugal-idUSKCN1IF24M.
54. Philippe Le Corre, “Chinese Investments in European
Countries: Experiences and Lessons for the ‘Belt and Road’
Initiative,” in Rethinking the Silk Road: China’s Belt and Road
Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations, ed. Maximilian Mayer
(Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 161–76.
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2019, non-Chinese shareholders blocked a €9 billion
offer from CTG to take over all of EDP Group.55
A similar story appears to be playing out in
Greece, where State Grid Corporation of China
purchased a 24 percent stake in Independent
Power Transmission Operator, usually referred
to as “ADMIE,” in 2017. In addition, the Chinese
corporation is now involved in the construction of
a high-voltage underwater link between Crete—
home to a US naval facility at Crete Naval Base—
and mainland Greece.56 China would like to increase
its stake in Greece’s energy sector, and Athens is
hoping to sell more of ADMIE as well as a 49 percent
stake in Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network
Operator.57 Athens, however, is unlikely to permit
a greater Chinese role in the sector to avoid creating a
monopoly, even though the Greek government faces
an existential need for FDI.58
China has also been active in the renewables
subsector. In August 2020, CTG acquired 13 solar
stations in Spain with a total generating capacity of
just over 500 megawatts, enough to power roughly
55. “Energias de Portugal Shareholders Block Takeover
Bid by China Three Gorges,” France24 (website), April 24, 2019,
https://f24.my/4pA8.
56. US civilian official assigned to United States European
Command, interview by author, November 19, 2020.
57. Public Power Corporation, Invitation to Submit an
Expression of Interest for the Acquisition of 49% of the Hellenic
Electricity Distribution Network Operator S.A. (Athens, GR: Public
Power Corporation, December 15, 2020), 23.
58. US civilian official serving at US embassy in Athens,
interview by author, October 5, 2020; and Γιώργος Φιντικάκης,
“Γιατί η ΔΕΗ «έκοψε» τους Κινέζους από την διεκδίκηση του
ΔΕΔΔΗΕ,” Liberal Markets, January 21, 2021, https://www
.liberal.gr/economy/giati-i-dei-ekopse-tous-kinezous-apo-tin
-diekdikisi-tou-deddie/350573.
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half-a-million homes.59 In 2016, CTG bought a majority
interest in WindMW GmbH, an offshore wind-power
joint venture in Germany. According to Reuters,
“WindMW owns Meerwind, a 288-megawatt project
in the North Sea and one of Germany’s largest
offshore windfarms.”60 In July 2018, China General
Nuclear Power Group acquired 75 percent of a
650-megawatt onshore wind project in Sweden. In
December 2017, China Resources Power Holdings
Company Limited acquired 30 percent of the
Dudgeon Offshore Wind Farm in the United
Kingdom. And in November 2017, Shenhua Group
Corporation Limited (now part of China Energy
Investment Corporation) acquired a 75 percent
stake in four Greek wind farms. Analysts view these
acquisitions as a key element of Beijing’s Made
in China 2025 technology acquisition initiative
because they promote Chinese expansion into
renewables and the advanced technologies that
underpin them.61
59. Reuters Staff, “China Three Gorges Enters Spanish
Energy Market with Solar Plants Buy,” Reuters (website),
August
18,
2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article
/spain-china-renewables-idUKL8N2FK4M9.
60. Reuters Staff, “China Three Gorges to Buy
German Wind Park Meerwind from Blackstone,” Reuters
(website), June 13, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-blackstone-group-wind-farm-china-thre/china-three
-gorges-to-buy-german-wind-park-meerwind-from-blackstone
-idUSKCN0YZ1DC.
61. Jost Wübbeke et al., Made in China 2025: the Making of
a High-Tech Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries
(Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016),
18; and Simon Nicholas, China Is Investing Heavily in European
Wind (Lakewood, OH: Institute for Energy Economics and
Financial Analysis, August 2018).
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In Poland, the government in Warsaw has agreed
to pay for most of the infrastructure necessary to
permit an expansion of the US military presence
there. How Poland will handle the development of
the surrounding infrastructure necessary to support
the expansion has not been determined yet.62 The
existing electrical grid, water and sewer lines, roads,
and rail lines are insufficient to support the planned
growth. Polish officials have told US counterparts if
Chinese firms bid on the tenders, they will likely be
the lowest bidder and therefore stand a good chance
of winning the work.
On a related point, some risk may be associated
with Chinese technology that ends up in electrical
grids and other public utility networks through
public procurement. Of the six or seven largest
smart-meter manufacturers in the world, only one—
Holley Technology—is Chinese. A smart meter
is like a traditional meter insofar as it measures
and records energy consumption data. The smart
meter differs in that it is a digital device that can
communicate remotely with the energy provider.
The device sends consumption information directly
to the energy provider, eliminating the need for a
human meter reader.63 If Chinese-built smart meters
are used around or on a NATO or US military facility,
Chinese authorities could potentially sense abnormal
activity and gather intelligence that could threaten
operational security. Since European smart-meter
62. US official assigned to US embassy in Warsaw,
interview by author, February 25, 2021.
63. Katie Fehrenbacher, “A Smart Meter Giant You’ve Never
Heard Of: Holley Metering,” GigaOm (blog), August 3, 2010,
https://gigaom.com/2010/08/03/a-smart-meter-giant-youve
-never-heard-of-holley-metering/.

143

manufacturers like Landis+Gyr and Siemens AG tend
to dominate the market in Europe, this risk may be
relatively low.
Additional Risk Considerations
Even though US and European officials have
become increasingly aware of, and wary of,
Chinese investment in European energy and
transportation infrastructure, Chinese entities have
attempted to adapt to the shifting landscape in Europe.
For example, Chinese entities appear to be using
third-party companies to expand ownership stakes,
including in militarily relevant infrastructure.64 The
case of joint venture Terminal Link SAS is illustrative.
Terminal Link SAS was formed in 2001 between
France’s CMA CGM—the world’s third-largest
container shipping company, ranking just ahead of
China’s shipping giant COSCO—and CMP. CMA
CGM owns 51 percent, and 49 percent is owned
by CMP, the state-owned public-port operator in
China (the sixth largest such entity in the world,
and a major beneficiary of the BRI).65 Terminal Link
owns terminals in Antwerp, Dunkirk, Le Havre, and
Thessaloniki, and US forces have used all of them.

64. US official assigned to US Mission to the EU,
interview by author, November 13, 2020; US official assigned
to US embassy in Warsaw, interview by author, February 11,
2021; US official at US embassy in Stockholm, interview by
author, February 19, 2021; US official assigned to US embassy
in Lisbon, interview by author, April 19, 2021; and national
security expert, interview by author, November 10, 2020.
65. “Top 10 Box Port Operators 2020,” Lloyd’s List (blog),
December 4, 2020, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence
.informa.com/LL1135004/Top-10-box-port-operators-2020.
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In late 2019, CMA CGM agreed to sell its stakes
in 10 terminals around the world to Terminal
Link, including Rotterdam World Gateway in the
Netherlands and Odessa Terminal in Ukraine.
The others were CMA CGM PSA Lion Terminal
(Singapore), Mundra Terminal (India), Kingston
Freeport Terminal (Jamaica), Gemalink (Cai Mep,
Vietnam), Qingdao Qianwan United Advance
Container Terminal (China), Vietnam International
Container Terminal (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam),
Laem Chabang International Terminal (Thailand), and
Umm Qasr Terminal (Iraq). The French company sold
its stake in these terminals to Terminal Link primarily
to reduce its debt and increase its liquidity.66 This
purchase, which the European Commission approved
in March 2020 after reviewing for anticompetitiveness,
increased Terminal Link’s global holdings to
23 terminals.67
Both the Rotterdam World Gateway terminal—
one of Europe’s most advanced terminals—and the
Odessa terminal on the Black Sea have been used
by the United States in recent years. The former has
been used for small amounts of sustainment cargo for
66. Chris Dupin, “CMA GGM in Binding Agreement to
Sell Terminals to Terminal Link,” American Shipper (website),
December 20, 2019, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/cma
-ggm-in-binding-agreement-to-sell-terminals-to-terminallink; and “CMA CGM Signs Binding Agreement with China
Merchants Port to Sell a Portfolio of Ten Port Terminals to
Terminal Link,” Hellenic Shipping News (website), December 23,
2019, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/cma-cgm-signs
-binding-agreement-with-china-merchants-port-to-sell-a
-portfolio-of-ten-port-terminals-to-terminal-link/.
67. “EU Approves Terminal Acquisitions by CMA CGM
and CMPorts,” Maritime Executive (website), March 19, 2020,
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/e-u-approves
-terminal-acquisitions-by-cma-cgm-and-cmports.
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US forces in Europe, and the latter has been used for
shipments of military materiel sold to Ukraine under
the Foreign Military Sales program.68
The Chinese company CMP reportedly has no
operational or managerial role at Terminal Link’s
ports.69 Evidence indicates CMP personnel have been
assigned to work in senior positions in Terminal Link
offices in Europe.70 The Chinese company having
personnel in senior Terminal Link positions may not
represent an imminent operational risk to Western
military forces, but it could form an intelligence
collection risk.
In addition to concealing Beijing’s hand through
minority stakes in ostensibly European companies,
Chinese entities often base themselves in or route
investment activity through seemingly more benign
locations like the Cayman Islands, an overseas
British territory. When investment in an entity in
the British home isles appears to originate from the
Cayman Islands—because such a direct investment
is not technically considered foreign—the operative
investment screening tools are never triggered
or employed.71
Similarly, Chinese investors have frequently
funneled
investments
into
Europe
through
Hong Kong, which until recently was deemed less
of a security risk than investment from mainland
China. But, given China’s systematic dismantling of
68. US official based in Europe, e-mail message to author,
May 6, 2021.
69. Kardon, “Research & Debate,” 129.
70. CMHI Finance (BVI) Co., Ltd., Preliminary Offering
Memorandum (Hong Kong: CMHI Finance [BVI] Co., Ltd.,
September 28, 2020), 36.
71. US official assigned to US embassy in London,
interview by author, April 26, 2021.
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Hong Kong’s democracy, perceptions are changing in
Europe. Several observers interviewed for this study
agreed companies operating from Hong Kong are no
different today in terms of the security threat they
pose than those based in Shanghai or Guangzhou.72
Despite this changing perception, some older
investments from Hong Kong-based entities are
inexplicably treated as still benign today. For
instance, Britain’s largest and busiest container
port—Felixstowe in Suffolk—has been wholly owned
since 1994 by Hutchison Port Holdings Limited, a
subsidiary of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison
Holdings Limited, and this potential issue has not
been subject to significant attention by US officials.
In other cases, US officials are aware of the risk to
Western security posed by Hong Kong firms like
CK Hutchison: In 2020, the United States reportedly
pressured Israel to prevent the company from
winning a tender for a desalination plant, and
some in the United States have long been
concerned with Hutchison’s operations in Panama.73
See table 6-2 for an assessment of infrastructure risks
in relevant countries.

72. US official assigned to US embassy in London,
interview by author, April 26, 2021; and Asia-based economist
employed by a European investment bank, interview by author,
April 9, 2021.
73. Shirley Zhao and Ivan Levingston, “Li Ka-Shing Hong
Kong Group Loses Israel Deal Amid US Push,” Bloomberg
(website), May 26, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2020-05-26/israel-s-ide-wins-tender-to-build
-desalination-plant; and Steven Mufson, “In Panama, Ports in a
Storm,” Washington Post (website), December 8, 1999, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/08/008r
-120899-idx.html.
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Table 6-2. Assessment of infrastructure risks in
relevant countries
US Reliance
for Transit

Chinese
Investment in
Mil-Relevant
Infrastructure

Low

High

High

High

NA

Moderate

Low

Medium

High

Low

Medium

Moderate

High

Medium

Country

US Reliance
for Basing

Belgium
France
Germany

High

Greece

Low

Overall
Infrastructure
Risk
Assessment

Italy

High

Low

Low

Medium

Netherlands

Low

High

Medium

Medium

Poland

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Medium

Mitigating Elements?
The risks outlined in the preceding sections are
mitigated to some degree by China’s own missteps.
Across Europe, Chinese investment in energy and
transportation infrastructure today is increasingly
viewed with a jaundiced eye, reflecting the broader
trends outlined in chapter 4. In many cases,
European officials are reluctant to permit additional
acquisitions or the expansion of existing infrastructure
investments. For instance, Greek authorities appear
reluctant to allow an expansion of Chinese ownership
at the Piraeus seaport. To expand its ownership stake
from 51 percent to 67 percent, COSCO was obligated
to make additional investments in the port, including
the construction of a fourth terminal. But COSCO has
been unable to implement these investments because
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locals have raised environmental concerns.74 Whether
intentionally or not, Greek bureaucracy has slowed,
for the time being, China’s advance in Piraeus.
Similarly, in Poland, China has built a poor
reputation by overpromising and underdelivering.
In 2009, the China Overseas Engineering Group Co.,
Ltd. won the tender to build two sections of Poland’s
main east-west highway—primarily, by severely
undercutting other competitors—and, according to
critics, the company used subsidies from Beijing to
do so. The then-cash-strapped Polish government
welcomed the bargain price tag, while China hoped
to use Poland as a springboard to break into Europe’s
construction sector.75 Instead, the Chinese company
was unable to meet the technical requirements, leading
to quality-control delays.76 Ultimately, the Poles
cancelled the contract, resulting in an embarrassing
scandal for the government in Warsaw.
Today, Poland is still eager for investment from
China, but not at the price of allowing Chinese entities
to run roughshod over Polish rules and regulations.
For example, Warsaw has approved plans to build
a large transport hub, including a new airport, rail
lines, and highways, in the middle of the country,
74. US civilian official serving at US embassy in Athens,
interview by author, October 5, 2020; and Angeliki Koutantou,
“China’s Cosco Hopes for Greek Deal on Piraeus Despite
Delay—Official,” Reuters (website), May 28, 2021, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-cosco-ship-hold-greece-piraeus/chinas
-cosco-hopes-for-greek-deal-on-piraeus-despite-delay-official
-idUSKCN2D91H7.
75. Jan Cienski, “Poland to China: You’re Fired,”
Financial Times (website), June 14, 2011, https://www.ft.com
/content/77f1d8c3-d258-3760-b035-6edee87cb6c2. .
76. US official assigned to US embassy in Warsaw,
interview by author, February 11, 2021.
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just over 20 miles west of Warsaw.77 The centerpiece
will be a new $10 billion airport intended to compete
with other major European gateway cities, such as
Amsterdam Frankfurt, and Paris. Chinese entities
were eager to get involved, but Polish officials
appeared reluctant to permit their involvement.78
Elsewhere, in some cases, Chinese investors
in European infrastructure have simply failed to
deliver on contractual arrangements. For example,
Everbright’s contract to operate Tirana airport
required the Chinese to invest in the airport by
expanding it, but they refused to do so, leading to a
confrontational situation. At one point in discussions
with Albanian officials, Chinese officials reportedly
suggested they would expand the airport’s capacity
by using tents.79
These examples and others indicate the Chinese
approach in Europe is unrefined and inconsistent.
Although this lack of quality and consistency may
provide some mitigation, neither Europe nor the
United States, which has a significant stake in the
security and reliability of European infrastructure,
can afford to rely solely on Chinese mistakes. The
next chapter examines how and where Chinese
investments in advanced technology and related raw
materials represent a challenge to the development of
defense capabilities and capacity in Europe.
77. “Poland
Approves
an
Ambitious
National
Transport Programme,” Railway Pro (website), November 3,
2020, https://www.railwaypro.com/wp/poland-approves-an
-ambitious-national-transport-programme/.
78. US official assigned to US embassy in Warsaw,
interview by author, February 11, 2021.
79. US official serving at US embassy in Tirana, interview
by author, April 21, 2021.
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7. SECURITY RISKS:
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE
Nicholas Nelson and Lauren Speranza
©2022 Nicholas Nelson and Lauren Speranza

Chinese penetration of Europe’s growing
technology sector is on the rise. Despite initial dips in
other types of Chinese investment in the wake of the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the
volume of Chinese technology investments in Europe
increased 25 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to
the first quarter of 2020.1 The rising demand for virtual
innovation during lockdowns created new openings
for technology investors in Europe, but China has long
been pursuing such strategic opportunities as part of
its climb to great-power status.
Emerging and disruptive technologies such as
artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems,
Internet of Things (IoT) components, and space
-enabled capabilities have been the targets of many
Chinese state-backed investors in Europe seeking
to sharpen China’s competitive edge with foreign
technology and know-how.2 Many of these dual-use
technologies have both civilian (that is, commercial)
and military applications, increasing their value
to Beijing. The risks would grow for European
1. GP Bullhound, Inc., “Asia Insights: Q1 Wrap-Up from
One of the First Markets to Reopen” (PowerPoint presentation,
GP Bullhound, Inc., London, UK, May 2020), https://docsend
.com/view/55r4qmv6s5wnf3h5?hsCtaTracking=320f4359
-fd0b-4be1-ac0b-29402daada8e%7C4338ba75-0a0d-4cce-b3d5
-ea569358eff5.
2. Henrik B. L. Larsen, “Europe’s Awakening to China’s
Tech Dominance,” Harvard International Review (website),
October 16, 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/europe-awakening
-china-tech-dominance/.
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governments and their allies if these technologies
ended up in the wrong hands or became subject to
foreign, malign influence.
As strategic competition between China and the
West has intensified, many European governments
have introduced new measures to limit Chinese
investment in sensitive technologies—particularly,
those that have explicit security and defense
implications.3 But as Europe’s preventative measures
have advanced, so too have China’s investment
practices for accessing foreign intellectual property
(IP) and technological capabilities. Beyond simple
state-owned investment and acquisitions, China is
leveraging commercial companies, complex webs of
venture capital (VC), and even international research
and talent programs to benefit from European dualuse technology without detection. China is also
manipulating critical supply chains to control access to
key raw materials, such as rare-earth elements (REEs),
required to produce and operate such technologies.4
These actions by China could result in significant
consequences for the security of Europe; its closest
ally, the United States; and the NATO alliance that
binds them.
This chapter explores the primary risks to allied
security posed by Chinese investment in dualuse technologies and related materials in Europe.
Beginning with China’s approach to technology
investment in Europe, this chapter outlines seven
3. Sarah Erikson, “Recent Developments in EU Foreign
Investment Screening,” Strategic Technologies Blog, April 19,
2021, https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog
/recent-developments-eu-foreign-investment-screening.
4. Agatha Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update
(Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 8, 2020).
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priority dual-use technologies at risk: AI, quantum
information
technology
(IT),
semiconductors,
space and space-enabled capabilities, additive
manufacturing (AM), robotics, and unmanned and
autonomous systems. These technologies were
identified based on two key factors: (1) China’s
significant focus on these technologies through
its policies, investments, and related activities in
Europe; and (2) the transformative potential of these
technologies for the strategic and military capabilities
of both China and the transatlantic alliance. The
chapter also looks at China’s efforts to influence and
control access to the REEs necessary to make and use
these technologies.
This analysis details China’s activities and
tactics for acquiring IP, penetrating supply chains,
and manipulating these technologies in Europe,
offering the following five primary categories for
conceptualizing and monitoring China’s influence in
this space.
•

Direct investments and acquisitions in Europe
by Chinese state-owned entities

•

Investments and acquisitions in Europe by
commercial Chinese companies not directly
linked to the government

•

Investments in VC, especially in European
start-ups, by Chinese VC firms and Chinese
limited partners in non-Chinese VC firms

•

The penetration of raw material supply chains
(particularly REEs)

•

Research and development collaborations and
talent programs between Chinese and European
companies and academic institutions
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The chapter then illustrates examples of these
Chinese activities across six key European countries as
case studies: the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. These cases were
selected because of their advanced defense technology
industries, manufacturing bases, talent pools, and
related raw materials as well as their strong track
records of deploying or partnering with the United
States for security and defense operations through
NATO. The chapter concludes by highlighting three
primary risks to allied security posed by China’s
dual-use technology investment activities in Europe.
China’s Approach to Dual-Use Technology
in Europe
As discussed in chapter 3, Beijing views
technological innovation and eventual supremacy
as key pillars of China’s rise as a great power. For
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), technology
is necessary to support an advanced economy,
government control of society, and a capable military,
all of which the party views as being interconnected.5
To facilitate the achievement of these goals, the
government has initiated a series of top-down,
whole-of-government policies and programs at home,
such as Made in China 2025, that are designed to
jump-start the development of dual-use technologies
and achieve military-civil fusion. Military-civil fusion
is a strategy designed to build China into an economic,
technological, and military superpower by fusing the
5. Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda, “China’s
Pursuit of Advanced Dual-Use Technologies,” Research Paper
(blog), December 18, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs
/research-paper/2018/12/emerging-technology-dominance.
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country’s military and civilian industrial, science, and
technology resources.6
The state has orchestrated sector-specific industrial
and innovation plans, targets for productivity and
market shares, domestic market protection policies,
the creation of national champions, and large-scale
R&D programs. One key tool is the Five-Year Plan
for national economic and social development, which
the Chinese government adapts incrementally to
shape commercial and technology goals for China’s
advancement through 2035.7 Another tool is China
Standards 2035, a 15-year blueprint for China’s
government agencies and technology companies
aimed at driving international standards for nextgeneration technologies and increasing China’s
global technology clout.8 Still another tool is China’s
military modernization strategy that involves efforts
to increase the innovation and global competitiveness
of large, defense state-owned enterprises and to work
with the civil and commercial sectors for inspiration.9
This strategy underscores the importance of dual-use
technologies for future battles, which are increasingly
6. Audrey Fritz, “China’s Evolving Conception of CivilMilitary Collaboration,” CSIS China Innovation Policy Series (blog),
August 2, 2019, http://www.csis-cips.org/blog/2019/8/2
/chinas-evolving-conception; and Congressional Research
Service, “Made in China 2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for
Congress, IF10964 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, updated August 11, 2020).
7. Congressional Research Service, China’s 14th Five-Year
Plan: A First Look, IF11684 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, updated January 5, 2021).
8. Naomi Wilson, “China Standards 2035 and the Plan for
World Domination,” Council on Foreign Relations (website),
June 3, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-standards-2035
-and-plan-world-domination-dont-believe-chinas-hype.
9. Nouwens and Lagarda, “China’s Pursuit.”
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playing out through unconventional means in the
cyber and information domains.
Though China prioritizes technology independence
and indigenous innovation, the extent to which
the country can generate dual-use technology
domestically to achieve its goal of leapfrogging the
United States as a technological superpower is limited.
Some of the limits China faces are time, difficulty, cost,
infrastructure, and talent. To fill these gaps, China
relies on a variety of approaches, especially those
outlined in chapter 3.
Priority Dual-Use Technologies at Risk
This study identifies seven advanced, dual-use
technologies as priority risk areas based on two
key factors: (1) China’s significant focus on these
technologies through its policies, investments, and
related activities in Europe; and (2) the transformative
potential of these technologies for the strategic and
military capabilities of both China and the transatlantic
alliance. The technologies include AI, quantum IT,
semiconductors, space and space-enabled capabilities,
AM, robotics, and unmanned and autonomous
systems. The following sections examine the relevance
of these technologies.
Most recently, in its 14th Five-Year Plan for
2021–25, the Chinese government outlined seven
“frontier technologies” that heavily characterize its

156

investment activities in Europe.10 Four of these dualuse technologies are particularly transformative for
defense and pose significant risks for European allies’
security and technology.
Artificial Intelligence
According to IBM Cloud Education, “AI leverages
computers and machines to mimic the problemsolving and decision-making capabilities of the
human mind.”11 Though AI has numerous commercial
applications, including e-commerce, workplace
communication, and health care, the technology is
a potential game changer, affecting a wide range of
military capabilities. The technology can empower
autonomous and high-speed weapons and defensive
systems across the land, air, sea, space, and cyber
domains. The technology also provides stark
advantages in logistics; exercising and training; target
recognition; situational awareness; data processing;
planning; and, for China, population surveillance
and control.12
10. Arjun Kharpal, “In Battle with U.S., China to Focus
on 7 ‘Frontier’ Technologies from Chips to Brain-Computer
Fusion,” CNBC (website), March 5, 2021, https://www.cnbc
.com/2021/03/05/china-to-focus-on-frontier-tech-from-chips
-to-quantum-computing.html; and Benjamin Cooper, “China’s
14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) Report,” Hill+Knowlton
Strategies (website), April 1, 2021, https://www.hkstrategies
.com/en/chinas-14th-five-year-plan-2021-2025-report/.
11. IBM Cloud Education, “What Is Artificial Intelligence,”
IBM (website), June 3, 2020, https://www.ibm.com/cloud
/learn/what-is-artificial-intelligence.
12. Forrest E. Morgan et al., Military Applications of AI:
Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2020).
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China has an ambitious set of policies and national
initiatives that have fueled its indigenous leaps
forward in AI. But China continues to benefit from
international R&D partnerships and underrated
AI-related investments in Europe.13 As it refines its
AI and AI-enabled technologies, China could be
positioned to sell them for security cooperation and
other geopolitical purposes that could undercut
alliance capabilities. China is also leveraging these
advances to set global AI standards and terms of use
in its favor, which could affect allies’ ability to apply
the technology in operations.14 China manipulates
standards through its large-scale physical control of
production, exchange, and consumption of AI products
as well as its foothold in international governance
bodies like the UN’s International Telecommunication
Union and the World Trade Organization.15 As
underscored by its National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence, the United States and its allies
are at risk of losing AI leadership to China in the next
decade.16 Given the close and high-stakes competition
13. Nouwens and Lagarda, “China’s Pursuit.”
14. Valentina Pop, Sha Hua, and Daniel Michaels,
“From Lightbulbs to 5G, China Battles West for Control of
Vital Technology Standards,” Wall Street Journal (website),
February 8, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-light
bulbs-to-5g-china-battles-west-for-control-of-vital-technology
-standards-11612722698.
15. Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, “China’s
Next Plan to Dominate International Tech Standards,”
TechCrunch (website), April 11, 2020, https://techcrunch
.com/2020/04/11/chinas-next-plan-to-dominate-international
-tech-standards/.
16. Eric Schmidt et al., Final Report (Washington, DC:
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,
March 1, 2020).
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between the alliance and China in AI, the technology
represents a key risk area for allied security.17
Quantum Information Technology
Quantum IT provides new forms of computing,
sensing, and communications to revolutionize
the processing and transmission of data.18 In the
commercial space, quantum IT could be applied
to enhance everything from engineering and
medicine to banking and environmental science.
Across military missions, these capabilities can
provide significant advantages in sensing, timing,
detection, synchronization, data encryption, and even
precision navigation.19 The navigation capability is
particularly critical to future operations, which are
likely to take place in denial-of-service environments
in which space-based Global Positioning Systems are
disrupted or disabled. Quantum IT can also provide
advanced sensing and tracking that can undermine
traditional allied military capabilities, such as
anti-submarine warfare.20
17. Sam Shead, “US Is ‘Not Prepared to Defend or
Compete in the A.I. Era,’ Says Expert Group Chaired by Eric
Schmidt,” CNBC (website), March 2, 2021, https://www.cnbc
.com/2021/03/02/us-not-prepared-to-defend-or-compete-in
-ai-era-says-eric-schmidt-group.html.
18. Timothy Spiller, “Quantum Information Technology,”
Materials Today 6, no. 1 (January 2003): 30–36.
19. Jon Harper, “Pentagon Trying to Manage Quantum
Science Hype,” National Defense (website), December 10,
2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020
/12/10/pentagon-trying-to-manage-quantum-science-hype.
20. Tom Simonite, “China Stakes Its Claim to Quantum
Supremacy,” Wired (website), December 3, 2020, https://www
.wired.com/story/china-stakes-claim-quantum-supremacy/.
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In addition to national subsidies and largescale investment programs, China has supported
its indigenous quantum advances by manipulating
international R&D partnerships, including in Europe,
to access foreign know-how.21 As China continues
to push toward quantum supremacy, Beijing could
become the global supplier of quantum technologies.
Quantum technology is another top risk area for
Europe and the alliance.
Semiconductors
Semiconductors or microchips have a huge range
of commercial applications, including IoT devices
such as smartphones, automobiles, televisions,
cameras, household appliances, and even lightemitting diode bulbs.22 Semiconductors are also used
in a variety of defense electronics and platforms, such
as computers, sensors, amplifiers, switches, weapons,
military aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and more.23 Semiconductors are integral to the way
modern militaries fight and conduct operations.
China has traditionally lagged behind leading
competitor semiconductor developers, such as the
United States and South Korea. Because China lacks
21. Tom Stefanick, “The State of US-China Quantum
Data Security Competition,” TechStream (blog), Brookings
Institution, September 18, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu
/techstream/the-state-of-u-s-china-quantum-data-security
-competition/.
22. “What
is
a
Semiconductor?,”
Semiconductor
Industry Association (website), updated May 25, 2021,
https://www.semiconductors.org/semiconductors-101
/what-is-a-semiconductor/.
23. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Electronics
Industry Study Report: Semiconductors and Defense Electronics
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003).
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domestic companies that can design and produce
tools its chip manufacturers need, it has relied on
Europe and other countries for key materials and
know-how.24 China has pumped billions of dollars
into developing its own semiconductor industry, a
move accelerated after the United States blacklisted
Chinese technology giant Huawei for espionage and
banned key component exports to China.25 Despite
US pressure on Europe, China has doubled down
on its activities on the continent in search of key IP,
subcomponents, processes, and materials. As a result,
semiconductors are a significant risk area for Europe
and North America.26

24. Arjun Kharpal, “SMIC, China’s Largest Chipmaker,
Plunges 23% After US Says It Could Blacklist the Firm,”
CNBC (website), September 7, 2020, https://www.cnbc
.com/2020/09/07/shares-of-chinese-chipmaker-smic-plunge
-amid-potential-us-blacklist.html; and Arjun Kharpal, “China
Is Pushing to Develop Its Own Chips—But the Country Can’t
Do Without Foreign Tech,” CNBC (website), October 24, 2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/25/china-pushes-to-design
-its-own-chips-but-still-relies-on-foreign-tech.html.
25. Arjun Kharpal, “Google Cuts Ties with Huawei. That
May Be a ‘Kill Switch’ for the Chinese Firm’s Global Smartphone
Ambition,” CNBC (website), May 20, 2019, https://www.cnbc
.com/2019/05/20/google-stops-some-business-with-huawei
-could-hit-its-global-smartphone-ambitions.html; and Arjun
Kharpal, “China Is Pushing to Develop Its Own Chips—but
the Country Can’t Do Without Foreign Tech,” CNBC (website),
October 24, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/25/china
-pushes-to-design-its-own-chips-but-still-relies-on-foreign
-tech.html.
26. Kharpal, “SMIC, China’s Largest Chipmaker.”
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Space and Space-Enabled Capabilities
Space capabilities, such as geospatial intelligence,
the Global Positioning System, launch vehicles, and
satellite communications, have many commercial
uses, from transportation to data analytics. For
governments and militaries, space capabilities provide
better, more real-time intelligence to decisionmakers;
enable military headquarters to manage battlespaces
effectively; and connect platforms and warfighters
across the globe.27 In fact, most allied capabilities rely
on access to and the freedom to act in space.
China has recently prioritized space exploration
and dominance as a strategic objective and made
significant strides in anti-satellite and counterspace
capabilities that could disrupt or disable NATO
capabilities.28 To makes these strides, China has
partially relied on access to foreign technology and
talent, in addition to national programs.29 Because
space is central to enabling much of the defense
innovation among great powers, space capabilities

27. Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities
(Washington, DC: Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization, 2001).
28. Liane Zivitsky, “China Wants to Dominate Space and
the US Must Take Countermeasures,” Defense News (website),
June
23,
2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion
/commentary/2020/06/23/china-wants-to-dominate-space-and
-the-us-must-take-countermeasures/.
29. Neel Patel, “China’s Surging Private Space
Industry Is Out to Challenge the US,” MIT Technology
Review
(website),
January
21,
2021,
https://www
.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china
-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/.
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represent a core risk area for allied technology and
defense capabilities.30
The 14th Five-Year Plan also emphasized three
additional areas of technological development China
may not consider as leading-edge but that it still
prioritizes across its investment activities, including
as part of Made in China 2025.31 These areas pose a
variety of risks to allied security and defense.
Additive Manufacturing
This technology represents a transformative
approach to industrial production that uses “software
or 3D object scanners to direct hardware to deposit
material, layer upon layer, in precise geometric
shapes.”32 The technology enables the creation of
strong, light parts and systems, often more quickly
than traditional methods. The technology can be
widely used across commercial sectors, including in the
aerospace, automotive, construction, health-care, and

30. “The Space Ambitions of China, Russia and USA,”
American University School of International Service (website),
August
13,
2018,
https://ironline.american.edu/blog
/space-ambitions-china-russia-usa/.
31. Xinhua News Agency, “Proposal of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Drawing Up
the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2030,” trans.
Etcetera Language Group, Inc., Georgetown Center for
Security and Emerging Technology (website), December 7, 2020,
https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0237_5th
_Plenum_Proposal_EN-1.pdf.
32. “What is Additive Manufacturing?,” GE (website),
updated May 25, 2021, https://www.ge.com/additive
/additive-manufacturing.
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entertainment industries.33 For security and defense,
additive manufacturing can be used to produce spare
parts quickly for key platforms like space launch
vehicles, fighter jets, submarines, and tanks; medical
supplies for personnel; materials like concrete and
metal; and even entire structures, like submersible
hulls or drones.34 More broadly, additive manucturing
is likely to encourage localized, on-demand
production, which could threaten China’s leading
position in global supply chains.35 To strengthen
Beijing’s production base at home and expand its
ability to exploit weakened manufacturing sectors
abroad, the CCP provides tax benefits; credit support;
and other incentives, including for international
collaboration, to support the development and
adaptation of AM technology for Chinese entities.36
These measures put European allies’ AM intellectual
property, manufacturing sectors, and supply chains at
substantial risk of Chinese manipulation.
33. Aaron Chen, “How 3D Printing is Being Used
in Different Industries,” C-Mac Industries Pty Ltd (blog),
December 15, 2018, https://www.cmac.com.au/blog/how-3d
-printing-used-in-different-industries.
34. Jen Owen, “3D Printing Uses in the Military,” 3D
Universe, October 21, 2020, https://3duniverse.org/2020/10/21
/3d-printing-uses-in-the-military/.
35. Tess Boissonneault, “50% of Chinese Manufacturers
Believe AM Could Challenge China’s Leading Position in
Manufacturing,” 3D Printing Media Network (website),
November
11,
2019,
https://www.3dprintingmedia
.network/50-percent-chinese-manufacturers-materialise
-survey/; and Economist Intelligence Unit Country
Analysis Service, “Manufacturing Makes a Comeback
in the 14th Five-Year Plan,” Economist Intelligence Unit
(website),
March
17,
2021,
https://onesite.eiu.com
/manufacturing-makes-a-comeback-in-the-14th-five-year-plan/.
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Robotics
Robots perform tasks done traditionally by
humans, either autonomously or with human
input.37 Robots have been widely incorporated across
commercial industries, such as manufacturing, mining,
and health care. In the defense sector, robots can
provide transformative advantages related to armor,
transportation and logistics, emergency response,
remote-controlled vehicles, information collection,
and more while minimizing risk to personnel.38 For
China, robotics has been a major innovation priority
for use in its military and in commercial industries.39
Following massive investments and subsidies under
Made in China 2025, China’s robotics capabilities have
advanced significantly in both areas.40 Despite buying
and building more robots than any other country,
China still depends on robotics manufacturing and
technology from Europe and Japan. Most Chinese
robot manufacturers lack the expertise to build key
components, such as encoders, or to coordinate
37. “What Is Robotics?” NASA (website), November 9,
2009,
https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8
/features /nasa-knows/what_is_robotics_58.html.
38. Heba Soffar, “Army Robots Types, Advantages,
Disadvantages & How Do Artificial Soldiers Change the
Future of War?,” Online Sciences, June 22, 2019, https://www
.online-sciences.com/robotics/army-robots-types-advantages
-disadvantages-how-do-artificial-soldiers-change-the-future
-of-war/.
39. Adam Minter, “Are Robots the Next Investment
Bubble in China?,” IndustryWeek (website), June 9, 2016,
https://www.industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/robotics
/article/21973472/are-robots-the-next-investment-bubble
-in-china.
40. Elsa Kania, AI Weapons in China’s Military Innovation
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, April 2020).
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multiple robots for integrated manufacturing; thus,
China does not yet make enough technologically
advanced industrial robots to meet domestic
manufacturing demand.41 As China explores new
ways—both legal and illicit—to close this gap,
European allies’ robotics intellectual property and
capabilities remain at risk.
Unmanned Systems and Autonomy
These systems are fundamentally changing
industries and warfare across all physical domains
(land, sea, air, and space). The most proliferated
uninhabited systems (UxS) at present are unmanned
aerial systems (UASs), commonly known as “drones.”
These aircraft systems are designed to operate
autonomously or to be controlled remotely without
a pilot on board, drawing on technology used in
robots.42 These systems have several valuable civil and
commercial uses, including delivering packages and

41. Fumie Yaku, “China’s Tech Spending Surges as It
Strives to Be Robotics Superpower,” Nikkei Asia (website), July
24, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/China
-s-tech-spending-surges-as-it-strives-to-be-robotics-superpower;
and Eugene Demaitre, “China Robotics Outlook: A State of the
Industry 2019,” Robot Report, November 19, 2019, https://www
.therobotreport.com/china-robotics-outlook-state
-industry-2019/.
42. “Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS),” SKYbrary,
December 8, 2020, https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php
/Unmanned_Aerial_Systems_(UAS).
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supplies and transporting critical medical aid.43 For
militaries, UASs have traditionally been key sources
of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities, and, more recently, the systems have
provided the ability to strike targets directly. The
systems provide this capability at a cost that is an
order of magnitude lower than that of manned aerial
assets as well as minimize the risk to pilots’ lives.
The use of unmanned aerial systems has been
increasingly transformative because they have had
a significant force-multiplying effect when paired
with other assets.44 In addition to their prospects for
aiding in population surveillance, these systems
are particularly attractive to China for upending the
high-end capabilities of the alliance due to their lowcost, low-risk, high-reward nature. Furthermore, the
asymmetrical use of UASs by adversaries exploits
gaps in NATO’s traditional doctrine.45
43. Annie Palmer, “Amazon Prime New Drone Delivery
Fleet Gets FAA Approval,” CNBC (website), August 31, 2020,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/31/amazon-prime-now
-drone-delivery-fleet-gets-faa-approval.html; and Jake Bright,
“Zipline Begins US Medical Delivery with UAV Program Honed in
Africa,” TechCrunch (website), May 27, 2020, https://techcrunch
.com/2020/05/26/zipline-begins-us-medical-delivery-with-uav
-program-honed-in-africa/.
44. Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh, “The Air and Missile
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and Defense” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(website), December 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air
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The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) brought
significant progress (largely carried by commercial
unmanned aerial systems) to China’s traditionally
underdeveloped general aviation industry, however,
the country still relies on foreign aviation technology.46
Though international investment and acquisition in the
broader European aviation sector are already restricted
due to national security concerns, to avoid screenings,
especially in Europe, China has pursued smaller and
seemingly commercial investments associated with
UASs and autonomy.47 At the same time, Chinese
drone companies, principally SZ DJI Technology
Co., Ltd., have effectively seized the European hobby
drone market—the company currently boasts over
70-percent market share. China could adapt these
commercial capabilities for military use with other
foreign or domestic intellectual property, exposing a
significant risk area for allied security.
Priority Raw Materials at Risk
China is also interested in investing in a variety
of raw materials (particularly REEs) that are required
to produce and use the technologies discussed
46. Jean Deville, “Overview of Chinese Investments in
the Western Aviation Industry,” China Aerospace Blog,
October 17, 2018, https://china-aerospace.blog/2018/10/17
/overview-of-chinese-investments-in-the-western-aviation
-industry/.
47. “Civil Aviation Administration of China: During
the ‘14th Five-Year Plan’ Period, Four New Situations Will
Be Explored to Promote the Construction of Smart Civil
Aviation,” Newsdirectory3.com, January 12, 2021, https://www
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previously. For the manufacturing and production of
high-tech products, rare earth elements are crucial.48
These elements have magnetic and conducting
properties that make products lighter, stronger, and
more effective compared to traditional inputs. For
example, the Internet of Things, unmanned aerial
systems, robots, quantum computers, additivemanufacturing technologies, and many AI-enabled
devices require REEs for key components like lenses,
lights, screens, computers, audio components,
batteries, electrical functions, and even petroleum and
steel-part refinement.49
Neodymium and praseodymium are some of the
most sought-after light REEs most commonly used
in technology, and demand for them has spiked in
recent years as technology has advanced. Although
neodymium is classed as an REE, it is common and
widely distributed in the Earth’s crust, however, more
than 80 percent of the world’s neodymium is produced
in China. The element is critical in the manufacturing
of permanent magnets that are necessary for
electric motors.
Praseodymium, as abundant in the Earth’s crust as
boron, is the fourth most common REE. The element is
commonly used as an alloying agent with magnesium
to create high-strength metals that are used in aircraft

48. “What Are Rare Earth Elements and Why Are They
Important?,” American Geosciences Institute (website), n.d.
https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq
/what-are-rare-earth-elements-and-why-are-they-important.
49. “How Do We Use Rare Earth Metals?,”
American Geosciences Institute (website), n.d., https://
www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq
/how-do-we-use-rare-earth-elements.
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engines.50 In the defense sector, heavy REEs such
as dysprosium and terbium are commonly used in
electronic displays, jet engines, satellites, guidance
systems, lasers, and radar and sonar systems.51 Access
to terbium, one the most difficult REEs to acquire, is
almost entirely dominated by China. Though large
portions of these technologies may not physically
comprise these elements, they are often required
for functionality.52
Because rare earth elements naturally occur in
other minerals, they must be mined, extracted, and
refined before use. After this process, REEs must be
transported to processing and manufacturing facilities
and incorporated into high-tech products.53 While this
process is costly, time-intensive, and environmentally
damaging, it provides valuable access to whoever
controls it. China has sought to gain a global monopoly
on REEs for two core purposes. First, access to these
materials will fuel China’s growth and position in
the high-tech sector. Second, China uses its nearmonopoly on REEs as leverage over foreign countries
50. Hobart King, “Rare Earth Elements and Their Uses,”
Geology.com, accessed May 20, 2021, https://geology.com
/articles/rare-earth-elements/.
51. Reuters Staff, “Explainer: China’s Rare Earth Supplies
Could Be Vital Bargaining Chip in US Trade War,” Reuters
(website), May 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-usa-china-rareearth-explainer-idUSKCN1T00EK.
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American Geosciences Institute (website), n.d., https://
www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq
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53. Bradley S. Van Gosen, Philip L. Verplanck,
Keith R. Long, Joseph Gambogi, and Robert R. Seal, II, The
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Fact Sheet 2014-3078 (Washington, DC: US Geological Survey,
November 2014).
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and companies, including in Europe, for both
political and economic coercion.54 The EU imports
98 percent of its REEs from China. This dependence
puts EU technologies, economies, supply chains, and
security at risk.55
Case Studies
To understand more specific examples of how
Chinese technology investments are unfolding in
Europe and how security risks vary among key
countries, this study undertook case studies of six
NATO allies: the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. These cases were
selected based on their advanced defense technology
industries, manufacturing bases, talent pool, related
raw materials, and strong track records of deploying or
partnering with the United States through NATO for
security and defense operations. Though the following
case studies are not comprehensive analyses, they
provide illustrative examples of Chinese investment in
each country’s technology sector with a view toward
assigning a general level of security risk to each.
United Kingdom
Over the last two decades and following the
eurozone crisis, the United Kingdom has gradually
54. “Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply
Chains?,” China Power (blog), July 17, 2020, https://chinapower
.csis.org/china-rare-earths/.
55. Finbarr Bermingham, “China’s Rare Earth Dominance
Casts Shadow over Europe’s Ambitious Climate Targets,”
South China Morning Post (website), February 25, 2021, https://
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3123162
/chinas-rare-earth-dominance-casts-shadow-over-europes.
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increased its cooperation with China to cultivate a
deeper economic relationship. For China, the United
Kingdom has been an extremely attractive market
due to its highly advanced technology sector, robust
education system, and intellectual pool. From
2017–19, China’s direct investments in the United
Kingdom technology sector totaled $5.53 billion.56
These investments spanned a range of technologies—
most notably, space and aerospace, semiconductors,
and data-centric capabilities related to artificial
intelligence and quantum IT.
Growing more sophisticated over time, Chinese
transactions in the United Kingdom have typically
involved multiple layers of investments and
acquisitions. For example, in 2017, leading British
chipmaker Imagination Technologies Limited was
acquired by a commercial Chinese company owned
by a larger, state-controlled Chinese firm.57 As another
example, in 2018, Britain’s Northern Aerospace
was bought by Gardner Aerospace, a subsidiary
of China’s Shaanxi Ligeance Mineral Resources
Co. Ltd.58 The year before, Shaanxi had acquired
Gardner from United Kingdom-based firm BECAP
Fund LP. More recently, Gardner attempted to buy
56. American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation,
“China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise
Institute (website), updated May 25, 2021, https://www.aei.org
/china-global-investment-tracker/.
57. Guy Faulconbridge and Paul Sandel, “Imagination
Tech IPO Years Away, but China Listing a Top Option,” Reuters
(website), April 28, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-imaginationtechnologies-ipo-britain-c-idUSKCN22A2BG.
58. Barney Cotton, “Aerospace Firm Agreed to Be
Sold for £44m,” Business Leader (website), June 11, 2018,
https://www.businessleader.co.uk/aerospace-firm-agreed
-to-be-sold-for-44m/46211/.
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Britain’s Impcross Ltd., which manufactures and
assembles components for civil and military aircraft,
but the former retreated following pressure from the
United Kingdom government.59 In the same year,
Gardner successfully acquired a 100 percent stake
in British additive manufacturing firm FDM Digital
Solutions.60 In another significant transaction in 2019,
Chinese steelmaker Jiangsu Shagang Group Company
Limited became the largest shareholder of the United
Kingdom-based commercial data center operator
Global Switch, which manages 13 data centers across
Europe, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Sydney.61
Several Chinese companies, including China’s
main space contractor China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation, have R&D collaborations
with Queen Mary University of London. Their
joint research center focuses on space terahertz
radiation technology, the outcomes of which are
designed to be transferred to Chinese industry for
59. Dominic Perry, “Gardner Commits to Steer Clear of
Impcross Acquisition after National Security Concerns,” Flight
Global (website), September 10, 2020, https://www.flightglobal.
com/aerospace/gardner-commits-to-steer-clear-of-impcross
-acquisition-after-national-security-concerns/140124.article.
60. “Gardner Aerospace Announces Acquisition of FDM
Digital Solutions Limited and Creation of Gardner Technology
Centre,” Gardner Aerospace (website), November 29, 2019,
https://www.gardner-aerospace.com/gardner-aerospace
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61. Tanishaa Nadkar, “Chinese Steel Maker Picks
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(website), August 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article
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-idUSKCN1VH1V2.
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commercialization.62 Terahertz radiation can penetrate
fabrics and plastics, and the People’s Liberation Army
is experimenting with terahertz radiation technology
to develop antistealth radar. Similarly, CloudWalk
Technology Co. Ltd.—a Chinese developer of facial
recognition technology—and South China University
of Technology have a R&D partnership with Britain’s
University of Warwick that was launched in 2019
and that focuses on artificial intelligence. CloudWalk
Technology’s AI facial recognition software is already
used by the Chinese government for domestic
surveillance across its smart cities.63 The Chinese
Academy of Engineering Physics has also explicitly
acknowledged its United Kingdom talent recruitment
program, which is designed to bring advanced
technologies back to China (the academy is responsible
for the research, development, and testing of China’s
nuclear weapons; it is essentially China’s equivalent of
Los Alamos National Laboratory).64
Over time, the UK government has introduced a
variety of investment review powers and regulatory
procedures.65 Some of these efforts were inspired by
Britain’s desire to align more closely with the harsh
US stance on Chinese investment, especially
after Brexit. The United Kingdom mirroring the
United States was particularly underscored by the
banning of Huawei from the UK 5G infrastructure
62. Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe.
63. Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe.
64. Joske, “Hunting the Phoenix.”
65. Marc Israel and Kate Kelliher, “UK Outlines
Its Plans for Wide-Ranging New Investment Review
Powers,” White & Case (website), November 11, 2020,
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert
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in 2020 following US sanctions on the Chinese
technology giant.66 Public opinion toward China has
generally followed.
Nevertheless, China has already deeply penetrated
the UK technology sector in many ways, and its
interest in the British market remains high.67 China’s
increasingly complex investment tactics signal
Chinese investors will continue to exploit gaps in
British regulatory regimes to expand their footprint in
smaller yet meaningful ways. Finally, due to its robust
technology sector, the United Kingdom remains
moderately vulnerable to China’s monopoly on REEs.
Germany
Since the early 1980s, Germany has seen China
as key to fueling long-term economic growth. China
continues to drive Germany’s export growth, even
throughout the pandemic, and many German
companies produce locally in China, too.68 In addition
to Germany being a large market for its products,
Beijing sees the country as its preferred technology
partner, especially in terms of helping China
modernize its manufacturing industry. The only
partner mentioned in an official document published
in 2020 by the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology of the People’s Republic of China is
66. Luke McGee, “Britain Might Like to Follow Trump’s
Lead on China. But It’s Hardly in a Position to Call the Shots”,
CNN
(website),
July
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2020,
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Germany; the document focuses on Chinese-German
cooperation on additive manufacturing and robotics.
The CCP has actively supported Chinese
companies, industrial associations, and scientific
research institutes that invest in Germany to grow
domestic Chinese skills and eventually move hightech production to China.69 As one example, in
2016, a Chinese firm bought Germany’s leading
industrial robotics firm, KUKA.70 China’s battery giant
Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited also
opened a battery cell plant in Germany to infiltrate an
EU manufacturing chain.71
Other Chinese priorities in Germany include
the Internet of Things, microchips, and data-centric
technologies. China is particularly interested in Berlin,
which has blossomed into one of the most diverse and
inclusive start-up ecosystems in the world, welcoming
talent and capital from “everywhere.”72 In 2019,
China’s e-commerce giant Alibaba Group bought
Berlin-based Data Artisans to access large quantities of
data, which could help to power artificial intelligence
69. Henrik Bork and Steffen Donath, “Germany Is
China’s Preferred Technology Partner,” ETMM (website),
November
13,
2020,
https://www.etmm-online.com
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Review 10, no. 356 (December 2020).
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and quantum IT.73 In 2018, China’s Shenzhen Goodix
Technology Co., Ltd. acquired German cellular IoT
firm CommSolid to accelerate China’s development
of microchips.74
In addition, Chinese-German corporate technology
R&D partnerships are strong because they usually
come as a mandate for German companies seeking
access to Chinese markets. For example, China
Electronics Technology Group Corporation has a
strategic partnership with Germany’s Siemens AG for
collaboration on AI, IT, and AM. China Electronics
Technology Group Corporation is one of China’s 10
state-owned defense conglomerates. The corporation
produces most of the electronic components used in
Chinese military systems.75 In addition, the corporation
previously developed a surveillance platform used
on the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.76 As another example,
73. Nadine
Schimroszik,
Thomas
Seythal,
and
Douglas Busvine, “Alibaba Buys German Data Analysis
Start-Up,” Reuters (website), January 9, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-data-artisans-m-a-alibaba
/alibaba-buys-german-data-analysis-start-up-idUSKCN1P30F0.
74. Chris Burt, “Goodix Acquires Cellular IP Company
CommSolid,” BiometricUpdate.com (website), February 26, 2018,
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201802/goodix-acquires
-cellular-ip-company-commsolid.
75. “Siemens
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Corporation,”
Siemens
(website),
updated
2016,
https://w1.siemens.com.cn/news_en/news_articles
_en/6780.aspx; and “China Electronics Technology Group
Corporation (CETC),” GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., https://www
.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cetc.htm.
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Internment,” Deutsche Welle (website), November 25, 2019,
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Chinese company Tencent Holdings Ltd. partners
with Germany’s BMW to provide the IT architecture,
AI, tools, and platforms supporting its entire R&D
process for autonomous and electric vehicles.77
Despite the security risks, these deep
interdependencies between the Chinese and German
economies have in many instances disincentivized
German political leaders from restricting Chinese
technology investments. Indeed, Germany was the
leading force behind the Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment (CAI) with China, despite discouragement
from the United States and some European countries.78
Germany remains a strong advocate for economic
cooperation with China and continues to maintain
openings for Chinese capital flows to fuel the German
economy. Unlike other European nations, Germany
has avoided explicitly banning Huawei from critical
5G investments in the country.79
Public opinion toward these policies varies
based on the issue. According to a Pew survey, 71
percent of Germans had an overall unfavorable view
77. Rita Liao, “After Baidu Tie-Up, BMW Taps
Tencent for Autonomous Driving in China,” TechCrunch
(website), July 19, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/19
/baidu-bmw-partnership-autonomous-driving/.
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Central and Eastern Europe (website), June 2, 2021, https://
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79. William Boston and Stu Woo, “Huawei Gets
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toward China.80 Yet, in a technology-specific survey,
53 percent of Germans responded, “I don’t know”
when asked whom they would side with in the growing
technological competition between the United States
and China.81 This widespread opinion leaves questions
over how Germany’s future government may shift
China policy. Finally, Germany’s heavy economic
reliance on its large manufacturing sector and growing
high-tech industries makes it exceptionally susceptible
to Chinese dominance of REE imports.82
France
French President Emmanuel Macron has pushed
to make France a leader in new technologies.83 In
a broader geopolitical context, this push is part
of France’s ambition to develop more “strategic
autonomy” and, in some ways, reduce reliance on
the United States.84 Meanwhile, France’s strategic
cooperation with China has been growing, particularly
80. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, Large
Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of Its
People (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 30, 2021).
81. Oscar Jonsson and Carlos Luca de Tena, European
Tech Insights 2021, Part II: Embracing and Governing
Technological Disruption (Madrid: IE Center for the Governance
of Change, 2021).
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83. Arjun Kharpal, “Op-Ed: Macron’s Vision to Make
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Mentality,” CNBC (website), June 20, 2017, https://www.cnbc
.com/2017/06/20/french-tech-emmanuel-macron-vision.html.
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October 15, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe
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179

on R&D and innovation.85 France’s recent efforts to
lure young specialists from educational institutions
in other countries or through immigration; to attract
VC investments; and to support start-up growth have
made Paris an enticing scene for Chinese investors.86
From 2017–20, China invested roughly $2.8 billion in
France’s technology sector.87 According to the French
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, nearly 700
subsidiaries of Chinese companies operating in France
employ about 45,000 people.88 Priority industries
include space, aerial systems, and semiconductors,
although the two countries also cooperate on
biotechnology and shipbuilding.89
For example, in the area of aerial systems, the
countries collaborated on the assembly of the Airbus
A320 aircraft and the completion of the A330 in
Tianjin.90 In space, state-driven ventures include the
85. Xinhua News Agency, “China, France Pledge to
Promote Bilateral Cooperation, China-EU Strategic Partnership,”
XinhuaNet, August 29, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com
/english/2020-08/29/c_139326734.htm.
86. Michal Rejman, “2021 Guide to Paris Startup
Scene: Events, Accelerators and VCs,” Ideamotive (blog),
February 1, 2021, https://www.ideamotive.co/blog/guide-to
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Past, Present, and Future of Europe’s Research Collaboration
with China,” Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
(website), February 18, 2021, https://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg
.de/observations/engaged-not-married-past-present-and
-future-europes-research-collaboration-china.
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Chinese-French Oceanography Satellite and Space
Variable Objects Monitor satellite projects.91 Notably,
People’s Liberation Army Unit 61486 was accused in
2012 of stealing data from France’s National Centre
for Space Studies. Unit 61486 is a People’s Liberation
Army unit dedicated to cyberattacks on US, Japanese,
and European corporations in the satellite and
communications technology industry.92 Important
acquisitions have also occurred, such as the 2018
purchase by China’s state-owned Tsinghua Unigroup
of French microchip maker Linxens for $2.6 billion.93
Talent and R&D programs are also robust. The
countries maintain approximately 60 joint public
research structures with around 600 research units
and 3,000 researchers. Academic cooperation extends
both ways, and Chinese students make up the second
largest group of foreign students in France (around
37,000).94 More than 40 Chinese overseas recruitment
stations operate in France, recruiting French scientists
in support of research projects that ultimately
benefit Beijing.95
91. “France and China.”
92. CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team, CrowdStrike
Intelligence Report (Sunnyvale, CA: CrowdStrike, 2014; and
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Though France has worked with Germany and
Italy through the EU to protect Europe’s largest and
most critical technologies from foreign influence,
France’s legislative review powers have not been fully
used. Macron’s probusiness government has typically
encouraged Chinese and other foreign investment,
especially for innovation.96 Public sentiment has
generally supported these investments. Though overall
public opinion is largely unfavorable toward China
according to Pew, 55 percent of French respondents
replied, “I don’t know” when asked whether they
would side with the United States or China in
their technology competition.97 France’s strong
manufacturing sector and expanding technology
development add to the country’s risk because REEs
under Chinese control are key inputs for both.
Italy
Italy has traditionally welcomed Chinese
investment to open new opportunities for trade and
to support its long-troubled economy. For China,
Italy provides access to advanced technologies and
traditional industries. Though China’s primary
focus in Italy has been infrastructure investment,
between 2017 and 2020, China’s investment in Italy’s
technology sector totaled $1.25 billion. China’s
activities have spanned the IoT, robotics, AI, and
semiconductors. Although not covered in this
study, energy and automobiles are also key focus
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July
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/french-foreign-policy/economic-diplomacy-foreign-trade
/entrepreneurship-and-investing-in-france/.
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areas for China in Italy that can have defense and
dual-use applications.98 Significant investments
have included China’s State Administration of
Foreign Exchange’s purchase of a 2 percent stake
in Prysmian SpA, a major Italian manufacturer of
cables, telecommunications components, and optical
fibers. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange
drafts rules and regulations governing foreign
exchange market activities and manages the state
foreign exchange reserves.99 Chinese technology giant
Huawei has also invested substantially in Telecom
Italia SpA and Vodafone Italia SpA to build Italy’s 5G
technology.100 In addition, in 2021, Chinese company
Shenzhen Investment Holding Corporation attempted
to buy a 70 percent stake in LPE SpA, a Milan-based
semiconductor firm, however, the Italian government
ultimately blocked the transaction.101 Chinese R&D
partnerships are also prevalent in Italy’s academic
98. Chad Bray, “China National Chemical Unit Nears
Deal for Tire Maker Pirelli,” New York Times (website),
March 22, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23
/business/dealbook/china-national-chemical-unit-nears-deal
-for-tire-maker-pirelli.html.
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-00144feabdc0.
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ecosystem. For instance, CRS4 in Sardinia opened a
joint innovation center in 2016 with Huawei focused
on AI and facial-recognition solutions. The Chinese
police in Xinjiang are applying the same technologies
for public surveillance.102 Huawei has also proposed a
Segrate R&D center in cooperation with the University
of Pavia to focus on next-generation complementary
metal-oxide-semiconductors and fin-shaped fieldeffect transistors (both have defense applications in
microsatellites).103 The center has since been held up
by the Italian government due to US blacklisting.104
Italy’s embrace of Chinese investment has
moderated in recent years, in part because of
mounting pressure from the United States and the
EU as well as Chinese assertiveness. Public opinion
has generally followed.105 The pandemic has struck
the Italian economy hard, raising concerns among
officials that Italy’s distressed companies might be
purchased by Chinese players at cheap prices.106 China
is now looking to acquire small and medium-sized
enterprises for rates below €100 million, which could
escape notice.
Finally, in terms of REEs, certain sectors of the
Italian economy rely on these elements, making Italy
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103. Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe.
104. Lauly Li and Cheng Ting-Fang, “US Hits at
Huawei Innovation with Blacklist of R&D Centers,”
Nikkei
Asia
(website),
August
21,
2019,
https://
asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown
/US-hits-at-Huawei-innovation-with-blacklist-of-R-D-centers.
105. Silver, Devlin, and Huang, Large Majorities Say.
106. Debalina Ghoshal, “China Buying Italy amid the
Covid Crisis?,” Global Dynamics (blog), April 29, 2020, https://
defense.info/global-dynamics/2020/04/china-buying
-italy-amid-the-covid-crisis/.

184

moderately vulnerable to Chinese control. Italy has
relatively low levels of venture-backed start-ups and
a limited high-tech sector, both of which help reduce
major risks of Chinese influence.
Netherlands
The Dutch government has prioritized innovation
as a key pillar of its modernization and development
strategy. Part of this innovation prioritization has
involved deep cooperation with China, including
through investments. For China, the Netherlands
represents a gateway for broader investments in
Europe.107 The Netherlands offers a highly skilled
workforce, advanced digital infrastructure, an
innovative culture, and tax and R&D incentives.108
China is the Netherlands’ second-largest investor
following the United States, and Chinese investment in
the Dutch technology sector between 2017–20 totaled
$2.14 billion.109 Key industries have included AI,
robotics, unmanned aerial systems, semiconductors,
additive manufacturing, and data-centric capabilities
related to quantum IT.110
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Notable acquisitions have included a subsidiary
of China’s Suzhou-based Jingfang Optoelectronics’
purchase of a 73 percent stake in Anteryon BV, a
spinoff of Philips.111 Independent analysts concluded
the buyer in this 2019 transaction was controlled
through “multiple layers of interlinked shareholders
who are ultimately in the hands of state entities.”112 In
March 2019, Guangzhou Hanxin Aviation Technology,
a company significantly influenced by the Chinese
state, acquired a 100 percent stake in Dutch aviation
firm Direct Maintenance Holding BV for access to
aerial technology.113 The same year, China’s Shenzhen
Goodix Technology Co., Ltd. bought the Voice and
Audio Solutions portion of NXP Semiconductors,
gaining access to critical human-machine interaction
technology and a highly skilled engineering team.114 In

111. Anteryon Wafer Optics BV, “Jingfang Optotelectronics
Completed Its Acquisition of Anteryon International B.V and
Anteryon Wafer Optics B.V,” press release, Cision PR Newswire,
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-notice-11601458202.
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addition, in 2020, China’s Wingtech Group acquired
Dutch semiconductor business Nexperia.115
Furthermore, more than 680 Chinese companies
have set up logistics hubs, headquarters, and
research centers in the Netherlands.116 For example,
Xi’an Bright Laser Technologies and Northwestern
Polytechnical University established an R&D
partnership with Airbus in the Netherlands that
focuses on additive manufacturing for unmanned and
aerial system components. The Chinese government
considers Northwestern Polytechnical University
to be a National Defense School; as a result, the
university is subordinate to the State Administration
for Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense, rather than the Ministry of Education of the
People’s Republic of China. The primary purpose of
Northwestern Polytechnical University is to develop
technology for defense applications, but it also
commercializes R&D findings on weapons, navigation,
aviation, and aerospace for Chinese industry.117 Also,
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
maintains a range of joint research projects, talent and
exchange programs, and even industrial cooperation
programs that bring Chinese and Dutch industry
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partners together with Chinese and Dutch academic
institutions to commercialize R&D.118
Like many other European countries, the Dutch
government has recently sought a more balanced
approach to economic investment and related security
implications.119 Public opinion is clear on this point,
with 72 percent of Dutch citizens having a negative
view toward China.120 A major move underscoring
this trend was the government’s decision, following
intense US pressure, not to renew the export
license of Dutch microchip maker ASML Holding
N.V. to sell its most advanced machine to a Chinese
customer after initially having granted it. Ultimately,
none of ASML’s extreme ultraviolet equipment was
shipped to China.121
Since then, the Dutch government has initiated
new review efforts, including critical conversations
about Chinese influence in Dutch universities and
research institutions. In terms of implementation,
somewhat limited progress has been made thus far.122
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Though parts of the Netherlands’ technology sourcing
require REE inputs, their need is comparably lower
than that of other EU countries. Thus, the Netherlands
is only moderately at risk from China’s monopoly.
Poland
Poland has generally considered China to be
an important part of its economic development,
embracing substantial trade with and investment from
Beijing. China is now the country’s second-largest
source of imports.123 In 2020, Poland was the third
top market for Chinese investment behind Germany
and France.124 Though the majority of this investment
was funneled into manufacturing and logistics, China
has also eyed Poland’s growing high-tech scene. The
Polish government has capitalized on digitization
to fuel its development, providing various start-up
initiatives and accelerators and cultivating one of
the largest technology talent pools in Europe.125 As a
gateway to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe for
Chinese companies seeking to grow abroad, Poland
has also attracted more than 800 Chinese companies
123. Chen Meiling, “Poland Looking to Bolster Trade
with China under BRI,” China Daily (website), updated
May 28, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2019
-05/28/content_37474473.htm.
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to operate locally, including Huawei and equipment
manufacturer Liugong.126
Chinese IoT and data-enabled companies Huawei,
TikTok, and ByteDance Ltd. have invested in Poland.127
In addition, China’s Liugong was acquired the civilian
arm of Poland’s steel mill and military equipment
manufacturer Huta Stalowa Wola.128 Much of China’s
investment has focused on Polish companies with
access to advanced manufacturing capabilities, many
of which have defense applications.
Though these high-tech risks may not be
immediate, China’s tactics in Poland in this industry
are worthy of examination. For example, in 2017, the
China Investment Corporation acquired Logicor,
a logistics company headquartered in the United
Kingdom with major facilities in Poland, from private
equity firm the Blackstone Group LP. The transaction
was filed in the United Kingdom, but the deal gave
the Chinese sovereign fund control of nearly 30 of
Logicor’s logistics parks and 900,000 square meters of
facilities in Poland without having ever purchased a
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Polish company.129 Furthermore, Chinese companies
have made several reinvestments and incremental
investments in their Polish subsidiaries that were not
included in the original transaction values.130
In Poland, R&D is a large investment focus for
China. Chinese electronics and telecommunications
corporation TCL Technology opened an R&D center
in Poland in 2018.131 But the United States accused TCL
Technology of building backdoors into their electronic
and technological devices for espionage in foreign
markets.132 Liugong also established an R&D center in
Stalowa Wola, Poland, associated with its acquisition
of Huta Stalowa Wola’s civil manufacturing arm.133 In
addition, the two countries established the ShanghaiWarsaw AI Scientific Joint Lab, which focuses on AI,
machine learning, and big data.134 As another example,
Poland’s National Science Centre and the National
Natural Science Foundation of China have established
the SHENG 2 funding initiative to support science and
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technology projects carried out by Chinese and Polish
joint research teams.135
Over the past three years, however, Poland has
recalibrated its investment policies toward China. As
a staunch ally of the United States, Poland has been
sympathetic toward US appeals to restrict sensitive
Chinese investments. Polish leaders have become
frustrated with the lack of fruit from China’s 16+1
initiative and taken Washington’s security concerns
over Huawei’s infiltration of Poland’s 5G technology
to heart.136 In addition, Poles’ generally favorable
public opinion of China has begun to shift, especially
since the onset of the pandemic.137 In a recent study by
the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, nearly
42 percent of respondents had a negative attitude
toward China, with 34 percent saying their views
worsened in the last three years.138
Though Poland’s technology sector offers growing
opportunities for China, deal values in Poland tend to
fall below the typical threshold of Chinese investors’
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interests.139 Furthermore, Poland’s key sectors are
minimally impacted by China’s dominance of REEs,
which places them in a less vulnerable position
compared to the countries profiled earlier.
Case Studies Summary
These case studies elicit cause for concern. China
has made significant inroads across many of these six
countries, each an important ally that contributes key
technologies and capabilities (for example, through
intelligence, operations, and training) in support of
NATO’s shared interests. China’s investments in
these countries’ technologies allow it to enhance its
capabilities—capabilities that could be used against
allied interests. Additionally, these investments
provide the CCP leverage to influence or potentially
force European governments and companies to act in
a manner contrary to US interests to avoid significant
economic consequences. Germany, France, and the
Netherlands are particularly at risk, although the latter
two are in the process of trying to enhance protections
for critical industries and technologies. The United
Kingdom and Italy are at a lower risk level, followed
by Poland, which has the least risk. See table 7-1 for an
assessment of technology risks in case-study countries.

139. “Chinese M&A in Poland Could See Push Once
the Dust Settles,” Mergermarket (website), March 20, 2021,
https://events.mergermarket.com/chinese-ma-in-poland-could
-see-push-once-the-dust-settles.

193

Table 7-1. Assessment of technology risks in case-study
countries
Chinese
State
Investment
Risk

Chinese
Company
Investment
Risk

Exposure

Rare-Earth
Elements
Reliance

Overall
Technology
Risk
Assessment

High

Extensive
Chinese
Acquisitions
and Joint
Ventures

Strong
Manufacturing
and
Technology

Moderate

Medium-High

High

Extensive
Chinese
Acquisitions
and Joint
Ventures

Robust
Manufacturing,
Technology,
and VC
Investment

Heavy

High

Moderate

Some Chinese
Acquisitions,
Mostly in
Non-critical
Industries

Limited VC
Investment

Moderate

Medium

Netherlands

High

Extensive
Chinese
Acquisitions in
Critical
Industries

Robust Tech
Sector

Moderate

Medium-High

Poland

Low

Limited

Limited VC
Investment

Limited,
but
Growing

Low

United
Kingdom

Extremely
High

Significant
Chinese
Acquisitions,
but Declining

Robust
Technology
Sector and VC
Investment

Moderate

Medium

Country

France

Germany

Italy

The absence of a European or NATO standard
for vetting, tracking, or illuminating supply
chains for critical technologies, REEs, and related
R&D programs is a significant weakness for the
transatlantic community. As a result, the allies are
duplicating efforts, and the countries’ national
regulatory frameworks contain gaps that make all
European NATO partners more vulnerable due to
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the cross-border nature of industry and technology,
particularly in the Schengen area.
Implications for Transatlantic Security
Looking ahead, Chinese investment in European
dual-use technology poses three primary risks to
allied security.
First, Chinese investment presents a direct threat
to the alliance military’s technological superiority.
China’s investment practices leave European
defense and dual-use technology companies
exposed to undesirable foreign exploitation. China’s
possession, replication, and reverse engineering of
key technologies degrades critical innovation on
the European continent and erodes cutting-edge
industries crucial to the alliance’s technological and
military edge. China’s investment activities have
allowed it to leverage Europe’s technology to develop
its own innovative asymmetric capabilities, such
as small unmanned aerial systems, that can offset
NATO’s traditionally high-end capability advantages.
For example, the alliance would not want to defeat
a $200 drone with a $3-million missile.140 Ultimately,
in some areas, including artificial intelligence and
quantum IT, NATO risks losing its technological
superiority to China.
Second, Chinese investment in European
technology risks a broader undermining of allied
security and economic competitiveness. When
foundational technologies related to artificial
140. Andrew Liptak, “A US Ally Shot Down a $200
Drone with a $3 Million Patriot Missile,” Verge (website),
March
16,
2017,
https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/16
/14944256/patriot-missile-shot-down-consumer-drone-us
-military.

195

intelligence, quantum IT, and autonomy are acquired
by Chinese stakeholders, China can advance in a wide
range of other areas. This technology can be employed
by the CCP for political purposes or extremely
profitable commercial applications, which could
strengthen China’s power at home and abroad at the
West’s expense. In some areas, including quantum IT
and AI, China is positioned to become a global supplier
of these technologies soon for security cooperation and
other geopolitical and commercial purposes. If such
developments are not prevented, they could further
displace European and US companies, undercutting
allied economies. In turn, this would reduce stability,
prosperity, and defense budgets in Europe, ultimately
weakening the alliance.
China’s growing technological prowess is also
enabling the CCP to set global standards and terms of
use for critical technologies, including AI, in its favor.
China accomplishes this task through its investmentenabled control of technology production and its sway
in international organizations. In a strategic sense,
China’s accomplishment of this task undermines
the alliance’s global leadership role in shaping
the rules-based order in accordance with its own
values and principles. In a practical sense, China’s
accomplishment of this task could affect the allies’
ability to apply technologies like AI in operations to
defend their interests.
Finally, Chinese investment in European
technology risks creating obstacles to interoperability
and allied defense cooperation. Chinese infiltration
via technology investment in the United States’ closest
allies could preclude the US government or military
from investing in, communicating securely with, or
cooperating with a given country should the United
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States determine its own forces, equipment, networks,
or intelligence would be at too great a risk of foreign
malign influence. Such a preclusion could create
problematic barriers in the ways in which the alliance
shares intelligence, engages in defense planning, and
conducts exercises and operations. Any obstacles
in these areas would reduce the alliance’s overall
readiness, deterrence posture, and defense capability.
Diverging investment strategies of European
countries, depending on who is willing to work with
China, could lead to different levels of innovation on
the continent, increasing the difficulty of advanced and
unadvanced allies working together. The proliferation
of various Chinese and non-Chinese technologyenabled systems across Europe could also create a
significant interoperability gap, both among European
countries and between European countries and the
United States. Additionally, European countries
that use Chinese-influenced technology may also be
prohibited from counting these capabilities toward
NATO defense planning targets or deploying them
for allied operations. Such a prohibition would have
a detrimental impact on burden sharing, an already
contentious issue threatening allied cohesion.
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8. LEARNING FROM LATIN AMERICA
R. Evan Ellis
©2022 R. Evan Ellis

This chapter examines Chinese engagement in
Latin America and draws insights from patterns as
well as possible connections with European companies
and institutions—insights and connections that may
be useful in understanding the strategic impact of
Chinese engagement in Latin America on Europe.
In Latin America, as elsewhere, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) is pursuing a principally
economically oriented strategy, although the PRC
also pursues goals in the political, institutional, and
security spheres to support those economic objectives.
Chinese companies, with the support of the Chinese
government, are engaging in Latin America to secure
sources of commodities and foodstuffs as well as
access to markets for Chinese goods and services,
particularly in value-added, strategic sectors.1 These
efforts are consistent with Chinese initiatives such as
Made in China 2025.2
In pursuing its goals in Latin America, the PRC
implicitly, and often self-consciously, employs the
lure of its enormous markets as well as its power as a
lender and investor. China leverages its government
in multiple ways, both facilitating multisector deals
and leveraging its control of access to the PRC
1. R. Evan Ellis, Chinese Engagement in Latin America
in the Context of Strategic Competition with the United States
(Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, June 24, 2020).
2. “‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued,” State Council of
the People’s Republic of China (website), May 19, 2015, http://
english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19
/content_281475110703534.htm.
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domestic market as an implicit or explicit tool to help
its companies secure contracts and other objectives.
Many of China’s investments and other activities
in the region focus on dominating the connectivity
fundamental to Latin America’s economies as a
complement to achieving secure sources of supply
and access to markets. This strategy includes building
and operating physical infrastructure, such as roads,
railroads, ports, and riverways, and engaging in power
generation and transmission, telecommunications,
e-commerce, and banking.
Profile of Chinese Engagement in Latin America
China’s economic presence in Latin America and
the Caribbean began to take off after the country’s
acceptance into the World Trade Organization in 2001,
with PRC bilateral trade with the region reaching
$314 billion by 2019.3 China’s physical presence in
Latin America expanded rapidly following the 2008
financial crisis, reflecting increased PRC need for
markets and factor inputs, increased contacts in the
region, and sophistication in international operations.4
Structure of China’s Advance
China’s advance in Latin America includes the
following three mutually reinforcing areas of focus.
1. Purchases, and other activities that provide
the PRC reliable access to sources of supply
3. International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Exports, FOB to
Partner Countries,” IMF Data, n.d., https://data.imf.org/regular
.aspx?key=61013712.
4. R. Evan Ellis, China on the Ground in Latin America
(New York: Palgrave, 2014).
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of factor inputs for manufacturing, capital
formation, and urbanization.
2. Reliable access to markets for Chinese
goods and services in strategically valued,
high-value sectors.
3. Connectivity, including physical infrastructure,
telecommunications,
electricity,
banking,
and e-commerce.
Reliable Access to Resources
To guarantee resources in Latin America, the PRC
has been increasing its presence in the petroleum
mining, agricultural, and forestry sectors. As in
Europe, China continues to use minority shares
to maintain a seat at the table, acquire technology,
and learn. Principal examples include its minority
positions in the oil and gas company Perenco,
the energy multinational Galp Energia, metals
company Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e
Mineração, and chemical company Sociedad Química
y Minera de Chile S.A.5
In mining, the PRC has a significant presence in
strategic minerals across Latin America, including
lithium and rare earths, impacting European countries
and companies that use these items in defense
goods and advanced batteries and other items for
electric vehicles and power generation. China-based
companies have a significant presence in lithium,
including a minority stake by Tianqi Lithium Corp.
5. Judy Hua, Wan Xu, and Ken Wills, “Sinopec Signs $3.5
Billion Deal for Galp’s Brazil Oil Asset,” Reuters (website),
November 11, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-galp
-brazil-sale/sinopec-signs-3-5-billion-deal-for-galps-brazil-oil
-asset-idUSTRE7AA0ZF20111111.
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in the Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A.
operation in Chile, a majority stake by Ganfeng
Lithium Co. Ltd. in the Cauchari-Olaroz project in
Argentina, and a partnership between Bolivia and the
Xinjiang TBEA Co., Ltd. in the Uyuni Salt Flat.6 As
of August 2021, TBEA and Ganfeng were positioned
to compete for Bolivia’s lithium in a new bidding
process being conducted by its new government. In
addition, Ganfeng is developing a lithium operation
in the Sonoran Desert in Mexico that could become the
largest in the region.7
In the rare-earths sector, China Molybdenum
Company Limited owns a niobium mine in Brazil,
where 85 percent of the world’s commercial niobium
is produced.8 The Chinese firm Baosteel Group has a
15 percent stake in Companhia Brasileira de
Metalurgia e Mineração, also in Brazil.
6. Dalilia Ouerghi, “China’s Ganfeng Completes Majority
Stake Acquisition in Argentina Lithium Project,” Metals
Bulletin, August 28, 2020, https://www.metalbulletin.com
/Article/3948479/Chinas-Ganfeng-completes-majority-stake
-acquisition-in-Argentina-lithium-project.html;
and
Miriam
Telma Jemio, “Bolivia Rethinks How to Industrialize
Its Lithium amid Political Transition,” Diálogo Chino,
May
19,
2020,
https://dialogochino.net/en/extractive
-industries/35423-bolivia-rethinks-how-to-industrialize-its
-lithium-amid-political-transition/.
7. Reuters Staff, “Ganfeng Lithium Increases Stake
in Bacanora’s Sonora Project to 50%,” Reuters (website),
November 13, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/bacanora
-lithium-ganfeng/ganfeng-lithium-increases-stake-in-bacanoras
-sonora-project-to-50-idUSL8N2HZ54S.
8. Jake Spring, “Hands off Brazil’s Niobium: Bolsonaro
Sees China as Threat to Utopian Vision,” Reuters (website),
October 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil
-election-china-niobium/hands-off-brazils-niobium-bolsonaro
-sees-china-as-threat-to-utopian-vision-idUSKCN1MZ1JN.
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Pursuit of Strategic Markets and Infrastructure
Although the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
focused on connecting the PRC to its near abroad and
markets in Europe, the Chinese government extended
the initiative to Latin America with the inclusion of
Panama in 2018. Today, 19 Latin American countries
have committed to participating, with Argentina
expected to become the twentieth. The extension of
the BRI to Latin America highlights China’s attempts
to dominate global logistics and other forms of
connectivity as a complement to expanding Chinese
positions in strategic markets, commodities, and the
agricultural sector.
A major example of Chinese physical infrastructure
operations in Latin America is Hutchison Port
Holdings Limited port operations: The company
has four ports in Mexico, two in Panama, one in
Buenos Aires, and one in Freeport, Bahamas. In
addition, China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd.
is constructing the port of Posorja, Ecuador.9 Other
Chinese ports include the $3-billion, 15-dock Chancay
minerals port in Peru; four ports in Brazil, including
the São Luis megaport project; and China Merchants
Port Holdings Company Limited’s (CMP’s) operation

9. Michele Labrut, “DP World Launches Construction of
Deepwater Port in Posorja, Ecuador,” Seatrade Maritime News,
September 28, 2017, https://www.seatrade-maritime.com
/americas/dp-world-launches-construction-deepwater-ports
-posorja-ecuador.
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of the port of Kingston, Jamaica.10 In addition,
PRC-based firms have explored major port operations
in La Unión, El Salvador; Puerto de Manzanillo,
Dominican Republic; and Berbice, Guyana, where a
Chinese firm may construct a commercial port.
China-based companies have become increasingly
successful in moving beyond the loan-based
construction of highways, bridges, and railroads in
small states and countries with friendly, populist
regimes to employing public-private partnerships
(PPPs) to win projects from governments with
relatively strong and transparent institutions,
including Colombia and Chile. Chinese companies
may be able to make inroads in European infrastructure
projects through similar strategies.
Major PRC advances in Colombia through PPP
programs include a highway from Medellín to the
Gulf of Urabá and the construction of the Bogotá
Metro in Colombia.11 In Chile, in April 2021, the
10. BNAmericas, “Cosco Sees 2020 Construction Start for
US $3 Bn Chancay Port,” BNAmericas (website), June 26, 2019,
https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/cosco-sees-2020
-construction-start-for-us3bn-chancay-port;
Marcela
Ayres,
“China to Announce Billion-Dollar Investment in Brazilian Port of
Sao Luis: Sources,” Reuters (website), November 13, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-brics-china-investment
/china-to-announce-billion-dollar-investment-in-brazilian-port
-of-sao-luis-sources-idUSKBN1XN2NM; and “Chinese Firm
Takes Over Kingston Freeport Management Company,” Stabroek
News (website), April 25, 2020, https://www.stabroeknews
.com/2020/04/25/news/regional/jamaica/chinese-firm-takes
-over-kingston-freeport-management-company/.
11. Jorge Valencia, “By Building Bogotá Metro, China
Makes a New Breakthrough in Latin America,” World (website),
November 5, 2020, https://theworld.org/stories/2020-11-05
/building-bogot-metro-china-makes-new-breakthrough
-latin-america.
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government awarded the Talca-Chillán segment of
Route 5 to China Railway Construction Corporation
Limited.12 The acquisition of a 30 percent stake by
China Communications Construction Company, Ltd.
in the Portuguese firm Mota-Engil, with a strong
presence in Latin America and experience with
PPP projects, will likely advance Chinese capability to
win more such PPP projects.13 Examples of PRC firms’
riverine projects include CCCC Shanghai Dredging
Co., Ltd. being poised to displace Belgian firm
Jan De Nul Group in the dredging and operation
of a riverine toll route along the Paraguay-Paraná
Waterway, which connects Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay,
Argentina, and Uruguay.14
In Latin America, with parallels to Europe,
China has also focused on synergies between
related economic activities, as seen in the São Luis
megaport project, which combines the financing,
construction, and operation of ports, railroads, and
other infrastructure. In Costa Rica, El Salvador,
the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Trinidad
and Tobago, the PRC has also sought to establish
free-trade zones, which give privileged access
12. David Arminas, “Chile Awards CRCC Major TalcaChillán Upgrade,” World Highways (website), April 14, 2021,
https://www.worldhighways.com/wh12/news/chile-awards
-crcc-major-talca-chillan-upgrade.
13. Mat Youkee, “Chinese Expansion with a Portuguese
Face,” Diálogo Chino, November 20, 2020, https://dialogochino
.net/en/infrastructure/38445-cccc-mota-engil-chinese
-expansion-with-a-portuguese-face/.
14. “China Competes in the Dredging of Paraguay/
Parana Waterway Which Handles 90 Million Tons of
Grains,”
MercoPress
(website),
November
25,
2020,
https://en.mercopress.com/2020/11/25/china
-competes-in-the-dredging-of-paraguay-parana-waterway
-which-handles-90-million-tons-of-grains.
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to Chinese companies for the warehousing and
distribution of items.15 Free-trade zones help Beijing
advance its position by allowing it to sell its products
in the region and dominate the associated value chain.
In the electricity sector, China has made important
advances in building and operating generation,
transmission, and distribution infrastructure, with a
concentration on South America. European companies
such as AES Global Power Holdings BV; Endesa, S.A.;
and Naturgy Energy Group S.A. have been among
the principal sellers—and competitors—as PRC-based
companies have advanced in these sectors.
Examples of Chinese electricity generation
construction projects in Latin America include six
hydroelectric facilities in Ecuador, three in Bolivia,
and two in Honduras. In addition, PRC firms are
advancing to construct two hydroelectric projects

15. Tico Times, “Costa Rica, China to Explore Creation of
‘Special Economic Zones,’” Tico Times (website), January 6, 2015,
https://ticotimes.net/2015/01/06/costa-rica-china-to-explore
-creation-of-special-economic-zones; Benjamin Russel, “What
a Controversial Deal in El Salvador Says about China’s Bigger
Plans,” Americas Quarterly (website), April 12, 2019, https://
www.americasquarterly.org/article/what-a-controversial-deal
-in-el-salvador-says-about-chinas-bigger-plans/; and Multimedia
Desk, “China to Fund Phoenix Park Industrial Estate,” Daily
Express (website), June 20, 2018, https://trinidadexpress.com
/business/local/china-to-fund-phoenix-park-industrial-estate
/article_31be9880-7498-11e8-aa35-134f694d9978.html.
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on the Santa Cruz River in Argentina and own the
Chaglla facility in Peru.16
Chinese firms are also active in building a range
of wind and solar facilities, including the Cauchari
facility in Jujuy, Argentina, the region’s largest
photovoltaic facility, often either working with
Europe-based companies or using technology the PRC
firms originally pioneered.17
In the nuclear sector, China is supplying its
Hualong One experimental reactor to the Atucha
Nuclear Complex in Argentina and is pursuing
construction of a new reactor for the Angra Nuclear
Power Plant in Brazil.18
Examples of PRC companies investing in electricity
transmission and distribution in Latin America
include the State Grid Corporation of China, China
Three Gorges Corporation (CTG), and China Southern
16. R. Evan Ellis, “New Directions in the Deepening
of China-Argentine Engagement,” Global Americans (blog),
February 11, 2021, https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/02
/new-directions-in-the-deepening-chinese-argentine
-engagement/; and “China’s SGCC Offers to Construct
HidroAysen Power Line,” Global Transmission Report,
January 4, 2012, https://www.globaltransmission.info/archive
.php?id=10056.
17. Luis Colqui, “Jujuy. Cauchari: El parque solar
más grande de América Latina comenzó a vender energía
al país,” La Nacion (website), September 26, 2020, https://
www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/jujuy-cauchari-parque
-solar-mas-grande-america-nid2461924/.
18. Sofia Diamante, “La energía nuclear, una herencia
a resolver con China,” La Nacion (website), January 22, 2020,
https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/la-energia-nuclear
-una-herencia-a-resolver-con-china-nid2326138/; and David
Dalton, “Angra-3 / Brazil Plans to Choose Partner by End of
Year, Says Minister,” NucNet (website), August 24, 2020, https://
www.nucnet.org/news/brazil-plans-to-choose-partner-by-end
-of-year-says-minister-8-1-2020.
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Power Grid Company Limited, which have expanded
their presence in the region since 2010, investing tens
of billions of dollars there and acquiring 13 percent
of the country’s long-distance power transmission
lines.19 Chinese companies have exploited experience
with specialized technologies for high-voltage, longdistance transmission to win projects such as State
Grid’s construction of a 2,539-kilometer line from the
Belo Monte hydroelectric facility to Brazil’s population
centers in the southeast.20
Chinese companies have further expanded their
positions in energy transmission and distribution
in Peru with China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd.’s
September 2019 acquisition of Luz del Sur, valued
at approximately $3.6 billion.21 In Chile, through
the acquisition of European firms such as Transelec
S.A., Atiaia Energia S/A, Chilquinta Energia, and
Compañía General de Electricidad, PRC-based
companies have acquired control of 57 percent of
Chilean energy distribution.22
19. R. Evan Ellis, “China’s Bid to Dominate Electrical
Connectivity in the Americas,” China Brief 21, issue 10 (May 2021).
20. May Zhou, “State Grid Helps Brazil Harness Power,”
China Daily (website), November 24, 2019, https://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201911/14/WS5dcc8
604a310cf3e35577345.html.
21. BNAmericas, “China Yangtze Power Completed
Its Acquisition of Peruvian Power Company, Luz Del Sur,”
BNAmericas (website), April 24, 2020, https://www.bnamericas
.com/en/news/china-yangtze-power-completed-its-acquisition
-of-peruvian-power-company-luz-del-sur.
22. Reuters, “Regulador chileno aprueba sin condiciones
compra de eléctrica CGE por china State Grid,” Infobae,
March
31,
2021,
https://www.infobae.com/america
/agencias/2021/03/31/regulador-chileno-aprueba-sin
-condiciones-compra-de-electrica-cge-por-china-state-grid-2/;
and Ellis, “China’s Bid to Dominate.”
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Examples
of
Chinese
telecommunications
infrastructure activities in Latin America include the
supply of devices and infrastructure by Huawei and, to
a lesser extent, ZTE Corporation to the region’s major
commercial operators, including Spain’s Telefónica
S.A. Huawei and others have been key builders and
contributors of components to the region’s 3G and 4G
networks and are now positioned to play a major role
in 5G in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
and other countries.23
Companies from the PRC have also built
strategically important fiber-optic lines in Latin
America, including one connecting Europe to Brazil
across the Atlantic Ocean and through Cameroon,
Africa.24 Chinese companies have similarly constructed
the Fiber Optic Austral network in Chile, fiber-optic
cables off the coast of the Guyanas, and a network
connecting Venezuela to Jamaica and Cuba.25
23. Reuters Staff, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro to Allow China’s
Huawei in 5G Auctions: Newspaper,” Reuters (website),
January 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil
-huawei-tech-idUSKBN29L0JM; Loop News (website), “Huawei
to Be Included in Dom Rep 5G Network Auction,” Loop
News, February 15, 2021, https://www.loopjamaica.com
/content/huawei-be-included-dom-rep-5g-network-auction;
and R. Evan Ellis, Chinese Engagement in El Salvador: An Update
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 2021).
24. Jeremy Page, Kate O’Keeffe, and Rob Taylor,
“America’s Undersea Battle with China for Control of
the Global Internet Grid,” Wall Street Journal (website),
November 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes
-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet
-grid-11552407466.
25. Reuters Staff, “Venezuela, Cuba Outfox US with Fiber
Optic Cable,” Reuters (website), January 18, 2011, https://www
.reuters.com/article/cuba-internet/venezuela-cuba-outfox-u
-s-with-fiber-optic-cable-idUSN1814550420110118.
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In addition, PRC companies have been increasingly
important suppliers of smart cities, digital surveillance
and public security systems, cameras in the Colón
Free Trade Zone in Panama, and Uruguay’s border
surveillance cameras, among others. China also
leveraged coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) to
donate thermal cameras subsequently installed in
Latin American airports, government facilities, and
other strategically important and sensitive spaces.
The PRC has also been playing an increased role
in Latin America’s financial infrastructure. Such
activities have included the provision of loans that
advance Chinese work in the region and the financing
of trade and investment between Latin America
and Asia through commercial banks, such as China
Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China. These activities have also included the
backing of currency swaps, which strengthens the
international position of China’s currency vis-à-vis the
established positions of the dollar and euro.
In the arena of e-commerce, the PRC firm Alibaba
Group operates in Latin America, and the ridesharing company Didi Chuxing Technology Co. has
established itself in Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
and Panama, among others, although its progress has
been hampered by COVID-19.
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America
China’s use of soft-power tools in Latin America
provides insight into the PRC’s potential coopting
of business and political elites in Europe. The
two most important and most comparable
dimensions are the expectation of benefit and
people-to-people diplomacy.
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In the case of the former, Latin American leaders
and businesspeople invest resources and accommodate
China by accepting questionable, nontransparent loan
terms or even changing diplomatic recognition in
hopes of selling their products to the PRC, receiving
Chinese loans, or partnering with China-based
companies for local Chinese investment.26 Such
expectations sometimes have a personal dimension,
including kickbacks or partnerships for the family
or partners of the leaders involved. To avoid putting
their businesses at risk, these elites sometimes selfcensor on issues of sensitivity and importance to the
Chinese state, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet,
and Xinjian. Such currying of favor and self-restraint
undermines the articulation of the Chinese threat and
the formation of more effective strategies by Latin
American governments for obtaining the benefits they
hope to secure from China.
Examples of the PRC engaging in people-to-people
diplomacy include its establishment of 39 Confucius
Institutes and 18 Confucius Classrooms in Latin
America. These institutions identify and recruit the
small number of future Latin American elites with
sufficient aptitude and interest to learn Mandarin
Chinese successfully, bringing them to study in China
on Hanban scholarships.
Beyond scholarships for Latin American students,
the PRC also brings political party leaders and
government bureaucrats, journalists, and thinktank professors from Latin America to China on
trips sponsored through the International Liaison
26. R. Evan Ellis, “The Evolution of Chinese Soft Power in
Latin America,” in Ying Zhu et al., ed., Soft Power with Chinese
Characteristics: China’s Campaign for Hearts and Minds (Abingdon
-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2020).
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Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).27
The PRC further expands its presence through
media activities such as the purchasing of regular
supplements in Latin American newspapers—for
example, La Tercera in Chile—as well as the provision
of free China Global Television Network feeds to Latin
American television and radio.28 This propaganda is
often presented without a qualifier it is produced by
the Chinese state.
Work with and through Multilateral Institutions
China has engaged with and sometimes
participated in multilateral institutions in Latin
America to advance its strategic objectives in ways
that resemble its activities in Europe. The PRC has
chosen to use the weekly institutionalized Community
of Latin American and Caribbean States forum as
its preferred vehicle for advancing its multilateral
agenda in the region, resembling its decision to use
the similarly weekly institutionalized 16+1 format to
engage with Central and Eastern Europe.
Insights for Europe from China in Latin America
In the face of such challenges, China’s advance in
Latin America offers Europe several important lessons
for managing its own relationship with the PRC.

27. Linda Zhang and Ryan Berg, “An Overlooked Source
of Chinese Influence in Latin America,” China Brief 21, no. 3
(February 2021).
28. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Advances in Chile,” Global
Americans (blog), March 2, 2021, https://theglobalamericans
.org/2021/03/chinese-advances-in-chile/.
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Limits of Institutional Fixes
In the economic realm, Latin America offers
a cautionary tale of what can happen where
governments have less-developed tools to limit China’s
growing role in their connectivity through investment
screening. Although the PRC presently has influence
in only a limited number of Latin American ports,
electrical systems, telecommunications networks, and
financial infrastructures, this position gives its leaders
knowledge of economic leverage through, and, in
extreme circumstances, a “trojan horse” position
inside these architectures.
At the same time, China’s success in gaining a
foothold in countries like Brazil, Chile, and Colombia
shows PRC-based companies can still succeed in
countries with reasonably strong screening tools in
place. These conditions bode poorly for countries that
lack truly robust investment screening mechanisms
and engaged governmental entities and individuals.
Populism with Chinese Characteristics
Beyond strategic economic issues, Latin America
also provides Europe with useful insights into
China’s threat to the democratic order through
Beijing’s enabling of populist governance. While the
PRC may not actively seek to establish politically
subservient client states as the Soviet Union did
during the Cold War, Chinese economic support for
populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela,
decreased these countries’ dependence on Western
economic ties as authoritarian leaders consolidated
power against democratic opponents and institutions
and moved their countries away from the West.
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The resultant propagation of undemocratic
regimes working against US interests bears
uncomfortable, if imperfect, parallels with the
embrace of China by European populist regimes in
Hungary and Serbia.
Soft Power as a Muzzle
Examination of Latin America suggests, even
in nonpopulist regimes, the most significant risk
from the PRC may be the ever-strengthening web
of influence it exercises. In part, this influence
manifests itself through China having stakes in the
businesses of political leaders and other actors.
In some cases, Chinese soft power in Latin
America extends into the public discourse when
Beijing shows it has the power to truncate discussion
about the nature of the PRC challenge. In Europe,
as in Latin America, such influence may undercut
the ability of the region’s governments to diagnose
and coordinate an effective resistance to the
China challenge.

214

9. LEARNING FROM AFRICA
Chris Alden
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As with Chinese engagement in Latin America,
China’s engagement in Africa holds significance for
our understanding of the evolution of the country’s
economic statecraft, offering potential lessons
for Europe in dealing with an increasingly active
participant in the global system. Beijing’s approach to
securing African resources starting in the mid-1990s
lays out the key themes that came to characterize
its Going Global strategy, including the country’s
positioning in new markets, its view of risk, and the
ideological framing of its engagement.
Moreover, the modalities of Chinese engagement
were devised during this period in Africa, including
the use of development finance as a point of entry
into target economies, the use of Chinese loans tied to
Chinese-built infrastructure in exchange for the stable
delivery of resources, the appeal of ideas like “no
strings attached” to prospective African partners, and
the use of high-profile diplomacy.1 These modalities
were revised and adjusted over time and proved to
be successful in securing China, in a relatively short
period, a significant position in trade, resources, and
the infrastructure sector in Africa.
At the same time, Africa’s enthusiasm for China
as an alternative to Western sources only began to
temper as the longer term implications of economic
1. Xiaojun Li, “China Is Offering ‘No Strings Attached Aid’
to Africa. Here’s What That Means,” Washington Post (website),
September 27, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/china-is-offering-no-strings
-attached-aid-to-africa-heres-what-that-means/.
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dependency on Beijing became clear. And, with the
onset of the Libya Revolt of 2011, Chinese leadership
discovered instability in Africa could hold costly
ramifications for its interests abroad, producing a
recalibration of risk.
Today, levels of public protest tied to Chinese
projects in local communities are on the rise. Formal
security commitments with African partners followed
from these protests, as did deepening involvement in
multilateral peacekeeping operations involving the
deployment of a small contingent of combat-ready
Chinese troops. Even private security companies,
including newly formed Chinese security firms,
were increasingly used to protect companies and
citizens abroad.
This chapter outlines the broad parameters of
China’s evolving ties with Africa and how this
experience over time has helped to shape Chinese
policies, modalities, and instruments of engagement
with the outside world. In short, Beijing’s involvement
in a marginal region in the international economy
provided a relatively benign environment in which
Chinese enterprises, policy banks, and even diplomacy
could “learn” to operate as a global power. These
experiences have shaped, and continue to influence,
the conduct of China and its firms as it develops
policies to secure resources and markets abroad. The
chapter concludes with reflections on the lessons the
African case holds for Europe.
Unpacking China’s Engagement in Africa
Though much has been written assessing the
rationale behind China’s upsurge of interest in Africa,
at the core, several factors drove the process. In the first
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instance, the economic sources of Chinese interests
were to be found in its deepening involvement in the
international economy. Since the late 1970s, China’s
reform and opening-up policy under Deng Xiaoping
had transformed the closed socialist economy into a
top investment destination and global manufacturing
hub.2 Integration into global value chains, however,
was, still partial in 1992, and Deng’s decision to
join the World Trade Organization led to extended
negotiations that lasted over a decade and saw the
US government press for tough conditions for Chinese
membership.3 This process was accompanied by
the domestic consolidation of tens of thousands of
state-owned enterprises into a few hundred “state
champions” in key sectors like energy and mining.4
Expansion into overseas markets followed in the wake
of consolidation through the Go Out policy, which
sought to position China’s new energy and mining
giants abroad in resource markets.5 Africa’s abundant
and underused resources placed it at the forefront
of Chinese interest at the time, all the more so as
subsequent events were to demonstrate how African
elites responded positively to Chinese entreaties.
2. Jonathan Fenby, Will China Dominate the 21st Century?
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014).
3. Hongyi Harry Lai, “Behind China’s World Trade
Organisation Agreement with the US,” Third World Quarterly 22,
no. 2 (2001): 237–55.
4. WU Zengxian, “How Successful Has State-Owned
Enterprise Reform Been in China?,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 7
(1997): 1237–62.
5. Paula Bellabona and Francesca Spigarelli, “Moving
from Open Door to Go Global: China Goes on the World Stage,”
International Journal of Chinese Culture and Management 1, no. 1
(2007): 97–102.
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The Go Out policy involved two important
strands: resource seeking and market seeking. On
resources, the Chinese state had determined in the
early 1990s its existing domestic pool of energy and
mineral resources were insufficient to sustain the
double-digit growth crucial to the industrialization of
its economy. State-owned enterprises such as China
National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec were
given mandates to secure licenses in energy markets
outside China. In this context, Africa proved to be
a region underexploited by Western firms and
interested in diversifying away from reliance
on the West.
Western-imposed, internal governance-focused
conditionalities on economic activities were
particularly disliked by African governments and
viewed as brazen interference into their domestic
affairs. Finding alternatives, especially external
sources of aid and investment not adhering to these
practices, would dilute the Western stranglehold
over African governments and broaden the ambit
for action on their part. Equally important was
the market-seeking imperative, which sought to
incentivize Chinese firms to position themselves in
global markets and hone their capabilities, compete
with foreign peers for business, and learn to globalize
their brands. These objectives were to be achieved
through the Exim Bank of China and, after 2006, the
China Development Bank effectively underwriting the
expansion of Chinese firms into unfamiliar markets
abroad as part of the tied aid that accompanied largescale loans to African governments. The convergence
of China’s oversupplied domestic infrastructure sector
and the well-recognized infrastructure gaps in Africa,
which continued to rely on colonial-era transportation
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and communication, provided ideal conditions for
China to expand into the market.
This convergence led to one of the most iconic
forms of Chinese engagement in Africa—big-ticket
agreements to borrow high levels of Chinese financing
in exchange for Chinese-built infrastructure backed by
fixed commitments of African commodities. Angola’s
securing of a $4-billion concessional loan in 2004 (to
rebuild its war-battered infrastructure) in exchange
for the timely construction of roads, railways, airports,
ports, public buildings, and—in a follow-up loan—
housing came in the wake of the refusal of Western
governments to provide finance until the government
accounted for the disappearance of $1 billion in
national revenue.6 Christened “the Angola mode”
by the Exim Bank of China, this form of engagement
soon became routinized as other African governments
sought to attract the unprecedented funds available
from Beijing for infrastructure development.
Notably, the use of Chinese firms to build
infrastructure is known as “tied aid,” a procedure
considered inimical by many in the development
business to the fostering of local employment and
transferring of skills and, as a result, much reduced
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Development Assistance Committee
countries.7 The African attraction to China reached
6. Ana
Cristina
Alves
and
Sergio
Chichava,
“Neopatrimonialism and Extraversion in China’s Relations with
Angola and Mozambique: Is Beijing Making a Difference?” in
Chris Alden and Dan Large, ed., New Directions in Africa-China
Studies (London: Routledge, 2019), 250.
7. Vivian Foster et al., China’s Emerging Role in Africa: Part
of the Changing Landscape of Infrastructure Finance, Gridlines Note
no. 42 (Washington, DC: Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility, October 2008), 1–2.
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its pinnacle in Gabon, where the leadership broke
the existing resource contract for iron ore with
Brazilian
firm
Companhia
Vale
do
Rio
Doce (later renamed Vale S.A.) in 2008 and
awarded it to Chinese mining firms on the
strength of their promise to cobble together
a consortium to build a transport corridor and
port facilities (they were never built, and the
contract expired).8
Africa as an emerging global actor, therefore, came
to serve as a zone of foreign policy experimentation
for China. This experimentation enabled the Chinese
state and its economic actors in key, strategic sectors to
learn the substantive practices and risks of operating
outside the domestic environment or in the more
familiar East and Southeast Asian milieu. Learning
globalization in Africa was guided by a different
calibration of risk from that of Western actors.
For instance, when addressing the problems of
political risk, Beijing appeared to rely on building
relationships with local elites coupled with its
policy of noninterference, which, in combination,
would insulate its companies operating in an
unknown environment from all but the worst local
political machinations.
While China claims a commitment to
noninterference in the domestic affairs of other
countries, the country routinely violates this
commitment. Usually, Beijing commits a violation
on the side of the ruling regime; for example, China
might provide such a regime with tools of repression
8. Ana Cristina Alves, China and Gabon: A Growing
Resource Partnership, China in Africa Report no. 4
(Johannesburg, SA: South African Institute of International
Affairs, 2008), 1–24.
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and surveillance. The selection of Chinese firms for
China-funded projects using known factors—Chinese
labor, management, and supplies—would largely
offset performance risk that might otherwise occur
when relying on unknown local firms to deliver
Chinese-funded projects. Concerns of local corruption
would also be mitigated as disbursement of actual
funds would remain in China and not involve transfer
to African governments. And, the multimilliondollar infrastructure loans to African governments
were seen to be secure because they were backed by
agreements for the purchase of commodities at a fixed
price (meeting China’s resource security imperative).
These measures were ultimately underwritten by the
deep financial pockets of the Chinese state, providing
effective sovereign guarantee on loans.
Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil sector in
1996, abandoned by Western majors after the
ongoing civil war with the southern separatists
rendered the concession too dangerous and subject
to Western sanctions for human-rights violations,
demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to carve its own
path in Africa based on this different assessment
of risk. China National Petroleum Corporation’s
concession, held in conjunction with minority
shareholders (which included the Sudanese national
oil company, Malaysia’s Petronas, and India’s Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation), was contested by armed
insurgents. China subsequently embarked on a major
infrastructure program that included the construction
of an oil refinery and pipeline from the upstream
sources to Port Sudan as well as transportation,
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housing, and commercial buildings in Khartoum.9
For a period in the early 2000s, Sudan provided the
equivalent of 9 percent of China’s overall foreign
petroleum imports. Subsequent events showed China
National Petroleum Corporation was not selling its oil
directly to the Chinese domestic market as strict price
controls applied to imports; rather, the corporation
chose to sell oil on the spot market, where the
corporation could accrue more revenue.
Diplomacy learning experiences in Africa
involved both innovation and imitation that would
shape China’s outreach in other regions. In 2000,
the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), which was loosely based
on preexisting diplomatic arrangements, such as
the Franco-African summit and Japan’s Tokyo
International Conference on African Development
process, involved minister-level meetings every
three years between Chinese officials and their
African counterparts. Alternatively held in Beijing
and an African capital, this gathering provided an
opportunity to build elite political and commercial
networks, to develop a better understanding of
respective development concerns, and to set a mutual
agenda for action; a forum for resolving disputes
informally; and, finally, an opportunity to build
consensus on international issues.10 Most importantly,
the FOCAC set the precedent—later pursued in
9. Luke Patey, “Learning in Africa: China’s Overseas Oil
Investments in Sudan and South Sudan,” Journal of Contemporary
China 26, no. 107 (2017): 756–68.
10. Li Anshan and Liu Haifang, FOCAC Twelve Years
Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward
(Uppsala, SE: Nordic Africa Institute, 2018); and Ian Taylor,
Forum
on
China-Africa
Cooperation
(FOCAC)
(London: Routledge, 2011).
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regional forum diplomacy in other regions like
Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and the
Middle East—of excluding Western participation
and, in this way, paving the foundation for an
engagement framework unburdened by Western
norms and interests.11 This intensification of ties
through “Sino-centric” regional forums would
hold implications for the building of consensus
positions and the management of regional
and international issues in the established
multilateral organizations.
Though the economic rationale dominated the
China-Africa relationship, it alone did not fully
capture the dynamics of Chinese involvement on
the continent.12 With several African countries
still formally recognizing Taiwan in the 1990s, the
diplomatic imperative of dislodging the rebel province
meant Beijing periodically pressured governments
to switch ties. On the bilateral diplomacy front, the
singular neglect of African leaders by successive
US administrations was contrasted with the annual
tour of the continent every January by China’s foreign
minister and the regular visits by Chinese leaders.
The commensurate attention showered on African
leaders and officials when they visited China both
enhanced their status and lay the foundation for
strengthening bilateral ties.
Finally, as China expanded its involvement in
African economies, so too did its exposure to the
11. Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves, “China’s
Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World:
Socialization and the Sinophere,” Journal of Contemporary China
26, no. 103 (2017): 151–65.
12. Ian Taylor, China in Africa: Engagement and Compromise
(London: Routledge, 2006).
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vagaries of local conditions increase, including
corruption, crime, and political instability. As the
situation on the ground changed and revealed the
shortcomings in risk assessment held in Beijing, Africa
would serve as an ideal terrain for learning how
to securitize Beijing’s global reach under complex
conditions. One avenue for managing political
instability was through the UN, where China’s
position as a permanent member of the Security
Council offered it opportunities—although limited
due to the requirement of consensus among the
five permanent members—to set agendas and steer
processes that conformed to its national interests. Its
growing participation in multilateral peacekeeping
operations and antipiracy missions off coastal Africa,
however, proved to be inadequate for preserving
Chinese interests when Beijing was confronted by the
outbreak of civil war in Libya and obliged to enlarge
its role in security further.
Africa’s Scorecard on China
Assessing the first decade and a half of China’s
active economic engagement with Africa—which
could be called “the honeymoon period”—
provides a clear picture of the role of incentives and
accompanying achievements that enabled the
relationship to thrive in a relatively short time span.
China’s achievements during this period included
becoming Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner
from 2009 onwards, with two-way trade reaching
$190 billion in 2012; becoming a leading bilateral
creditor for Africa with $148 billion in loan
commitments between 2000 and 2018; and securing
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over 60 percent of all African infrastructure projects
since 2012.13
At a macroeconomic level, African development
experienced an unprecedented boom from the
largely Asian-driven commodity demand, making
discernible
development
improvements
that
created the conditions for an African middle class
to emerge from poverty and enabled even relatively
resource-poor economies like Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Senegal to grow.14 But the concerns of segments of
African society over China’s role lingered and, when
aligned with Chinese conduct as a creditor toward
African governments in recent years, contributed to a
more ambivalent assessment of the relationship.
On the positive side of the ledger were the
following.
New sources of development finance and diversifying
markets. Africa pointed to the Chinese focus on
funding construction in the neglected infrastructure
sector, which was critical to the functioning of markets
in terms of the transportation of goods and the flow of
information. Provisions for finance were remarkably
free of the constraints imposed by Western donors
and multilateral banks, though, interestingly, the
nontransparent nature of these agreements obscured
the fact loans were sometimes not concessional but,
rather, at commercial rates. Concurrently, African
13. Eleanor Albert, “Backgrounder: China in Africa,”
Council on Foreign Relations (website), July 12, 2017, https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa; and Hong Zhang,
Understanding the Structural Sources of Chinese International
Contractors’ Market Power in Africa, Policy Brief no. 56
(Washington, DC: China-Africa Research Initiative, 2021), 1.
14. African Development Bank, The Middle of the Pyramid:
Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa (Washington, DC:
China-Africa Research Initiative, 2011), 1–24.
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governments were excited about opening new
market opportunities for their resources and the
accompanying expansion of revenue. The willingness
of Chinese sources to pay well over the usual fees
and bonuses to obtain licenses, driving up the
bidding for more marginal concessions in some cases,
was welcomed.
Lack of conditionalities. The absence of
conditionalities in Chinese lending practices was
much celebrated by African governments and Beijing.
Characterized as “the Beijing Consensus,” this absence
of conditionalities was key to China’s rapid expansion
into resource and infrastructure sectors in Africa. This
stands in contrast to the Washington consensus on
the necessity of adhering to neoliberal prescriptions
on internal governance or the use of environmental
impact statements for developing countries
borrowing from Western sources. Notably, political
concessions were applied to Chinese loans—the
recognition of Beijing over Taipei—and the use of the
tied-aid principle in Chinese lending required African
governments to use Chinese firms, management,
labor, and supplies in providing services. These
issues were initially offset, however, by the speed
with which infrastructure projects were built, thus
enabling African governments to deliver tangible
outcomes to their populations in a relatively short
period. Moreover, concerns about Chinese labor
were somewhat addressed over time as African
governments increasingly imposed requirements
on projects for the use of local content. Indeed, these
big-ticket infrastructure projects often featured in the
election campaigns of African leaders seeking another
term in office.
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The appeal of China’s development model. More
generally, African governments and some policy
communities responded positively to the breaking
of the Western-led development “donor cartel” and,
in particular, China’s emphasis on social factors (for
example, public health and the environment) over
provisions for infrastructure development. Behind
this positive response was the concrete experiences
of China, which had in the lifetime of most African
politicians transformed from a poor, developing
country into an emerging power. China has followed
its own path toward integration into the global
system without compromising single-party rule,
a significant factor for many African leaders and
governing parties.
Providing recognition and respect through diplomacy.
For African leaders, to be feted by the leadership of
the world’s second-largest economy, a member of the
UN Security Council, and a growing military power
was a huge boost for prestige and international
recognition. This boost especially applied to
the governments that had run afoul of the West
and consequently needed diplomatic support to
strengthen their legitimacy. Moreover, for African
leaders unfamiliar with China, this engagement
provided the basis for strengthening bilateral ties.
On the negative side of the ledger were the
following.
Debt burdens. Though not initially acknowledged,
the rise in bilateral debt to China became a growing
problem for African governments. In part, this debt
was exacerbated by a fall in commodity prices in
2014 and the concomitant scarcity of foreign reserves
to pay off dollar-denominated debt. Though debt
forgiveness had featured as part of the bilateral
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loan packages, it was nominal and concerned small
sums accumulated during the 1980s; as African
governments were to find out, Beijing proved to be
reluctant to restructure loans. Part of this resistance is
due to an unwillingness to be seen joining a Westernled donor initiative like the Paris Club, a move that
would both tarnish China’s developing-country
credentials and restrict its ad hoc, bilateral approach
to lending. Moreover, though much is made of the
possibility of asset seizure of the kind that took place in
Sri Lanka, Chinese officials have recognized belatedly
the damage such an approach would inflict on
their image. For this reason, officials are unlikely to
pursue this option again, at least in such a blatantly
public form. Evidence from China’s bargaining with
Western-designated “pariah governments” like
Zimbabwe has illustrated one of the alternatives:
the imposition of International Monetary Fund-like
monitoring within government ministries to insure
against corruption and to facilitate loan repayment.15
Nontransparent lending practices. Examples of
Chinese nontransparent lending practices include
the provisions for large-scale loans negotiated with
China, virtually all of the agreements for which
feature nondisclosure clauses, as well as the avoidance
of collective restructuring initiatives, such as the
Paris Club.16 When parliamentary processes or other
forms of public disclosure have occurred, as was the
case with Kenya’s standard-gauge railway, the terms
15. Staff Reporter, “China Puts Screws on Zim,”
Mail & Guardian (website), January 23, 2015, https://mg.co.za
/article/2015-01-23-china-puts-screws-on-zim/.
16. Anna Gelpern et al., How China Lends: A Rare Look into
100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments, CGD Working
Paper 573 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development,
March 31, 2021), 6–9.
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have proved to be unsatisfactory and have instigated
a reworking of the agreement to allow for more
local subcontractors and suppliers.17 More generally,
this lack of transparency has fueled the suspicions
of society and translated into a conventional
anti-Chinese trope that has readily featured
in opposition politics across the continent—
ironically, potentially destabilizing China’s overall
diplomatic gains.
Economic competition. Low-cost Chinese imports
and services have created steep competition for
African firms that compete directly with Chinese
firms. Except for the cases of South African
construction, steel production, textiles, and data
services, the talk of China deindustrializing Africa
was largely overblown. Nonetheless, competition
from Chinese firms has resulted in market-share and
contract losses that have been especially unwelcome.18
In northern Nigeria, for instance, Chinese apparel
imports have gradually replaced local production by
factories, throwing thousands out of work.19 At a more
parochial yet socially significant level, the arrival of
Chinese workers in many African countries, many of
17. Oscar Meywa Otele, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative
and Intra-Regional Dynamics in Africa,” African Studies
Quarterly 19, issues 3–4 (October 2020): 53–74.
18. Richard Grabowski, “Deindustrialization in Africa,”
International Journal of African Development 3, no. 3 (Fall 2015):
51–67.
19. Mathis Agri Eneji et al., “Impact of Foreign Trade and
Investment on Nigeria’s Textile Industry: The Case of China,”
Global Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 9, issue 1 (January 2020):
1–12; and Murtala Muhammad, Mansur Ibrahim Mukhtar, and
Gold Kafilah Lola, “The Impact of Chinese Textile Imperialism
on Nigeria’s Textile Industry and Trade: 1960–2015,” Review of
African Political Economy 44, no. 154 (2017): 673–82.
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whom have opened small retail shops in urban and
rural areas, has posed direct competition for local
retailers, a situation that has sometimes spilled over
into protests.20
Poor conduct or quality delivery by Chinese firms.
The failure to incorporate an independent (or any
at all, in some instances) environmental and social
impact evaluation into Chinese-financed projects has
had a notable influence on project implementation.
So too has the weak regulatory regimes of African
countries, which have proved to be unable to
provide oversight. At the implementation level, the
conduct of Chinese firms in some instances has
violated local labor regulations, even impinging on
human rights and producing negative environmental
impacts that have affected local communities in
several documented cases. Indeed, the findings
of one study link the rise in public protests to the
number of Chinese projects set up in each area and
community.21 Concurrently, without the resources
necessary to conduct a proper review of adherence to
regulatory standards in the delivery of infrastructure
projects in the host country or of imported goods
from China, the outcome has been uneven at best.
Some spectacular construction failures—for example,
a Chinese-built hospital in Luanda that had to be
evacuated and closed after cracks were discovered in

20. Romain Dittigen, From Isolation to Integration? A Study of
Chinese Retailers in Dakar, Occasional Paper no. 57 (Johannesburg,
SA: South African Institute of International Affairs, March
2010), 1–14.
21. Franco Iacoalla et al., “Chinese Official Finance and
Political Participation in Africa,” European Economic Review 136
(July 2021): 1–2.
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its walls—have tarnished China’s image as a credible
economic partner.22
Crisis and New Realism
For China, the collapse of Libya, which forced
Beijing to evacuate its 35,000 citizens living
there, acted as a catalyst to ramping up Chinese
involvement in African security as well as a more
general review of the exposure of firms and interests
abroad.23 These events propelled China formally
into the security sector, and, at the triennial FOCAC
summit in 2012, the China-Africa Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Security was launched.
Security and defense issues became one of the five
pillars of the relationship, and intelligence sharing
and commitments to expand military training
programs featured in subsequent FOCAC action
agendas.24 In September 2015, China’s president
Xi Jinping announced a billion-dollar contribution
over 10 years to support UN peacekeeping
operations and authorized an unprecedented
contingent of combat-ready Chinese peacekeepers
22. Louise Redvers, “Safety Fears for a Chinese Built
Hospital in Angola,” BBC News (website), July 7, 2010,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/2010/07/100707
_angolahospital.shtml.
23. Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications
of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China
Brief 11, no. 4 (March 2011); and Shaio H. Zerba, “China’s
Libya Evacuation Operation: A New Diplomatic Imperative—
Overseas Citizen Protection,” Journal of Contemporary China 23,
no. 90 (2014): 1093–1112.
24. Chris Alden and Yixiao Zheng, “China’s Changing Role
in Peace and Security in Africa,” in Chris Alden et al., ed., China
and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2018), 52.
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to UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and
Mali. In addition, the same year, China finalized
long-standing discussions with the government of
Djibouti over opening its first overseas “logistics
facility” or military base.25
For Africa, the catalyst for reassessing the
relationship was found in the economic sector, not the
security sector. China’s growing economic dominance
and power on the continent had raised domestic
debates on Chinese neocolonial intentions. China’s
role as a creditor nation and, more specifically, its
conduct in this capacity as it sought to ensure African
governments met their debt obligations, continued
to stoke concerns of neocolonialism, as reflected
in private conversations and public media.26 The
launching of an ambitious infrastructure development
program on the continent by Premier Li Keqiang
in 2014 coupled with China’s much-publicized
investments in special economic zones aimed at
fostering Africa’s industrialization—a much-cherished
development ambition—was further reflected in the
FOCAC 2015 action plan.27 These initiatives, however,
were increasingly overshadowed by the harsh realities
25. Sarah Zheng, “China’s Djibouti Military Base: ‘Logistics
Facility’ or Platform for Geopolitical Ambitions Overseas?,” South
China Morning Post (website), October 1, 2017, https://www
.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113300
/chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or.
26. Mpumelelo Mkhabela, “ANC Is Selling Our Country
to China,” Sowetan Live (website), October 5, 2015,
https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2015-10-05-anc-is-selling
-our-country-to-china/.
27. Shannon Tiezzi, “In Africa, Li Keqiang Refutes
Charge of Chinese ‘Neo-Colonialism,’” Diplomat (website),
May 13, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/in-africa
-li-keqiang-refutes-charge-of-chinese-neo-colonialism/.
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of restructuring or suspending debt payments and
the impact these actions would have on the national
growth prospects of African economies, a situation
that the onset of the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic in 2020 only exacerbated.
At the same time, given all the financial difficulties
experienced in Africa, including the critical revenue
shortcomings of newly constructed railway projects
like the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and Kenya’s
standard-gauge railway, Beijing began a quiet
recalibration of risk in Africa. At the FOCAC summit
in 2018, Xi himself acknowledged too many “vanity
projects” had been supported by China and would
no longer automatically receive Chinese backing.28
Concurrently, the Chinese government instituted
changes to its lending practices to promote a
public-private partnership (PPP) model, much as
Beijing has pursued in Latin America in recent
years. Participating Chinese firms are required to
put up some of the financing to ensure their stake
in producing a better-quality project and encourage
a stronger emphasis on revenue generation after
project completion.29
Insights for Europe from China in Africa
The African experience with China holds several
lessons, but most of these lessons readily apply to other
commodity-dependent, developing economies, rather
28. Abdi Latfi Dahir, “Why 2018 Marks a Critical
Milestone in China-Africa Relations,” Quartz Africa (website),
September 10, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1384079/china-africa
-relations-make-a-crucial-turning-point-in-2018/.
29. Chris Alden and Lu Jiang, “Brave New World: Debt,
Industrialisation and Security in China-Africa Relations,”
International Affairs 95, no. 3 (May 2019): 641–57.
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than the sophisticated and diversified, industrialized
economies found in much of Europe. Nonetheless,
the African experience offers insights and lessons for
European countries in some key areas.
As in Latin America, the most noteworthy aspect of
China’s engagement in Africa is its extreme dexterity
in seeking out opportunities and repositioning itself
in response to obstacles, whether they be market
related or the result of local regulatory constraints.
Equally notable is the opportunistic character of
African governments seeking development resources
from any corner of the globe and their lack of concern
about undue Chinese influence in their economies.
Potentially strong parallels could be drawn between
African countries and less-developed Central, Eastern,
and Southern European countries. More specifically,
several applicable lessons for all of Europe emerge
from China’s experience in Africa.
Ostensibly Chinese Commercial Infrastructure Becoming
Dual-Use
Port facilities in Djibouti; currently developing
port facilities in Beira, Mozambique; and prospective
port facilities like Bagamoyo Port, Tanzania, illustrate
the range of possible projects and outcomes. The
allure of modern facilities coupled with logistics and
expanding transshipment networks, all of which are
linked to transport corridors to the interior, are the
common thread among these projects. In addition, all
of these projects represent unabashed development
gains from the African perspective. The latter applies
particularly to coestablished industrial parks and
free-trade zones, into which Chinese firms are
invited, offering new employment opportunities for
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locals, among other benefits. The potential for such
infrastructure to serve military purposes, especially if
such facilities are linked to new revenue streams for
the government when operationalized, is unlikely to
disturb most African governments.
Chinese Firms Stifling Domestic Competition
South Africa is the most diversified economy
in continental Africa and, as a result, the country
has lost market share to Chinese products through
imports (textiles, appliances, electronic goods, and
machinery) both domestically and in third-country
markets. Equally as important have been the losses
in contracts on international tenders for large-scale
infrastructure projects where Chinese firms have been
able to undercut higher-costed South African bids
and exclude the South African firms from additional
supply contracts linked to the original contract.
Some firms have sought to enter a consortium with
Chinese firms to bid for international contracts. As
Chinese dominance of infrastructure has increased,
African governments have been introducing
requirements that effectively encourage Chinese firms
to incorporate African companies into bids. Even in
the case of Chinese-financed infrastructure projects,
recipient countries have sometimes insisted deals
include clauses requiring local subcontractors and
local suppliers. For example, Kenya insisted on this
clause, but only after receiving public pressure from
parliament and business interests.
Restrictive domestic policies on the use of labor
unions have limited, at least initially, Chinese
investment into domestic markets like South Africa
and Zambia. But Chinese firms as diverse as Hisense
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Group (appliances) and BAIC Group (automotive)
have expanded previously opened factories as
they have learned how to navigate and profit in
the local market and address the issue of labor and
environmental regulatory regimes. Evidence from a
comprehensive study of African protests and Chinese
projects indicates the establishment of Chinese
projects, especially in African democracies with
relatively strong cellular networks and distribution,
is linked to the upsurge in local community protests.30
The possibility of local unrest in parts of the EU where
Chinese projects have been set up, following from
the African experience, is very real because of the
preconditions of democracy, civil society, and high
levels of cellular connectivity.
China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy as Sowing Division
With two decades behind it, the FOCAC’s
enduring success can be attributed to Beijing’s
careful, nonconfrontational diplomacy coupled with
a close reading of African priorities and practices
at the African Union (AU). Africa and China have
occasionally disagreed on policy matters. For example,
when China was involved in the Darfur conflict in the
early years of the FOCAC and the AU took a punitive
approach toward the Sudanese regime, Beijing
shifted away from the defense of Sudan toward
mediation to allow for AU (and, later, UN)
peacekeepers. The AU denied Sudan’s president,
Omar al-Bashir, the right to serve as AU president, in
accordance with the annual AU leadership rota. This
shift marked a considerable departure from Beijing’s
stated foreign policy principle of nonintervention.
30.

Iacoalla et al., “Chinese Official Finance,” 1–2.
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Had Beijing not shifted its policy stance, however,
China likely would have witnessed a major split within
its African government support. The incorporation of
the AU as a member of the FOCAC in 2018—another
sticking point for African governments Beijing had
resisted until Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017—
illustrates the tug and pull intra-African politics can
have over the relationship.
At its core, the FOCAC’s development focus is
hugely appealing to African governments. Despite
occasional and even strong differences, regional
forums are welcome because they lead to development
assistance, a showcase of diplomacy, and an
opportunity to exchange views and vet initiatives on
a wide range of topics. Beijing has been successful
in leveraging the FOCAC as an avenue for Chinese
development in Africa, leading to the unwillingmess
of African governments to critique China’s internal
affairs. This dynamic offers a cautionary tale for
China’s use of the 16+1 format and Beijing’s continuing
efforts to get 16+1 countries to undermine EU criticism
of China’s domestic human-rights policies.
Chinese Loans as a Potential Lever . . . for Europe
China’s position as a creditor holding African
debt has, more than any other factor, begun to
change the contours of the relationship in directions
that are problematic for Beijing. Simply put, the
narrative of a shared Chinese-African global identity
(as developing countries historically exploited by
Western imperialists) is unraveling as China’s conduct
in managing debt exposes African governments
to pressures to fulfill payment obligations in a
timely manner. The once-celebrated resources for
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infrastructure, predicated on a relatively high price
for commodities, has turned into a payment dilemma
for Beijing.
At the same time, nontransparent negotiated loans
have fueled speculation in Africa and elsewhere that
China is set to seize national assets as part of the
deal. Evidence culled recently in a study of
nontransparent loans demonstrated the Chinese
concerns were aimed at countering Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development and Paris
Club involvement, presumably as Beijing feared public
disclosure of nonconcessionality of terms and perhaps
even a backlash domestically from the Chinese public
already unhappy with their country’s overseas aid
policies.31 The EU, along with the United States, could
continue the policy of requiring African governments
to reveal their actual debt and accompanying
requirements to China as a price for restructuring
loans and obtaining any additional loans. Such
transparency provides the basis for comparative
assessment of the Chinese loans and their overall
impact on the national balance of payments.

31. Gelpern et al., How China Lends, 6–7, 34–37;
Chen Zhiming and Russell Smyth, Why Give It Away When
You Need It Yourself? Understanding Public Support for
Foreign Aid in China (Wollongong, AU, and Melbourne,
AU: University of Wollongong and Monash University,
October 3, 2014), 10–13; and Yun Sun, “The Domestic
Controversy over China’s Foreign Aid and the Implications
for Africa,” Brookings (blog), October 8, 2015, https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/10/08/the-domestic
-controversy-over-chinas-foreign-aid-and-the-implications
-for-africa/.
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10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Beijing employs a wide range of mechanisms to
pursue its interests in Europe. Moreover, the amount
of resources, personnel, and attention China has
devoted to Europe has increased substantially over
the past decade. The European political environment,
however, appears to be becoming increasingly
challenging for Beijing. Many Central and Eastern
European countries have soured on the perceived
promise of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
16+1 format, and European countries are becoming
more concerned about China’s predatory economic
statecraft and its attempts to acquire political influence
and more in Europe through investment.
As a result, many European countries are beginning
to implement investment review processes and to
shut down Confucius Institutes and other Chinese
influence channels. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats
in Europe are not becoming more conciliatory;
rather, they are becoming more belligerent. These
trends would seem to suggest Beijing needs to adjust
its strategy toward Europe—and, as the last two
chapters have shown, China has a track record of
adaptability in the face of geopolitical challenge. But
no indications exist as to whether China will adapt
its diplomacy in or strategy toward Europe anytime
soon, much less what form such an adjustment
would take.1
1. Ties Dams, Xiaoxue Martin, and Vera Kranenburg, ed.,
China’s Soft Power in Europe: Falling on Hard Times (Brussels:
European Think-Tank Network on China, April 2021), 10–13.
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Meanwhile, China is adapting to overcome
European defenses against predatory investment.
To
evade
investment
screening
procedures
European countries have introduced to prevent
large foreign investments and hostile takeovers in
strategic industries, China appears to be engaging in
smaller-value transactions, taking noncontrolling
stakes, and routing investments through ostensibly
more benign subsidiaries or third countries or locales.
In many cases, China is focused on deals that give
its stakeholders access to key transportation nodes,
utilities, intellectual property (IP), materials, or
know-how related to dual-use technologies that do
not necessarily have strategic importance but may
have military applications.
Across its investments in Europe, China is using
more ostensibly private sector actors, complex webs
of venture capital (VC) funds, and multilayered
transactions that obscure sources of funding and their
connections to the Chinese state. Discerning whether
China is taking a centralized or otherwise coordinated
approach or whether profit and market share are the
primary motivating factors is sometimes difficult.
Likely, given the nature of the Chinese economic
model and the ubiquitous political patronage system
at work there, both factors play important roles.
In infrastructure, Chinese stakeholders appear
to prioritize seaports; logistical distribution
hubs, such as airports, with strong linkages to
road and rail transport; and energy generation
(especially renewable energy) and distribution. For
defense-related technology, Chinese investors are
prioritizing investments in start-ups to access nascent
technology and penetrate supply chains early, before
screenings can catch formal acquisitions. Establishing
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and supporting research and development (R&D)
centers and university partnerships, which are not
typically covered by European investment screenings,
is also becoming a more common tactic for accessing
technology, IP, and talent. China continues to leverage
its control of Europe’s rare-earth element (REE)
supply chains, alongside new investments in REE
transportation infrastructure and facilities in Europe,
for political and economic coercion.
Table 10-1 provides an overview of the risk
assessments for each of the focus countries in this
study.2 This assessment is based on type and intensity
of Chinese activities in the given country, the
country’s rigor of investment regulation and
screening, and the country’s public opinion
toward China (as an indicator of whether public
policy might be accommodating toward Chinese
investment activity). The situation in some countries
represents a significant risk to both the country’s
security and to US and allied security more broadly.

2. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, Large
Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of
Its People (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 30,
2021); Adrian Brona et al., Polish Public Opinion on China in the
Age of COVID-19: Desirable Partner Versus a Source of Concern
(Bratislava, SK: Central European Institute of Asian Studies,
2021); and Richard Q. Turcsanyi and Matej Šimalčík, “Hungarian
Policy toward China Might Be Facing a Seismic Shift,” Diplomat
(website), June 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/06
/hungarian-policy-toward-china-might-be-facing-a-seismic
-shift/.

241

Table 10-1. Overview of risk assessments for each focus
country3

Overall
Risk
Assessment

Country

Belgium

High (until
proposed
law enters
into force,
then
Medium)

High

NA

NA

28/67

MediumHigh (after
proposed
screening
law enters
info force)

France

Medium

Medium

MediumHigh

Medium

29/66

Medium

Germany

Medium

Medium

High

High

21/71

MediumHigh

Greece

High

Medium

NA

High

52/42

High

Infrastructure
Risk
Assessment

Technology
Risk
Assessment

Political/
Diplomatic
Risk
Assessment

Popular
Sentiment
toward China
(Percent
Favorable/
Percent
Unfavorable)

Investment
Screening
Risk
Assessment

NA

High

25/50

MediumHigh

Medium

Medium

Medium

38/60

Medium

NA

24/72

Medium

Hungary

Medium

NA

Italy

Low

Netherlands

Low

Medium

MediumHigh

Poland

Medium

Medium

Low

NA

32/42

Medium

United
Kingdom

Low (as of
Jan. 2022)

NA

Medium

Medium

27/63

Low (as of
Jan. 2022)

3. Public opinion data in table comes from Laura Silver, Kat
Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect
the Personal Freedoms of Its People,” Pew Research Center (website),
June 30, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads
/sites/2/2021/06/PG_2021.06.30_Global-Views-China_FINAL.pdf;
AdrianBrona, Richard Q. Turcsányi, Matej Šimalčík, Kristína Kironská,
and Renáta Sedláková, “Polish Public Opinion on China in the Age of
COVID-19,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies (website), accessed
May 25, 2021, https://ceias.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/PL-poll-report
.pdf; and Richard Q. Turcsanyi and Matej Šimalčík, “Hungarian Policy toward
China Might Be Facing a Seismic Shift,” Diplomat (website), June 9, 2021,
https://thedip l omat.com/202 1/06/hungarian -p oli cy - t oward- chi na
-might-be-facing-a-seismic-shift/.
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Most
broadly,
Chinese
investment—or,
sometimes, merely the promise of investment—
continues to form a lever of influence for Beijing
in chancelleries and trade ministries across the
continent. On the other hand, the current trajectory
of more skeptical European attitudes toward China
is unlikely to change, at least in the short run. This
trend is shaped by a growing perception of China as
constituting an economic competitor and systemic
rival, disillusion with Chinese economic promises,
Chinese assertiveness abroad, concerns with the
country’s human-rights record, and a backlash against
Beijing’s behavior during the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic. This more skeptical attitude
toward China has been instrumental in driving the
debate on the need to shore up European sovereignty
through more robust trade defense mechanisms.
Nonetheless, some prominent European leaders still
cling to pragmatic engagement with Beijing on trade
issues while avoiding outright confrontation for fear
of economic retaliation. Yet, this approach appears
to be reaching its limits considering the strong recent
backlash against China’s willingness to sanction
European politicians as well as the growing pressure
from within European capitals to take a firmer stance
against Beijing’s international assertiveness.
These evolving European attitudes can in principle
provide a sound basis for stronger transatlantic
cooperation in the coming years, although they do not
necessarily mean European capitals will always align
themselves perfectly with Washington. At the same
time, China’s experience in Latin America and Africa
mean Europe and the United States should expect
an adaptive approach toward predatory economic
statecraft on the part of Beijing. The real question,
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then, is how the current political climate can translate
into redefining the European approach toward Beijing
in the coming years, including with the support,
encouragement, and assistance of the United States.
In its great-power competition with China,
Washington has a vital interest in preventing Europe
from becoming a contested space. Only with allies and
partners can the United States successfully push back
against China’s promotion of its state authoritarian
model. Moreover, US security remains intricately
tied to stability, security, and prosperity in Europe.
For all these reasons, this chapter outlines a series of
recommendations for policy makers on both sides of
the Atlantic as they seek to navigate the challenges
and threats posed by China’s statecraft.
Tighten Investment Screening Requirements
Current screening mechanisms across Europe
vary greatly in their scope, duration, and thresholds.
Although the EU has attempted to provide a set of best
practices, its efforts in this area are largely advisory
because the responsibility for investment screening
resides at the member-state level.
European governments, in coordination with
the United States and the EU, should introduce
additional, more rigorous screening mechanisms and
regulatory procedures to protect transportation and
energy infrastructure, existing indigenous innovation,
and dual-use technology from foreign malign
influence and takeovers. As China seeks smaller-value
transactions and noncontrolling ownership stakes,
current thresholds for screenings should be lowered.
Moreover, the responsibility for leading investment
screening processes should be removed from the
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realm of economy, finance, and trade ministries. These
bureaucracies tend to lack the incentives and expertise
necessary to identify and defend allied security
interests threatened by predatory Chinese statecraft
effectively. Ideally, European allies would establish
interagency panels—like the United States’ Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
mechanism or the United Kingdom’s Investment
Security Unit—that draw on expertise from across
government. Security-related agencies, such as
ministries of defense or interior, ought to lead national
security investment screening efforts in any case.
Furthermore, to address existing gaps China is
exploiting, regulatory processes should be expanded
to cover additional dual-use and commercial areas,
such as additive manufacturing (AM) and investments
in REE-related facilities and related transportation
infrastructure. Review measures should also extend
to other types of activities beyond equity investments,
such as academic and R&D partnerships.
Nevertheless, as seen in the case of Latin America,
stronger institutions and more effective bureaucratic
processes are no panacea. Only in combination
with other measures will European states effectively
protect infrastructure, dual-use technology, and
other sensitive economic sectors from predatory
Chinese behavior.
Make Investment Screening Retroactive
Investment screening tools can be very effective
in highlighting and blocking predatory economic
activity, and European governments have taken steps
in the last year or more to strengthen the screening
tools at their disposal. But many of these recent
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improvements do not permit European authorities
to reexamine investments in sensitive, dual-use
technology companies or critical infrastructure,
including investments made during the 2016–17 high
point of Chinese activity.
Making screening mechanisms retroactive—as is
the case in the United Kingdom under the terms of
the recently enacted National Security and Investment
Act 2021—would allow European governments
to retroactively assess Chinese investments that
government authorities are not initially notified of but
are later determined to place national security at risk.
In the United Kingdom, officials in charge
of investment screening can review completed
transactions that the government was not previously
notified of for up to six months from the date on which
the government became aware of the transaction. The
government has this authority for up to five years
from the date of the transaction’s completion.4
Screen Some Investments, Regardless of Nationality
Even though European investment screening
mechanisms have improved to some extent,
determined entities can still skirt them. One way
of skirting these mechanisms is to mask ownership
using subsidiaries based in the EU, which can help
non-European entities such as those from China
evade scrutiny.
To prevent this evasion, European investment
screening processes should be applied to all
4. Bernardine Adkins and Claire Bradwell, “The UK’s
Investment Screening Regime Is Coming—What Should
Businesses Be Doing Now?,” Gowling WLG (website),
March 8, 2021, https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources
/articles/2021/uk-investment-screening-regime/.
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investments, whether from within the EU or not,
in a limited set of industries or sectors. These most
critical industries or sectors should include, but not
be limited to, seaports, airports, telecommunications
infrastructure and services, utilities, artificial
intelligence (AI), quantum information technology (IT),
semiconductors, space and space-enabled capabilities,
AM, robotics, and unmanned and autonomous
systems. Tightening investment screening procedures
in these sectors to avoid reference to nationality would
enable European countries to catch companies that
are using third-party, offshore fronts, including in the
overseas territories of European countries.
Leverage NATO
The primary transatlantic forum for security
collaboration and cooperation, NATO, has finally
taken notice of China. The June 2021 NATO summit
in Brussels was the first meeting of alliance heads
of state and government to address China in a
significant way, building on initial efforts at the
December 2019 summit.5 Although engaging China
through the alliance remains contentious among
allies, NATO can and should act as the geostrategic
policy forum that aligns transatlantic objectives that
address the impact of Chinese economic statecraft on
common security interests in Europe. Although the
5. David M. Herszenhorn and Rym Momtaz, “NATO
Leaders See Rising Threats from China, but Not Eye to Eye with
Each Other,” Politico (website), June 14, 2021, https://www
.politico.eu/article/nato-leaders-see-rising-threats-from-china
-but-not-eye-to-eye-with-each-other/; and Jens Ringsmose and
Sten Rynning, “China Brought NATO Closer Together,” War on
the Rocks (website), February 5, 2020, https://warontherocks
.com/2020/02/china-brought-nato-closer-together/.
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EU currently has a more expansive toolbox to deal
with China’s influence in Europe, only a transatlantic
approach will be sufficient to protect vital Western
interests. Under the auspices of article 2 (on economic
cooperation) and article 4 (on security consultations)
of the North Atlantic Treaty, allies can build a
common transatlantic strategy toward China, identify
the risks posed by Beijing’s exercising of its economic
statecraft, and share intelligence on the same.6
Second, NATO has the logistical knowledge and
planning skills to help to identify assets that might
be important for operations in or through Europe.
The alliance also has defense capability insights,
science cooperation networks, and defense investment
expertise that could help to highlight risks in
dual-use technology that are relevant to the military.
Additionally, NATO’s recently established Joint
Support and Enabling Command, based in Germany,
could help to identify the infrastructure necessary
for reinforcement and sustainment in Europe. An
enablement study is underway within the alliance that
could help NATO develop a more coherent approach
in this area. Ultimately, the Joint Support and Enabling
Command could have the expertise to identify critical
infrastructure necessary for sustainment and enabling
operations; the new command has indeed examined
critical infrastructure from a broad perspective in
6. Ian Brzezinski, “NATO’s Role in a Transatlantic
Strategy on China,” New Atlanticist (blog), June 1, 2020, https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/natos-role
-in-a-transatlantic-strategy-on-china/; and Bloomberg, “China
Muscles onto NATO’s Turf, Roiling Alliance Frayed by Trump,”
BloombergQuint (website), August 4, 2020, https://www
.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/china-s-expanding
-footprint-roils-a-nato-reluctant-for-showdown.
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Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.7
Presently, the authority to coordinate with allies
on critical infrastructure is at the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe/Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe level.8 At some future point, however,
Joint Support and Enabling Command could receive
the authority to engage directly with individual allies
and their military logistics experts.
Third, NATO can help to align policies by
facilitating the exchange of information and
promulgating
best
practices
for
legislation,
regulations, and organizational procedures, especially
for European allies that are not part of the EU. These
activities can be accomplished through routine North
Atlantic Council meetings, under the auspices of
NATO’s recently revived economic analysis capacity,
or through relevant NATO Centres of Excellence that
focus on logistics or energy security.9
Offer Liquidity Alternatives
The EU’s effort to provide liquidity in the face of
the pandemic-induced recession is a welcome and
marked shift in its policy response, relative to the
economic crises of a decade ago. Mutualized debt
and other assistance should go far in filling liquidity
gaps. But the United States can assist more as well.
Specifically, Washington could more aggressively
employ the US International Development Finance
7. Civilian official at NATO’s Joint Sustainment and
Enabling Command, interview by the author, March 19, 2021.
8. US officer assigned to NATO’s Joint Sustainment and
Enabling Command, interview by the author, February 22, 2021.
9. “Economic Analysis at NATO,” NATO (website),
updated November 25, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/topics_76400.htm.
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Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank of the
United States as lenders of last resort for distressed
state-owned assets in Europe.
The DFC has traditionally been used to provide
debt financing, equity investment, and other forms of
advice and assistance to less economically advanced
countries. But several European countries are eligible
for assistance, including Greece, Portugal, the
Baltic states, and several other Central and Eastern
European allies and partners. Moreover, the European
Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019
granted the DFC the authority to work in Europe on
energy and energy-related investments, regardless of
a country’s income status.10 Finally, the corporation
could collaborate with the development finance
institutions of wealthier European countries to address
liquidity gaps in middle-income European countries,
such as those mentioned above.11
The export-import bank facilitates the export of
American goods and services by providing financing
to US companies when private sector lenders are
unable or unwilling to do so. Washington could
leverage the export-import bank to encourage
or incentivize US firms to purchase or invest in
European assets. Although the export-import bank
and the DFC may require additional staffing capacity
and expertise to accomplish the goal set out here,
both could prove useful in helping state-run,
indebted facilities. Moreover, these institutions could
10. “Where We Work,” International Development
Finance Corporation (website), n.d., https://www.dfc.gov
/what-we-offer/eligibility/where-we-work.
11. Conor M. Savoy, Paddy Carter, and Alberto Lemma,
Development Finance Institutions Come of Age: Policy Engagement,
Impact, and New Directions (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, October 2016), 22–23.

250

be particularly helpful to European partners that have
fewer options. Beijing is likely to step in in areas with
less resistance, so helping these two US entities to do
more with other countries in Europe would provide
an alternative to Chinese solutions.
Magnify China’s Shortcomings through Public Diplomacy
Europeans are already becoming increasingly
concerned about the inability or unwillingness of
Beijing to deliver on its commitments. Washington
should showcase the widening gap between Chinese
promises and the reality on the ground. For example,
in the Czech Republic, the Czech president said
Chinese investment has not panned out as Prague
had hoped, and China has not delivered to the extent
Chinese investment had promised. According to one
US official, billions of dollars in promised investment
have not materialized.12
Similarly, Italy has not seen its involvement in
China’s BRI pay off. Even though Italy is the only
Group of Seven country to sign onto the BRI, Rome
has yet to see any increases in market share in China
for its exports.13
Showcasing China’s failure to live up to its promises
as well as its diplomatic missteps and its efforts to
spread corruption would strengthen the arguments
of bureaucratic and political actors in European
states who are interested in reducing Beijing’s
influence. Evidence from Latin America and Africa
points to the necessity of pushing back aggressively
12. US civilian official assigned to the US embassy in
Prague, interview by the author, October 6, 2020.
13. US military official assigned to the US embassy in
Rome, interview by the author, October 8, 2020.
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on Beijing in this way, lest a creeping self-censorship
take hold in Europe’s public discourse.
From a multilateral perspective, pointing out
China’s propensity to overpromise and underdeliver
may also help to undermine Beijing’s use of regional
formats: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States, and the 16+1 format. As seen in
Latin America, Africa, and now Europe, Beijing’s
use of such forums can undermine US leverage
by causing countries in these regions to peel away
from Washington.
Ensure Contingency Access to Infrastructure
American officials across Europe should revisit
all military and defense cooperation agreements
between the US military and European allies and
partners to ensure US and NATO priority access
to infrastructure during crises. In recent years, the
Department of Defense has begun addressing this
topic in new military construction projects overseas,
requiring agreements pertaining to these facilities
to have a clear statement ensuring US operational
access. Nonetheless, a lack of consistency among these
agreements across Europe remains—particularly, the
agreements governing older facilities. For example, to
access the Greek port in Alexandroupoli, American
officials can make a request for in extremis access
with as little as 48 hours’ notice. Similarly, Belgian
government officials have told their US and allied
counterparts if Chinese ownership of the terminal
at Zeebrugge presented a serious security issue
during a crisis or otherwise, Brussels would simply
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nationalize the facility.14 In contrast, though, the
military cooperation agreement between the United
States and the Czech Republic—an important transit
country between southeastern Germany, where many
US troops are forward stationed, and Poland—does
not address this issue whatsoever.
Additionally, American officials should encourage
European officials to ensure any agreements
regarding foreign investment in infrastructure include
provisions for nationalization in the event of a
national security crisis. Such provisions exist
currently regarding China Ocean Shipping Company,
Limited’s (COSCO’s) concession to operate the Greek
port of Piraeus. These caveats are vital to protect
European and US security in the event of a national
security emergency.
Mandate Transparency
As seen in both Africa and Latin America,
less-than-transparent financing agreements offered
by China often obscure concessionary loan rates’
complete lack of transparency. Furthermore,
classifying Chinese loan terms that would otherwise
be available to public scrutiny can mask kickbacks
and payoffs, helping some corrupt regimes promote
their own longevity.
The EU should require its member states to
publicize the financing terms for any projects in key
critical infrastructure and related sectors. These
terms might include energy and other utilities,
transportation, logistics, and IT networks. Requiring
14. US military officer assigned to the US military
delegation to the NATO Military Committee, interview by the
author, December 14, 2020.
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this disclosure would help to shed needed light on
China’s predatory statecraft, level the playing field for
non-Chinese lenders and financing mechanisms, and
promote an informed public.
Apply a National Security Lens to Advanced
Technologies Now
Work on 6G, the successor telecommunications
technology to today’s still unfolding 5G, has already
begun within private industry.15 In the case of 5G,
US government officials did not begin to understand
the extent of the security risks posed by 5G equipment
originating from China fully until after the rollout
of the technology. This delayed recognition led to a
painful diplomatic process of trying to convince allies
to abandon Chinese 5G equipment. Similarly, the
EU has recently begun drafting a law on the
appropriate use of AI, with an eye toward limiting
human-rights abuses by law enforcement and other
government agencies.16 But this technology is already
in use across Europe, from metro stations to grocery
stores, and trying to backfit any new laws onto existing
practices may prove challenging.
Rather than waiting until 6G and other advanced
technologies are fielded, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of State,
the National Security Council, and potentially others
should become engaged in technology-related
15. Laurens Cerulus and John Hendel, “Hologram Wars:
The Race to 6G,” Politico (website), April 11, 2021, https://www
.politico.eu/article/6g-race-eu-united-states-china/.
16. Melissa Heikkilä, “Cities Want to Make AI Rules
Too,” Politico (website), June 28, 2021, https://www.politico.eu
/article/cities-ai-rules-eu/.
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discussions and standard setting now. Engaging
in interagency and intra-alliance discussions on
standards for 6G and other advanced technologies
now will make it far more likely the efforts of the
United States and its allies to reduce China’s role in
implementation will be coordinated. The relatively
new US-EU Trade and Technology Council could play
an important role here.
Increase Staffing at US Embassies
The national security challenge China poses is
not simply a function of its willingness to violate
international law and norms; rather, this challenge
also stems from the scale of the threat from Beijing.
To counter this threat in Europe and elsewhere,
US embassies need significantly more Foreign Service
officers and other US government officials. Increased
personnel resources would help to enable embassy
efforts more effectively in two areas.
First, additional US embassy personnel devoted to
countering Chinese influence could facilitate pushing
back on planned Chinese investments in Europe
earlier and more aggressively. Evidence indicates
pressure from US officials has helped to dissuade
European officials from permitting Chinese entities
to invest in European infrastructure. For example,
when a Chinese entity expressed interest in investing
in the port of Gdansk, US officials relayed concerns to
counterparts in Warsaw. Though ascribing causality
to this interaction is difficult, Poland ultimately turned
down the Chinese effort.17
17. US official assigned to the US embassy in Warsaw,
interview by the author, February 11, 2021.
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Second, additional personnel resources at US
embassies would enable more counterprogramming
in response to Chinese propaganda and outreach.
At present, the sheer volume of Chinese activity in
European countries means most US Foreign Service
officers spend most of their time simply trying
to keep up with the reporting requirements and
drafting cable traffic for Washington and others.
These efforts usually result in thorough reporting,
but they also result in diminished programmatic
pushback and information operations.
The current approach of assigning regional
China watchers to a limited set of US embassies is
inadequate because the watchers cannot cover all
of this territory, literally or figuratively. Instead, the
State Department should assign at least one (and
possibly more) China watcher to every embassy in
Europe, and these personnel should have language
skills in both Mandarin and the language of their
country assignment.
The State Department’s acquisition of the
fiscal resources and development of the personnel
resources necessary to achieve these goals will take
time. In the meantime, a short-term or interim step
could be to implement a China working group at
each US embassy in Europe, as already exists in
some locations, such as Paris and the US Mission to
the International Organizations in Vienna, and much
like the working groups that already exist, such as
those on the rule of law and counterterrorism. This
strategy could at least better synchronize the efforts
of the many US government agencies working at
the country-team level on Chinese efforts and
influence in host nations. Additionally, American
embassy officials could develop similar working
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groups among counterparts from other allied
embassies to share information and synchronize
responses, as is the case for crisis response situations.
Complicate NATO Exercises
In the event of a crisis in European security,
European infrastructure will be put to the test.
Described by one expert as “in the autumn of its
lifespan,” most European infrastructure would
struggle to handle the extreme demands of a
major crisis.18 Such a situation would likely entail
US, British, and Canadian military forces as well as
humanitarian relief organizations trying to get into
Europe; other continental allies trying to get their
forces and equipment across Europe; and refugees
and commercial interests flowing in the opposite
direction. Layered on top of this flurry of activity
would be complications arising from Chinese
operations or overwatch of several parts of the
infrastructure network necessary to make all of the
movements into, across, and out of Europe. Such a
situation would be extremely chaotic.
To reduce the chaos and identify the most
vulnerable elements of the infrastructure network,
NATO should exercise infrastructure use in the
context of a major contingency crisis. Conducting
such exercises would enable NATO to simulate what
would happen if military, commercial, humanitarian,
and refugee demand for access to European lines of
communication were to increase substantially in the
context of potentially compromised infrastructure.
18. US officer assigned to NATO’s Joint Sustainment and
Enabling Command, interview by the author, February 22, 2021.
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Forces from the United States and NATO allies
conducted a similar exercise in recent years: the Joint
European Time-Phased Force Flow and Sustainment
rehearsal of concept.19 This effort should be expanded
into an exercise that includes nongovernmental
aid organizations as well as relevant commercial
entities, and it should better reflect the real
world through consideration of China’s role in
European infrastructure.
Enhance Shared Understanding
In some cases, national or intergovernmental
institutions in Europe are not motivated by the same
incentives because they lack a shared understanding
of the security environment. This lack of
understanding can create vulnerabilities for Chinese
entities to exploit. For example, in November 2020,
Albania launched a tender for the construction of
a 100-megawatt solar power plant in Durrës in the
western-central part of the country. The second
of two short-listed bidders was China-based
Universal Energy Co., Ltd., a company with clear
ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The
Albanian government has concerns about Chinese
investment in critical infrastructure, but European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development rules did
not allow Tirana to place restrictions on the tender.
Because Albanian officials could not afford to ignore
the wishes of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, which was supporting the
19. United States European Command, JETS ROC Drill
(Stuttgart, DE: United States European Command, 2019),
YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fdmxsp
RKR94.
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tender with technical assistance, the Chinese bid
was permitted.20
Ultimately, the other short-listed bidder won
the tender thanks to a lower-priced offering. But
this example shows the potential problems that
can result from European entities at the state or
intergovernmental levels not being motivated by the
same incentives. These incentives can be shaped in
part by increasing access to the same scope and scale
of information on Chinese statecraft.
The EU and NATO can help to facilitate a more
concerted multinational effort to illuminate supply
chains and financing sources in infrastructure,
dual-use technology, and raw materials industries.
These efforts could be facilitated through a dedicated
workstream within NATO’s Joint Intelligence and
Security Division or the EU’s Hybrid Fusion Cell.
Relatedly, the United States, which arguably has
the most rigorous apparatus for examining these
vulnerabilities, should further amplify the outcomes
of its investigations of the companies of foreign
countries and adversaries by downgrading this
information to the lowest classification level
possible. This measure would make this information
more widely releasable to NATO allies and other
European nations facing similar risks.

20. Axel Reiserer, “EBRD-Supported Tender in Albania
Delivers Competitive Price for Solar Power,” European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (website), March 30, 2021,
https://www.ebrd.com/news/2021/ebrdsupported-tender-in
-albania-delivers-competitive-price-for-solar-power.html.
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Provide Alternatives and Promote More
Domestic Innovation
One of the major obstacles to Europe’s ability
and willingness to restrict Chinese technology
and infrastructure investment has been the lack
of available alternatives. In the technology sector,
leveraging the collective power, common funding,
and budgetary incentives of the EU and NATO,
member governments should provide more start-up
funds and accelerators that are accessible only to
companies in EU and NATO countries to promote
indigenous innovation and R&D in dual-use
technology. Though these initiatives may not provide
long-term solutions for competing with VC funding
from abroad, they can make an important impact if
orchestrated collectively.
In the infrastructure sector, although the United
States is home to two private port operations
companies, neither is very active internationally.
Moreover, the United States lacks major shipping
companies; meanwhile, of the world’s top 20 largest
shipping companies, four are Chinese. Europe has
some major players in these sectors, including APM
Terminals (Netherlands), Maersk (Denmark), and
Eurogate Terminals (Germany).
Additionally, allied governments and NATO
should increase efforts to seed their domestic
dual-use and defense technology markets. This
effort should involve connecting to the private sector
early and often; clearly communicating capability
priorities and requirements; and providing accessible
opportunities for industry, including nontraditional
companies, to readily sell into the alliance. Too often,
national and international defense establishments
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do not provide discernable paths to revenue for
dual-use technology companies and start-ups, offering
unattractive or unfeasible project timelines and
forcing them to pursue alternative or foreign funding.
To remedy this problem, allied countries should
look to the Department of Defense, which has
succeeded in attracting start-ups and nontraditional
companies to its ecosystem through rapid awards,
proof-of-concept contracts, and matching VC funds
for start-ups.
To offset China’s domination of critical minerals
and raw material supply chains, the EU should
establish a European joint investment fund to secure
alternative sources of REEs and develop indigenous
abilities to refine and process REEs. European leaders
should also explore the potential for Europe to engage
in the early stages of REE supply chains through
the continent’s primary resources (for example,
metallogenic belts). All of these efforts should be
coordinated with the US government—especially,
considering the Biden administration’s renewed push
to develop secure and independent REE supply chains.
Routinize US-EU Coordination and Cooperation
Washington and Brussels have much room for
improvement in transatlantic coordination on fending
off China’s predatory economic statecraft. In particular,
the United States and the EU should look to bolster
transatlantic dialogue, leverage and synchronize the
soft power and regulatory power of both parties,
engage in more joint planning sessions, and share
strategic assessments about the implications of China’s
investment activity and other economic statecraft. The
newly reenergized, high-level US-EU Dialogue on
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China could provide one potentially useful avenue
for discussing policy approaches between Brussels
and Washington on a range of different issues. These
discussions could address the alignment of foreign
investment screening and technology export control
regulations, the curbing of Chinese subsidies and
theft of IP, pushing back against economic coercion,
the diversification of supply chains, holding China
accountable for its human-rights violations, and the
coordination of a response to malign Chinese influence
in international organizations. The trick would be for
this new format to meet on a regular basis and at a
sufficiently senior level.
In addition to engaging with Brussels, the United
States should also use its bilateral relationships with
individual European capitals and regional formats
with groups of countries to carry out strategic
conversations about China. For instance, as countries
in Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more
skeptical of China, platforms like the Visegrad Group
and the Bucharest Nine could be particularly useful for
US officials to emulate. Similarly, the EU three group
of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom could
be another helpful grouping for the United States to
engage in on strategic issues pertaining to China as
part of a reenergized, transatlantic Quad format.
Besides meetings at the leadership level, more
frequent and extensive transatlantic policy planning
sessions devoted to China andgreat-power competition
are necessary to share strategic assessments and
outlooks. The challenges China poses to Europe
and the United States are becoming increasingly
complex, difficult, and parallel. Only through careful
coordination can the two partners effectively counter
these challenges.
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